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Thesis Summary  
 
 Contrary to the long-received theory of FDI, interest rates or rates of return 
can motivate foreign direct investment (FDI) in concert with the benefits of direct 
ownership.  Thus, access to investor capital and capital markets is a vital 
component of the multinational’s competitive market structure.  Moreover, 
multinationals can use their superior financial capacity as a competitive advantage 
in exploiting FDI opportunities in dynamic markets.  They can also mitigate higher 
levels of foreign business risks under dynamic conditions by shifting more financial 
risk to creditors in the host economy.  Furthermore, the investor’s expectation of 
foreign business risk necessarily commands a risk premium for exposing their 
equity to foreign market risk.  Multinationals can modify the profit maximization 
strategy of their foreign subsidiaries to maximize growth or profits to generate this 
risk premium. In this context, we investigate how foreign subsidiaries manage their 
capital funding, business risk, and profit strategies with a diverse sample of 8,000 
matched parents and foreign subsidiary accounts from multiple industries in 38 
countries.  
  
 We find that interest rates, asset prices, and expectations in capital markets 
have a significant effect on the capital movements of foreign subsidiaries.  We also 
find that foreign subsidiaries mitigate their exposure to foreign business risk by 
modifying their capital structure and debt maturity.  Further, we show how the 
operating strategy of foreign subsidiaries affects their preference for growth or 
profit maximization.  We further show that superior shareholder value, which is a 
vital link for access to capital for funding foreign expansion in open market 
economies, is achieved through maintaining stability in the rate of growth and good 
asset utilization. 
  
Keywords:  Foreign Direct Investment, Capital Markets, Profit Theory,  
                   Investment Theory, International Trade.  
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CHAPTER ONE  INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis seeks to build on the traditional theories of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) through the investigation of contemporary challenges in the 
international business environment through empirical testing and analysis of 
economic and financial models.  We demonstrate that capital markets are a 
functioning component of the multinational firm’s market structure.  As a component 
of the firm’s market structure, capital markets both internal and external affect the 
focus and scope of operating strategies.  This in turn has an impact on the investment 
policies of foreign direct investments including their capitalization, capital structure, 
and their profit maximization strategy.  The long-standing emphasis on FDI as a 
measure of national economic activity and international vehicle to exploit cross-
border strategic advantages should also consider the effects of the underlying 
financial motives of FDI.  These financial motives link the socio-economic 
performance of FDI with the volatility and risk in global financial markets.  This 
linkage is important to the development of economic policy and efficient managerial 
practice.  In this context, the capital movements to FDI are an important link in 
explaining the future trends of financial market integration and the globalization of 
world trade.  We seek to expand the research literature by developing the underlying 
financial principals that motivate FDI as a foreign investment strategy.  
 
 In this thesis, we apply the principles and methods of financial economics to 
three research problems in international business (IB).  Financial economics is a 
specialized area of research in applied economics which focuses on the firm-level 
financial determinants of economic performance including: (a) investment under 
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uncertainty; (b) asset pricing; (c) the modeling of corporate financial systems; and in 
particular, (d) the funding of major capital investment projects (Jones, 2008).  
Specifically, we explore the funding, risk mitigation and profit strategies of foreign 
subsidiaries of multinationals as the primary channels of international foreign 
investment.   
Organization of Thesis 
 
 
 We begin the thesis by framing the basic research agenda and the 
contemporary challenges in the global economic environment that motivated this 
research.  The central arguments that underpin the empirical analysis follow, along 
with a review of the policy motives for the research.  This is followed by a general 
literature review that is intended to provide a historical context and critique of the 
basic theories of foreign direct investment and general determinants of FDI as they 
apply to the three empirical chapters.  A general overview of the econometric 
approach is presented together with the data collection methods and description of the 
data set.  Finally, we have the three empirical research chapters, each with its own 
concluding remarks and summarization of the chapter findings.  The tables, figures 
and research questions of each chapter are labeled with the system “1-1” or Table 1 
of Chapter One, etc. 
  
The three empirical chapters each address a different research problem in 
international business and include a chapter-specific literature review following the 
chapter introduction.  Each chapter has a distinct data set that is taken from the same 
master data set.  In addition, we summarize each chapter’s results with suggestions 
for future research on the chapter’s specific results.  The thesis conclusion restates 
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the chapter findings but also integrates the results in more comprehensive support of 
the central arguments.  This is followed by a discussion that includes a subjective 
opinion about the motives of the research and its future policy implications.    
  
Research Agenda 
 
 Kindleberger records over 38 market bubbles and asset price crashes between 
1618 and 1998, or a recurring financial market crises about every 10 years 
(Kindleberger, 2000).   In the last several financial markets crashes, FDI capital flows 
have declined and recovered with the overall value of world financial markets that 
points to a linkage between FDI and market rates (i.e., the price of shares of publicly 
traded firms based on the value of the operating assets).  In the research literature, we 
typically see FDI as a phenomenon of national economic activity with its linkage to 
domestic policy development and international trade.  However, FDI is also like any 
other type of major capital investment that is linked with business cycles, arbitrage 
mechanisms, interest rates, and expectations on future growth and other factors more 
exclusively associated with financial assets.  In fact, over 30% of world trade is 
comprised of the commercial trade movements (i.e., the purchase and exchange of 
goods and services) between foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations.  FDI 
as a driver of international trade and economic growth is linked with the 
internationalization of financial markets, and the export and allocation of national 
domestic assets and productive resources in foreign markets.  Moreover, developing 
the linkages between capital markets and FDI will support future research of 
spillovers or externalities that FDI has on emerging host economies where the current 
literature is inconclusive. 
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The multinational enterprise (MNE) has been the steady topic of economic 
inquiry since the early 1950’s with the post-war expansion of US firms in the UK and 
Europe.  There is a general understanding on the strong link between the 
multinational’s foreign investments and FDI, but this relationship is not extensively 
researched at the firm level.  We know that overall, multinationals are the main 
drivers of FDI capital flows (i.e., the flow of capital between parents and their 
foreign affiliates or between the foreign affiliates themselves).  For example, a 2005 
study shows that 100 of the largest multinationals comprise 12% of the world’s total 
foreign owned assets.  Moreover, multinationals account for over two-thirds of world 
exports, and over one-third of that trade is between the foreign subsidiaries 
themselves (UNCTAD, 2009).  If we consider the trade between foreign subsidiaries 
themselves comprised almost 30% of the world trade in 2010, then we should 
expect that the parallel capital flows amongst parents and foreign subsidiaries also 
form a vital link in maintaining global economic stability. 
 
Of the world’s 100 largest economies, 51 are corporations and 49 are 
countries (Cohen, 2007).  In fact, capital flows to FDI in 2010 are estimated to be 
almost $1.4T, and the sales (i.e., the trade flows) of foreign subsidiaries will 
approach 50% of world total GDP.  Moreover, as multinationals account for the 
largest single factor in international trade, they are vital to the financial stability of 
world capital markets.  For example, following the global financial crisis of 2008/9, a 
majority of multinationals reported that they intended to reduce their FDI to levels 
prior to 2008 (UNCTAD, 2009).  Yet, in spite of 50 years of IB research, we have 
only a handful of studies that stress the financial motives and financial risks 
underlying the capital funding of the FDI process.  This thesis will close part of the 
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gap in the research literature by moving beyond FDI as a measure of national or 
industrial economic activity towards the identification of the important financial 
motives and determinants that drive FDI as a critical foreign investment activity of 
the multinational.  
 
We also address a current issue in international business (IB) research by 
extending its agenda to integrate other topics more common to financial economics.  
Buckley commented that the IB research agenda is “running out of steam” in that it 
has successfully explained FDI flows, the strategy of the multinational and the 
explanation of the process of internalization in the global environment (Buckley, 
2002).  One of the new (IB) research agendas that Buckley suggests is to understand 
the challenges to global capitalism.  The financial successes and failures of the large 
and visible multinational has arguably become a highly identifiable symbol of global 
capitalism.  This research provides a closer examination of the investment policies 
and profit maximizing strategies that foreign subsidiaries employ and will help to 
explain how FDI will be linked with the evolution of free market and state capitalism.    
 
While it has been argued that international business research has 
successfully explained many of the central problems in international business, it is 
not clear that all the determinants of FDI have really been fully explained or even 
identified.  In the paper, “Is the international business research agenda running out 
of steam?,” Buckley points to a general trend toward rehashing the same few 
questions in explaining FDI flows and determinants of FDI (Buckley, 2002).  In 
contrast, we show that FDI capital flows that are linked with global assets prices 
and returns and growth expectations would not be generally predicted by the direct 
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investment and internalization theories, but flow in concert with interest rates and 
price expectations in contrast to the theories of direct ownership control.  This 
challenges the assertion that FDI flows and motives have been successfully 
explained.  A similar challenge arises in “The new theory of foreign direct 
investment: merging trade and capital flows,” where the argument is forwarded that 
a general model of FDI is emerging from the various research streams with the 
exception of the effect of the sources of financing on FDI  (Russ, 2009).   
 
The Central Arguments   
 
 
 The strategy-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm within the industrial 
organization tradition says the firm’s market structure has a strong influence on its 
conduct (e.g., its investment, profit, or risk strategies), which in turn determines its 
performance (Porter, 1981).   The three central arguments of this thesis each touch on 
a different aspect of the SCP paradigm.  In Chapter Four, we will show that the firm’s 
relationship with its capital markets which is its main source of investment capital are 
as fundamental to its conduct (i.e., its investment strategy) as some of the other 
traditional elements in the firm’s market structure such as the concentration of 
competitors.  In Chapters Five and Six, we will show that the multinational firm’s 
conduct (i.e., its risk mitigation and profit strategies respectively) are also linked with 
its relationship with capital markets and other factors in its market structure.  The 
three central arguments are developed in three empirical chapters.  
 
(a) Capital markets (i.e., the external financial markets where firms raise 
capital funds for investment), are part of the firm’s market structure and 
affects its investment strategy (i.e., how it will invest in foreign assets). 
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(b)  Risk and uncertainty in the business environment of foreign subsidiaries 
can be mitigated by shifting financial risk to creditors in the host market by 
adjusting the level and maturity of its debt structure. 
 
(c)  The risk premium that is demanded by investors for investment of their 
equity in foreign market risk affects the form of the profit maximization 
strategy chosen by the parent on behalf of the shareholder for its foreign 
subsidiaries and based on the firm-level risk factors in the host environment.   
 
 
These three arguments also correspond to three major topics in financial 
economics:  (a) the funding of investment, (b) investment under risk, and (c) the 
impact of uncertainty on asset pricing.  Moreover, our three topics in financial 
economics also correspond to the three basic principles of financial management 
theory which are: (a) the funding of capital requirements for operating needs and 
growth, (b) the management of the value generating process with its attendant risks, 
and (c) the creation of shareholder value (Brigham & Erhardt, 2002).   We apply 
these principals to a different research problem in international business. 
 
In Chapter Four, we examine the link between market valuation levels and 
capital funding of FDI.  In this study, we investigate how external market prices, 
expectations of growth and interest rates drive capital flows to foreign subsidiaries 
(FDI).  The firm’s financial capital and net worth are substantial cofactors in the 
capacity for foreign subsidiaries to capitalize their growth and increases the 
likelihood that multinational firms can successfully exploit their internal strategic 
advantages in foreign markets.  We also distinguish between capital flows to FDI 
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and capital investments which are critical to linking FDI with capital markets.  We 
demonstrate that asset prices, the future expectation of growth, and the firm’s 
financial strength have a significant relationship with capital movements in foreign 
subsidiaries.    
 
In Chapter Five, we examine the linkage between the foreign affiliate’s 
operating strategy and its capital structure.  Explaining this linkage is important to 
understanding how foreign risk is mitigated through the foreign subsidiary’s capital 
structure where financial risk is shared with host creditors.  By using higher levels 
of debt and more short-term debt, foreign subsidiaries can reduce the shareholder’s 
financial risk, and improve the returns necessary to generate the risk premium for 
foreign asset investment.  Moreover, foreign subsidiaries have distinct operating 
strategies that are linked with their traditional economic motivation in the applied 
economic literature.  The linkage between the firm’s operating strategy (i.e., how it 
organizes its factors of production in foreign markets) and its capital structure are 
investigated.  We show that operating strategy is linked with changes in its capital 
structure, which in turn is how the foreign subsidiaries balance business and 
financial risk.  
 
 In Chapter Six, we examine the linkage between growth and profit 
maximization in foreign affiliates and their capacity to create shareholder value for 
the parent firm and their capital investors.  We define the primary measure of 
shareholder value for the foreign subsidiary as the excess return on equity over that 
of the parent’s return on equity.  This excess return measures the risk premium that 
is being paid on the investment in foreign assets.  We investigate the firm-level and 
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host-level determinants which affect the ability of the foreign subsidiary to generate 
sustainable shareholder value through this risk premium.  We show that stable 
growth in revenues when coupled with higher asset efficiency is strongly related to 
the creation of shareholder value as defined by the subsidiary’s excess return.  
 
Policy Motives 
 
 
 The complex and qualitative features of the financial motives of FDI would 
normally incline our examination of foreign investment activities from the strategic 
management perspective with its emphasis on managerial policy and individual 
choice behavior as an idiosyncratic function of the firm’s performance.  In contrast, 
the analysis this thesis is organized within common approaches of financial 
economics.  The objective of this thesis is to provide a quantitative analysis of the 
observable features in the public firm’s conduct and performance so that we can draw 
inferences about unobservable choice and policy preference.   
 
An optimal profit strategy is vital to the long-term sustainable growth of the 
multinational and it is the primary focus of its managers and investors.  Through this 
research, we will also see that financial motives (i.e., the factors that influence 
investment, profit and risk policies) are important in developing broader industrial 
and social policy given the strong links between FDI and the stability of the global 
economy.  A brief discussion of some of the policy motives follows.   
  
While financial capital has practically very few barriers to mobility in a 
contemporary context, labour capital is no more mobile than in the 1900’s and this 
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has an impact on social entitlement policies particularly in developing economies 
(Geide-Stevenson, 1998).  Multinationals and their foreign affiliates must organize 
and operate their production cycles within a broad range of political and economic 
paradigms and in different economic systems; from open and free markets, to closed 
state-managed economies.  National industrial policy can motivate non-financial 
firms to modify their production cycles in ever-increasing complex patterns to 
maximize access to labour pools and nationally controlled natural resources (e.g., 
coal, oil, metal ores, etc.).  It is the growth and profit maximization strategies of 
foreign subsidiaries that will determine both its performance and its economic 
contribution to domestic economies through significant externalities in host labour 
and factor markets.    
 
Sustaining economic growth in the developing world is a challenge 
particularly for emerging economies which need foreign direct investment as a source 
of investment capital (Thangavelu et al., 2009).  Contemporary theories of economic 
growth have long recognized that profit maximizing firms (as compared to state 
operated firms) are the central motivating agents in the modern, endogenous model of 
industrial growth (Romer, 1986).  The operating strategies and investment policies of 
foreign subsidiaries will dictate how they will allocate the capital from inward 
investing countries and to what extent local and regional social policy will have in 
encouraging inward FDI.  If this intersection between trade flows, capital movements 
and labour policy is more fully understood, it is less likely to impair the development 
of domestic industrial policy that is beneficial for growth and fair international trade.   
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This thesis proposes to expand the understanding of the importance of 
financial motives underlying FDI that if balanced properly, may benefit both 
academic research and the practitioner in international trade and investment.   
 
Contribution to Knowledge  
 
 
The long-standing, received theories of FDI and international business have 
for the most part, concentrated on the traditional economic determinants of FDI at the 
industry and country level largely in the context of social policy and the economic 
problem.1  This thesis develops financial linkages between foreign subsidiaries, their 
host market structure, and their parent firms by direct investigation at the firm level 
which is frequently a deficiency with the traditional economic literature.  The unique 
contribution of this thesis is to bridge the methods of financial economics with topics 
in international business in the following areas: 
 
(a) the contemporary literature on foreign direct investment is contrasted 
with theories from economics, finance, strategic management, and international 
business to provide a broad context for understanding the importance of financial 
motives and determinants of FDI, thus bridging a gap in the literature between 
international business and corporate finance;  
 
(b) the link between FDI and standard investment theory which governs 
the rate of capital investment via the demand and production function, and interest 
                                                 
1 For a historical discussion of the classical economic problem, or socio-economic dynamic of the free 
market and its function within society, see Scherer (1970). 
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rates is explored and tested showing that capital markets (i.e., the source and cost of 
investment capital) have a direct effect on capital flows and capital investments of 
foreign subsidiaries thus linking these two theories of investment;   
 
(c) a new framework for linking business and financial risk is proposed.  
Using the taxonomy for classifying competitive FDI strategy by Driffield and Love, 
we show how the competitive market strategy of foreign subsidiaries (e.g., an 
efficiency or location advantaged strategy) are linked with specific business risks 
such as labour actions or high fixed-capital investment.  Foreign subsidiaries may 
adjust their level of financial risk by modifying their capital structures in response to 
firm-specific business risks in the host environment by placing higher amount of debt 
on host creditors or with the use of short-debt maturities or trade credit;  
 
(d) contemporary econometric estimation methods are applied to improve 
on some of the more elementary results used in many of the more traditional 
empirical research literature in modeling capital flows and capital structure of foreign 
subsidiaries; and    
 
(e) the contemporary research on the determinants of capital structure 
modeling within foreign subsidiaries is tested with a large, proprietary data set with a 
set of unique firm-level accounts.  
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CHAPTER TWO  HISTORICAL LITERATURE REVIEW  
  
 As an introduction to the thesis, we review the foundational literature that 
provides a historical perspective and philosophical tradition of the thesis as an 
academic work of social science and empirical research.  We explore the historical 
foundations of FDI theory, the financial theories of profit maximization, and the 
portfolio theory of FDI that are necessary to understand the basic principles and 
factors affecting the financing of foreign investments.  Afterwards we support each 
empirical chapter with a separate and specific literature review that underlies the 
development of the chapter research questions and models in each chapter.   
 
Foundations of FDI Theory 
 
The foundations of contemporary FDI theory is rooted in the traditional 
industrial economics/organization approaches, international business, and strategic 
management fields that also recently include treatments from international finance.  
In the industrial organization (IO) context, foreign direct investment is a central or 
key component of the multinational’s profit maximizing strategy.  The central 
argument of contemporary industrial organization’s strategy-conduct-performance 
(SCP) theory is the firm’s market structure has a significant effect on how the firm 
organizes its profit maximizing strategy that in turn determines its performance.  In 
contrast, the resource-based view and strategic management theories recognizes the 
feedback loops between these market and firm-level functions and argue that profit 
strategies and performance can also alter the market structure of firms (Porter, 1981).  
The very early theoretical foundations of industrial organization were built on the 
theory or model of the firm as the “combiners of inputs” in imperfect markets.  The 
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first, early theory of the firm was given by Ronald Coase who introduced the 
‘transaction cost’ approach to explaining the origins and nature of the firm, which 
he saw as a mechanism for reducing the cost of market transactions (Coase, 1937). 
 
The first working theories of FDI were developed from within the field of 
industrial economics which holds that there is a strong relationship between market 
structure and the firms conduct or strategic policy (Bain, 1952). The Bain 
arguments also asserted that monopolistic power has a negative social welfare 
implication by enabling the constraint of production to maximize price.  In contrast, 
Schumpeter’s work argued the purpose of the firm is to exploit competitive 
opportunities and render competitive action obsolete which necessarily entails 
“creative destruction” of inefficient business models in favor of more efficient 
resource-allocating firms (Schumpeter, 1951).  In contrast, the ‘Chicago’ school of 
industrial economics countered the Bain arguments that monopolies had a 
detrimental social welfare feature by showing that profits are more likely to result 
from efficiency in production and distribution rather than through collusion or 
monopolistic powers (Stigler, 1950).  From these theories of the firm, foreign direct 
investment theory grew with an over-arching interest in social policy that 
dominated most academic economic research in the mid twentieth century.   
 
Early FDI Theory 
 
Applying the concepts of the firm to the international setting, the first, 
practical theory of FDI was organized by Stephen Hymer as an early attempt to 
address the internationalization of domestic firms and outline the mechanism of 
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international market structure which motivated cross-border profit seeking behavior 
(Hymer, 1960).  Vernon extended FDI theory by showing how market structure 
motivates the organization of production in stages and cycles in competitive cross-
border settings (Vernon, 1966).  Later, Caves’ seminal work “International 
Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment” provided the first 
proper treatment of FDI theory within the industrial organization framework which 
detailed how the competitive market structure of monopolistic and oligopolistic 
firms is determined by product differentiation and diversification, thus affecting 
their performance (Caves, 1971) .    
 
Caves was the first to argue that “high capital charges” which are imposed 
by markets for financing large transactions might serve as a barrier to foreign 
market entry for some firms.  In this context, Caves is one of the first to suggest the 
linkage between capital markets and the firm’s market structure.  Moreover, he also 
recognizes early in the development of the FDI theory the relationship between risk 
and return in foreign investments and that investors in foreign firms may insist on 
higher rates of returns.  In this context, Caves early works somewhat contrasts the 
notions of Hymer that interest rates or rates of return are not sufficiently 
determinative in the FDI decision process, although this notion escapes much 
further scrutiny for another 40 years.   
 
The early work of Hymer, Vernon, and Caves provided the early theoretical 
foundations for the development of the internalization theory (Dunning, 2003).  
Internalization theory is one of the most important works toward the formulation of 
a general theory of FDI as proposed in “The Future of the Multinational Enterprise” 
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(Buckley & Casson, 1976).  In this work, the authors forward a general theory of 
the internalization of foreign markets.  Markets are internalized by firms until the 
“benefits of further internalization are outweighed.”  By extension, it is the cost of 
cross-border market failures that drive FDI over indirect investment such as 
licensing or exporting.  Buckley et al also show a high degree of correlation 
between technology and multinationality of firms, concluding that internalization of 
technology resulted from higher transaction costs in external imperfect markets.  
They also argued that stronger and not weaker property rights would stimulate 
sharing of technologies.  Moreover, what set this work apart from other similar 
research in FDI was that it was the first to be “distinguished by its positivist stance” 
(Buckley & Casson, 2003).  
 
In contrast to the industrial organization literature, strategic management is 
a parallel and complementary research field, and in the case of FDI theory is largely 
organized within the international business research framework.  It is commonly 
associated with the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm.  The RBV seeks to 
identify the internal nature of the firm which enables it to sustain a competitive 
advantage through some proprietary function or other feature which creates high 
barriers to entry (Lockett et al., 2009).  The RBV both embraces and rejects some of 
the key principles of IO, of which the most important distinction being the emphasis 
which IO attributes to the impact of the external market structure on the firm.  In 
contrast, the RBV stresses a focus on the firm’s internal resources in defining or 
shaping the firm’s profit maximizing strategy (Conner, 1991).    
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Direct Ownership Motives in Early FDI Theory 
 
Hymer’s 1960 doctoral thesis on “The International Operations of National 
Firms, a Study of Foreign Direct Investment” is the first modern economic theory of 
FDI.  It is one of the seminal works of early conceptual FDI theory in which he 
rejects the classical Ricardian idea of portfolio investment as a motive for foreign 
direct investment (Hymer, 1960). Among the paper’s numerous and original insights, 
he is the first to distinguish that FDI is not necessarily motivated by interest rates or 
differential rates of return as suggested in classical economics but by the ability to 
exploit ownership advantage.  The theory is set in the context of monopolistic 
competition and asserts that firms will only engage in the higher risk of foreign 
operations if those returns are higher than a domestic expansion of the same type.  
The strength of Hymer’s arguments lay in the clear examples and the simple logic of 
his observations even though the study provides only limited data analysis or rigorous 
rationalization of his research methodologies.  Dunning and Rugman later provide a 
more extensive analysis of Hymer’s considerable contribution to the formation of a 
general FDI theory (Dunning & Rugman, 1985). 
 
Hymer’s rejections of interest rates on direct investment are based on his 
analysis of the classical portfolio theory of trade that states that capital flows in 
response to differentials in interest rates.  Hymer argues that since portfolio theory 
does not explain the preference for direct investment, it must be rejected in favor of a 
direct theory of foreign investment that he offers as an alternative.  Hymer offers four 
points in evidence against portfolio theory: 
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(a) the international account balances of the Standard Oil Company would 
discount any movement with respect to interest rates because capital 
move to countries where interest rates or returns are lower; 
 
(b) the cross-border movement of capital from the US to other countries is 
insufficient to be explained by interest rates alone; 
 
(c)  that nearly all FDI is undertaken by the US so if interest rates were a 
motive of FDI more countries would be engaged in FDI; and 
 
(d) that FDI persists in some industries and not in others. 
 
In retrospect, Hymer’s main arguments really only suggest that portfolio 
theory alone is insufficient to explain FDI.  His arguments were more relevant before 
FDI began to spread to other industries and countries in the late 1960’s.  Hymer’s 
strongest argument is that portfolio theory alone does not explain the desire for the 
control of foreign assets as found in direct investment.  In other words, if control 
were not important, then investors would simply invest in a portfolio of assets (e.g., 
the stocks of multinationals with foreign operating firms).  However, in a 
contemporary context, global credit, capital formation and interest rates are even 
more relevant in the expansion of FDI than in Hymer’s time when only very large, 
mostly public firms engaged in FDI.  Therefore, while it can be argued that portfolio 
theory is indeed insufficient to explain FDI, we argue that it is not altogether 
unnecessary.   
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Hymer’s theory was influenced by Dunning's early work on FDI              
“American Investment in British Manufacturing Industry” (Dunning, 1958).  In 
Hymer’s view, direct foreign operations were a strategy conceived of very large 
companies with few capital constraints.  Moreover, FDI as seen by Hymer and his 
contemporaries was primarily a practice of very large UK firms in the pre-war period 
followed by US firms in the post-war period.  These firms were thought to be 
international vehicles for the allocation of excess or surplus domestic capital that 
sought to exploit under-served and weakly protected foreign markets.  Now, FDI is 
no longer overly constrained by firm size or surplus domestic capital and is more 
prone to opportunistic impulses in the business and financial market cycles.   
 
Mid-Century FDI Theory  
 
 
Vernon is a central figure in early FDI theory whose simple and direct 
analysis remains popular and frequently cited in contemporary literature as a general 
economic motive for FDI (Vernon, 1966).  Vernon’s FDI theory appears in his 
“International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle” where 
products are produced in different global locations at different phases of their life 
cycle according to the comparative advantage of the host country.  As products 
mature, they will become more technologically simple to reproduce thereby seeking 
out the lowest labour inputs as economies of scale are achieved. 
 
Following Vernon, Caves builds a more formal industrial organization 
framework of FDI in “International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of 
Foreign Investment.”  In contrast to Hymer’s emphasis on direct ownership, Caves 
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argues that the motives for FDI are driven through the operational structure of the 
multinational’s need to expand or diversify by:  a) vertical integration of more of 
suppliers, or b) horizontal addition of more production capacity.  One of the 
shortcomings in the Caves analysis is the discounting of the possible spillover 
benefits on host economies, but it possesses an overall strong and practical model for 
the economic motivations for FDI in the familiar context of the IO framework.  
Following Caves, much of the work on FDI theory moves stepwise through more 
topic specific details of economic variables of interest on the specific economic 
determinants of FDI. 
 
In McManus’ work “The Theory of the International Firm,” he discusses a 
general theory of how interdependent corporations are formed in different 
countries, and coordinate though pricing and ownership mechanisms (McManus, 
1972) . Likewise, Oliver Williamson’s work “Markets and Hierarchies” observes 
that the existence of different firms derives from ‘asset specificity’ in production.  
Williamson also discusses the factors of the internalization of market functions, and 
in particular he introduces the idea of ‘bounded rationality’ that argues for the 
limits on human capacity as a key factor which determines the capacity for growth 
in the firm (Williamson, 1973).  Arguably, this type of ‘transaction cost’ reasoning 
became most widely known through his early works on this subject.  Rugman’s  
“Risk Reduction by International Diversification” asserts that a motive for FDI is 
the risk diversification which is facilitated by operating in different locations  
(Rugman, 1976) which remains somewhat inconclusive in the current research 
literature. 
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 In 1979, James Anderson introduced the ‘gravity’ theory of trade that has 
been frequently used as a model for bi-lateral FDI.  As the distance between trading 
countries increases, cross-border trade decreases.  Anderson claims “the gravity 
equation is one of the empirically successful models in economics” (Anderson, 
1979).  In 1984, Helpman examined the different determinants of FDI which 
combined with the factors of ownership and location advantages to show that more 
productive firms are generally engaged in FDI as opposed to exporting or licensing 
(Helpman, 1984).  In 1997, Brainard proposed a theory on the location of FDI by 
moving plants and production facilities closer to its foreign customers so that 
achieving scale economies with multiple locations is more efficient (Brainard, 
1997).     
 
While Hymer, Vernon and Caves provided the early, broad foundations of 
research on the economic determinants of FDI, the four decades of research that 
followed have produced only one general economic factor that is consistently 
correlated in the empirical research literature with capital flows to FDI; that is, 
market size or GDP.  In the comparative study “The Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investments: Sensitivity Analyses of Cross-Country Regressions,’” Chakrabari 
examines all of economic determinants of FDI in the research literature such as GDP, 
labour costs, and tax and exchange rates.  He shows that GDP (per capita) as the only 
general economic determinant that has shown a consistent consensus among 
researchers with respect to its correlation with FDI.  In other words, FDI is more 
strongly correlated in developed countries where firms can more readily build or 
expand market share in an environment that has a developed infrastructure and 
commercially advanced markets  (Chakrabarti, 2001).  
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 In “A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants,” Blonigen 
gives a contemporary and comprehensive survey of the large body of current studies 
of the economic determinants of FDI.  In this work, he summarizes the major 
determinants as currency exchange rate effects; tax schemes; quality of 
infrastructure; trade protection; and exchange and tax rates (Blonigen, 2005).  These 
economic determinants are all linked in part with some profit motive that seeks return 
for foreign risk.  However, these basic economic motives do not reflect the complete 
or final form of profit maximization that foreign subsidiaries may undertake. 
 
Profit Maximization in FDI 
 
 
FDI by definition is the direct ownership of a foreign enterprise of not less 
than 10% of the firm’s assets or equity (Cohen, 2007).  For this research, a practical 
working definition of FDI would be:  capital investment in foreign productive 
assets that are engaged in economic activity by a foreign investor with a controlling 
interest.  By this definition, we generally mean that FDI is foreign capital that is 
engaged in production for profit (e.g., the manufacture of goods and services). 
 
Most multinationals at some point were successful domestic firms which 
mastered the managerial and capital demands of growth in an international market 
structure (Cohen, 2007).  That foreign operations are distinctly more profitable than 
their domestic counterparts has long remained a stylized fact in economics (Daniels 
& Bracker, 1989). It has been shown that foreign subsidiaries frequently perform 
better than their purely domestic competitors suggesting they have more adaptive 
foreign operating strategies in a dynamic market structure (Razin & Sadka, 2007b).    
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The capacity for sustained growth in multi-site and geographically diverse 
organizations necessarily requires the ability to manage complex and competing 
financial priorities over secular business cycles.  The distinguishing feature of the 
multinational’s profit-maximizing motive is the structure of its foreign risk.  As 
compared to direct investment in a domestic affiliate, the foreign affiliate must in 
many cases, generate a foreign risk premium in addition to the investor’s required 
rate of return on domestic investment alternatives.  This necessarily requires a 
significant financial planning component in the FDI decision process. 
 
From the perspective of the literature of international business, we rarely see 
a distinction between the profit strategies of the parents and that of their foreign 
subsidiaries.  More recent studies have shown that more capital is in fact allocated 
to foreign subsidiaries with better strategic growth opportunities (Mudambi, 1999).  
Thus, the profit maximization strategy of foreign subsidiaries is not merely the 
result of its initial market entry mode or ownership structure, but linked with the 
economic risks and opportunities in the host which it seeks to exploit (Gilroy & 
Lukas, 2006).  There must be some other unique feature of the foreign subsidiary’s 
profit maximization strategy which reflects the alignment between the basic 
operating motives for FDI (e.g., access to labour markets) and the business risks 
inherent in a given host economy (Barrell, 1996).   
 
Most large multinationals have their own internal capital markets as the result 
of their multiple cross-border operating assets (Desai et al., 2004).  This also gives 
them some limited capacity to modify the profit strategy of their foreign subsidiaries 
based in part on their unique market structure.  As a consequence, some foreign 
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subsidiaries may alter their short-run profit maximizing strategy to match or exploit 
dynamic market shocks in localized settings.  For example, they may absorb short-
term losses or take on additional risks to shelter their parent or other vulnerable sister 
divisions in dynamic cycles (Peyer & Shivdasani, 2001).  This is a key concept that 
underpins one of our central arguments; the foreign subsidiaries’ profit maximization 
is always linked with its operating strategy (i.e., how it organizes its factors of 
production in foreign markets) which are linked to the initial economic market entry 
decision and the dynamic risks and competitive market structure of the host economy.  
 
 
We argue that capital markets (i.e., where the source of investment financing 
is arranged) have an effect on the market structure of the multinational firm and its 
subsidiaries.  It may motivate them to modify their strategic conduct by choosing, for 
example, where and when to invest in additional capacity or to diversify its product 
offerings.  These modifications can affect the funding, risk mitigation and profit 
maximization strategies that are the topics of the three empirical chapters.    
 
FDI and Portfolio Theory 
  
Traditional portfolio investment theory within economics says that capital  
flows in response to comparative country-level interest rates (i.e., the rates of returns 
on local investments) and international trade is therefore regulated by national, 
comparative advantage (e.g., countries with natural efficiencies should have better 
returns on their sources of national competencies) (Maneschi, 1992).  One of 
Hymer’s important arguments draws from his observation that many firms cross-
invest between countries, thus eclipsing the interest rate motive for direct investment  
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(Driffield & Love, 2005).  Instead, Hymer theorized that FDI was largely undertaken 
as a form of firm-specific advantage seeking via direct investment as opposed to 
other types of portfolio investment.  Thus, portfolio theory was laid aside as the 
search for FDI theories focused on economic motives that discounted significant 
interest rate considerations.  In contrast, we argue that in today’s credit constrained 
environments, the cost of capital is central to the interest rate motive, which is why 
the firm’s relationship with its sources of capital is so important.  Firms with strong 
ties to financing alternatives not only finance at a lower cost, but also may possess a 
fundamentally different view of FDI opportunities simply based on their financial 
capacity for greater FDI at the margin.  
 
The long-standing arguments against portfolio theory or the  ‘differential rates 
of return’ theory of FDI have centered on three points: that portfolio or arbitrage 
theory of FDI (a) does not  explain why FDI is financed with foreign capital (b) does 
not explain the intra-industry investment between similar industrial sectors, and (c) 
does not explain the preference of corporate investors for direct ownership over 
portfolio investing ( i.e., if an industrial firm could receive the same rate of return by 
investing in other international firms rather than in its own foreign production).  
Through an investigation of the financial determinants of the FDI process, we attempt 
to address some of the significant gaps in the arguments against the portfolio theory 
of FDI. 
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Summary of the Historical Literature    
 
 
 The current FDI literature  proposes only a few candidates for a realistic and 
comprehensive theory of FDI (Russ, 2009).  The early theories of FDI grew out of 
transaction cost economics where the internalization of market functions resulted in 
lower costs through development of internal company functions.  As this concept was 
applied to cross-border settings, economic theory sought out different motives for 
direct investment that were not explained by transaction costs, interest rates or rates 
of returns as was traditionally held in portfolio theory.  Direct foreign investments 
were believed to be motivated by some form of direct ownership advantage where 
profit maximization depends on the ability to exploit some form of intangible 
competency in a cross-border context.  Internalization theory later explained how FDI 
lowers transaction costs in a cross-border setting where ownership advantage enables 
the exploitation of foreign markets.  In contrast, firm-level profit maximization 
theory has not really explained how strategies work in cross-border settings where 
there may be dynamic or incompatible strategies between the parents and its diverse 
set of subsidiaries.  In seeking to explain how firms modify their profit strategies of 
their foreign subsidiaries, we must return to portfolio theory to explain how the 
access to capital and credit, and the cost of capital are critical determinants of FDI in 
a world of global trade and dynamic credit cycles.  
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CHAPTER THREE   METHODOLOGY 
 
We apply the general methods of financial economics in our analysis of firm 
level accounts and introduce concepts from financial and strategic management 
literature that address some of the choice and feedback mechanisms from the firm’s 
performance back to the adjustment of the firm’s strategy.   
 
The basic research paradigm in this thesis may be categorized as essentially   
positivistic.  That is, this thesis seeks to find definitive explanations of economic 
behavior through the observation of economic systems, the exploration of logically 
available facts, rational argument, and empirical analysis.2 One of the challenges in 
economic positivism is to reconcile the apparent conflict in social economic theory 
between the firm’s performance and its profit maximization strategy.  For example, 
the traditional measures of firm performance within industrial economics are: (a)  
the firm’s selection of which products to produce; (b) the continuous engagement of 
new technologies to support efficient production; (c) the full employment of 
resource factors such as labour and capital; and (d) the equitable distribution of 
income to achieve price stability (Scherer, 1970).  While we do not explore these 
motives or any other specific choice behavior, we do seek to understand the 
underlying policy motives that deal generally with our research questions.  We 
                                                 
2 It is the express intent of this research to provide a rational explanation of economic behavior 
without value judgments or advocacy of any particular national policy or political position.  In 
contrast to research on managerial behavior or business theory approaches, this research is set 
firmly in application of established economic theory for the exploration of quantitative research 
problems.  In this context, it is an also a work of applied economics as the logical consequences of 
the results are ultimately linked with the economic problem, that is choice of what is to be produced 
and how the allocation of capital and labour serves those choices.  Moreover, we could also say that 
this thesis is a more generally a work of instrumentalism, that is, we are not concerned with testing 
the truth status of the long-standing economic theories and their derivative models but whether they 
can provide and useful or practical results (Boland, 1989).   
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reserve the discussion of the broader implications of social policy in the thesis 
conclusion. 
 
Economic Modeling 
 
 
In each chapter, the introduction and review of the research literature is 
intended to support the formation of the main arguments, which are then reduced to 
specific research questions for testing.  Econometric models are formulated for each 
research question, followed by analysis of the results from the econometric 
estimations of the non-experimental data sets.  In each case, the underlying financial 
and economic theory is identified as the foundation for the research question that is 
subjected to econometric testing of the data.  Where possible, the chapter literature 
review and arguments are intended to identify the gaps in the theoretical foundations 
that account for the divergence of the models with the real-world features of the data 
set and the uncertainty in the economic environment.  For each model, we introduce 
new, and in some cases, novel exogenous variables that attempt to better explain the 
model and its explanatory variables of interest.   
 
The basic unit of economic activity in the traditional industrial organization 
view of economic activity has been at the industry level, while the strategic 
management and financial theories have focused more closely at the firm level.  In 
this research, the foreign subsidiary is the basic unit of empirical study.  We link all 
the variables of the accounts of the foreign subsidiaries with the variables of interest 
from its parent firm, host economy, and industry.  We also examine different classes 
of strategic groups within and across industries and classes of FDI.  This also means 
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there are some gaps in the data sets that may affect the consistency and efficiency of 
the estimation of the models.  
 
  The general approach to econometric modeling is to first identify any 
functional forms from extant economic and financial theory within the current 
literature that may have been previously employed to analyze a similar problem 
statement.  We then seek to modify or extend those models with the assumptions 
outlined in each chapter.  There are also several statistical assumptions made with 
respect to all the models in this thesis.  First, all of the model specifications in this 
thesis are dynamic, that is, they include a lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory regressor to capture the prior year effects or shocks in expression of the 
current year values.  Secondly, all the empirical models are stochastic in that each 
model anticipates some indeterminate outcome and therefore contains an error term.3  
 
All the model specifications assume the presence of some unobserved 
heterogeneity as the result of some omitted variables and generally, we discount the 
occurrence of measurement error given the standard accounting practices of most of 
the firms in the sample.4  However, this does not mean that there are no reporting 
biases within each firm that would have similar effect to a measurement error.  This 
is why we seek the largest possible sample constrained by those firms with near-
complete accounting data.5 
                                                 
3 Generally, we assume that the errors are identically and independently and distributed.  We report z-
values (i.e., student t values in a panel data set) of greater than 2.00 as significant with confidence 
levels of 95%. 
 
4 All of the firms in the data set use international accounting standards IRFS.  
 
5 This may produce some sample selection bias against firms that under-report results; but in this 
case, we are only investigating firms with capacity to engage in, and already committed to FDI, and 
firms that under-report are unlikely to have strong financing links with capital markets in any case. 
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The estimation methods are selected based on their capacity to handle the 
various violations of the ordinary least square (OLS) assumptions, fixed effect or 
instrumental estimation methods that are common in the research literature.  The 
recent development of the generalized method of moment (GMM) estimators for 
panel data sets in the 1990’s has greatly improved the ability to handle these 
violations with internally generated instruments in dynamic panel sets (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991). 
 
There are two different types of econometric models that are used for analysis 
in this thesis: descriptive and reduced form equation models.  Descriptive 
econometric models seek to recover statistically significant features within the data 
set and the inferences made with these models may only be applied to the subjects or 
agents within the data set.  In contrast, reduced form equation models are based in 
economic theory, and seek to recover some economic primitive.  They are generally 
derived from a structural system of equations.  The objective of these structural 
models is to transform a basic, deterministic economic model into a dynamic, 
stochastic econometric model that can provide efficient and un-biased estimates with 
non-experimental data.  However, most of our reduced form equations are more 
properly described as a descriptive regression of joint population density (Reiss & 
Wolak, 2000).  For clarity, we address underlying the economic and statistical 
assumptions in all three chapters below to show the context of the applied economic 
and financial theories in the models.   
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In Chapter Four, we are seeking to link capital markets with capital flows and 
capital investments to and by foreign subsidiaries.  This presupposes a the linkage 
between capital markets and the firm’s market structure.  Model 2.0 describes the 
aggregated capital flows as given in Baker, Wurgler and Foley (Baker et al., 2008).   
Model 2.1 is our extension of the Baker et al model that is a descriptive econometric 
model derived from a reduced form demand function common to economic theory 
where demand increases with a decrease in price.  In this case, the increased price of 
the firm’s assets is based on total returns or forward-looking market values (e.g., PE 
ratios) and has a reciprocal relationship with its cost of equity.   
 
The changes in capital investment is given in Model 3.2 and is also a 
descriptive model which has some similarities with a demand function if we assume 
that future expectation of growth has a reciprocal relationship with the cost of 
financing foreign assets. Model 3.2 is a dynamic model derived from Precious’ model 
for an investment function shown in Model 3.1.  that was built on the static and 
deterministic Cobb-Douglas production function (Precious, 1985). 
 
In Chapter Five, we are modeling factors that affect or “drive” the capital 
structure of the foreign subsidiary in response to business risk factors.  Model 4.0 is 
also a descriptive econometric model that is derived indirectly from an economic cost 
function, but also contains some aspects of a profit function and utility function 
where some qualitative feature of the type of capital may affect the selection of the 
source of capital.  It is built on similar contemporary models for capital structure of 
corporations (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Frank & Goyal, 2009). 
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In Chapter Six, we model the factors that support or constrain growth in 
foreign subsidiaries.  The models include variants with different dummy variables 
used to distinguish the effects of different categorical responses.  In Model 5.0, we 
specify revenue growth as our measure of output and allow for externalities, 
dynamic shocks, individual and time effects and the use of proxies for productivity 
in a purely descriptive model (Griliches & Mairesse, 1995).   In Model 6.0, we 
specify an ordered, four-vector model using vector autoregression on panel data sets.  
This model measures the impact or response of the dependent variable, ( i.e., in this 
case, the rate of sales growth) of producing a 1% shock (impulse) on an explanatory 
variable of interest (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988).   
 
We conclude Chapter Six with Model 7.0, a purely descriptive econometric 
model to measure shareholder value as function of the foreign risk premium.  This 
model has an implied cost function as higher growth rates of sales or revenues entail 
both higher commitments to capital and the constraint of the limited rate of 
technological change which a firm can integrate over time (Fisher & Pry, 1971).  It is 
designed to recover a hypothetical relationship between growth and the risk premium 
paid to foreign shareholders (i.e., the FDI risk premium) holding profitability 
constant. 
 
 
Master Data Set 
 
 For this research, we required a unique set of firm-level accounts that 
contained matched parent and subsidiary level details over a large number of 
industries and countries.  Many firm-level studies are frequently limited to the use of 
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proprietary data bases such as the COMPUSTAT® database which contains detailed 
records for only US firms over a long sampling period.    
 
To model the economic conditions of foreign subsidiaries in a host economy, 
we need to model factors common to most industrial foreign subsidiaries with 
contemporaneous country-level and parent-level data.  Subsidiary-level data has 
been traditionally difficult to obtain on any large scale with good accuracy.  In 
particular, the ownership structure and reporting mechanisms of large, multi-site 
multinationals creates a daunting accounting task of building a model of capital 
flows that can be applied across different firm types.  However, recent 
developments in data mining and computer databases have provided better and 
more accurate access to subsidiary-level data with standardized accounting that 
supports the development of firm-level modeling.     
 
Data Collection and Organization  
 
We selected the ORBIS® database by Bureau Van Dijk, a large, proprietary 
database of over 40 million firms worldwide.  We began with raw data from our 
data sources in electronic format directly from ORBIS®.  The data set was then 
organized and programmed into a relational database that allows all data sources to 
be linked at the firm level.  Each firm is uniquely coded with an identifier that also 
serves as its panel identification number.  All the variables of the subsidiaries 
parent values were linked directly with each subsidiary’s value for each year in the 
8-year sample 2000 to 2007.  About three-quarters of the parent firms are publicly 
held. 
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The working database for this research contained over 2 million firms of 
both parents and subsidiaries from over 50 countries, and included country-level 
data such as GDP or inflation.  However, given the accounting variables necessary 
to track transactions between parent and subsidiaries, the final working dataset 
comprised a list of about 8,000 subsidiary firms from 38 countries.  This is about 
16,000-matched parent and subsidiary firms as a few parents have multiple 
subsidiaries reported in the data set.  The data set was program into a relational data 
base which combined all external datasets for country-level and firm-level data 
elements to be combined for panel analysis.  The advantage of this approach lay in 
the ability to redraw a sample from the master data set with a new or different set of 
explanatory variables to test or contrast changes in the regressions, the strength of 
its instrument matrixes, and other similar problems inherent in working with large 
data sets.  These sampling techniques enabled more exogenous variables of interest 
to be identified.  This also helped produced regressions with stronger instruments 
and only one model reported a Hansen test below 0.100 as weak instrumentation is 
a known weakness of GMM estimates of panel sets.   
 
On average, a 8-year panel with 8,000 matched firms, each with 50 annual 
data elements from the firm’s income statement and balance sheet, and 25 annual 
data elements from the host and source country yielded a typical panel data with 
over 64,000 observations for each regression.  For a typical GMM estimation with 
10 variables of interest, about 80 to 100 internal instruments would be generated to 
handle endogeneity.  The sample selection process only reduced the dataset by 
excluding firms with too many gaps in their accounts. Typically, firms which 
reported fewer than 5 of the 8 year sample period were excluded.  This tends to bias 
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the data set with firms with established public reporting and could may under-
represent higher performing firms that have poor reporting records.   
 
The division of firms is about 60% within OCED and 40% within the 
emerging world. In addition, the sample is more heavily weighted in the older EU 
countries as they have a longer history of reporting data for public consumption 
(See Table A-1 in the Appendix).  The use of different data sources is outlined in 
each chapter as they apply to the specific problems in the modeling process.  Unless 
otherwise specified, all currency values are denominated in thousand ($000) US 
dollars. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCING        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter seeks to fill a significant gap in the international business 
literature by bringing together the standard analysis of the motivation for FDI, with 
the multinational’s ability to finance growth and expansion. We provide direct 
evidence that capital market rates affect the rate of investment in foreign 
subsidiaries. Using a large, firm-level data set of matching parents and subsidiaries 
within the OCED, we show that secondary capital flows and capital investments to 
FDI are linked with capital market values.  As parent firms can raise capital in 
periods of high market values to fund FDI, this type of ‘arbitrage’ driven FDI may in 
turn lead to the partial decoupling of economic and financial motives for FDI in 
financial market bubbles.  This suggests that internationalisation decisions that are 
taken by firms in response to over-valued equity markets, may well be rational in the 
short term, but may be unsustainable in the long-run.  
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Introduction 
 
The rates of return or yields on capital market securities and financial assets 
can influence the funding of FDI by changing expectations of future growth, asset 
prices, and interest rates.  This has a significant impact on the ability of firms to raise 
capital and exploit opportunities in foreign markets. The long-standing theoretical 
research on foreign direct investment (FDI) has emphasized the importance of firm 
specific advantages such as host country technological development, labour costs, 
and macroeconomic conditions as the economic drivers of FDI.  The conceptual FDI 
motives of Hymer and Vernon which have dominated FDI research for 40 years have 
focused on the initial entry mode decisions and the operational and technological 
functions of the international firm.  However, the more recent research on the 
motivations of FDI has shown that some financial factors may also play a significant 
role in determining capital flows to FDI.   For example, Baker, Foley and Wugler 
show how ‘cheap’ capital created by high stock market values in the parent firm’s 
source country is linked with higher rates of FDI (Baker et al., 2008).  In a similar 
context, Forssbaeck and Oxelheim show that the firm’s financing capacity is also 
linked with higher levels of FDI (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2008).  Together, these 
trends suggest a link between capital markets and the funding of FDI that points to an 
under-developed area within the traditional economic theories of FDI; namely, how 
the firm’s financial strength and capital market rates may function as financial 
determinants of FDI. 
 
The evidence of a linkage between capital markets and the capital funding of 
FDI also suggests a new inter-disciplinary research agenda in investigating the 
impact of global financial turbulence on the capital movements of foreign 
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subsidiaries.  For example, global financial crises frequently affect domestic interest 
rates in emerging economies and may motivate the lowering of local trade restrictions 
to encourage more inward FDI (Aizenman, 2005).  In light of the global financial 
crisis of 2008/9, there are also some links being drawn to the Asian crisis of 1996/7 
when cheap capital fuelled excessive investments in several Asian countries, leading 
to an over-reliance on debt that was unsustainable (Driffield et al., 2007).  In this 
context, we undertake a new investigation on the link between capital markets and 
FDI by modelling the capital movements of foreign subsidiaries in two parts.  First, 
we develop the ‘cheap’ capital hypothesis expounded in (Baker et al., 2008) to 
examine the link between capital markets and new capital flows (i.e., new additions 
or ‘injections’ of debt or equity to fund working capital or fixed asset investments 
that are in excess of the subsidiary’s available cash on hand); and secondly, we 
examine the new capital investments made by those same foreign subsidiaries which 
are more reflective of actual investment in economic activity. 
 
This chapter undertakes a new analysis that builds on the recent research on 
the financial determinants of FDI that couples firm-level factors, host economic 
conditions and factors within global capital markets.  We employ a large sample of 
matched parents and subsidiaries over a large number of years, industries and across 
a range of OECD countries.  We demonstrate the difference between capital flows 
and capital investments is linked with expectations of growth, asset prices, and the 
firm’s financing capacity. We also seek to address a basic paradox in the literature: 
that is, why the two long-standing theories of economic investment (i.e., FDI and 
‘Keynesian’ capital investment theory) should run parallel with little real 
intersection.  We address a gap in the international business literature by providing a 
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firm-level model of capital movements that link capital markets with the basic market 
structure of foreign subsidiaries.  This contribution is made possible by developments 
that are more recent in availability of detailed firm-level data.   
 
Since the path-breaking work of Hymer, the emphasis in IB research has been 
on developing foreign direct investment theory with the firm as the coordinating unit 
of value-adding activity.  Within these strands of analysis, firm-specific advantages 
and host-country-specific factors combine to motivate FDI based on economic 
competition and the capacity to exploit competitive advantages, particularly those in 
which the firm can exploit some form of intangible intellectual property.  The 
clearest example of this theoretical stream is seen in the dominance of Dunning’s 
OLI framework as a tool of IB research. Dunning argues that for foreign market 
entrants to be successful, they must possess advantages in ownership, location and 
other internal factors which it can exploit exclusively in a foreign market (Dunning, 
1988).  In an extension of this paradigm, Buckley and Casson developed the more 
inclusive internalization theory which provides a competitive framework for the 
motives of FDI by demonstrating how firms seek foreign ownership in response to 
market imperfections in cross-border trade environments (Buckley & Casson, 1976). 
 
The dominance of these paradigms within IB research has meant that much of 
the empirical work in both international business and economics, as well as regional 
science, have focused on very similar models, augmented only by particular variables 
of interest (Buckley, 2002; Buckley & Casson, 2009).  But despite the abundance of 
empirical research in this area, Blonigen argues that our understanding of the 
determinants of FDI is still in a stage of relative infancy (Blonigen, 2005).  This state 
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of relative underdevelopment is partly a function of the complexities underlying the 
motivating behaviours for FDI. The IB literature as such has largely side-stepped the 
importance of standard economic investment theory in explaining FDI, which like all 
other types of investment, are linked with expectations on interest rates, asset prices 
and other factors common to irreversible investment. 
 
More recent trends in the research on the motivation for FDI have sought to 
bridge international business research with other areas of economic theory to link 
FDI motivations with trans-national trade, capital flows, and firm-level financing 
effects (Blonigen, 2005).  For example, Doukas and Lang show that the relationship 
between new ‘Greenfield’ FDI and changes in shareholder value provide a link 
between the portfolio investor’s demand for risk premium and the foreign direct 
investment activities of the multinational firm (Doukas & Lang, 2003).  In general, 
the financial dimensions of FDI motivation have been relatively absent in the 
research literature.  This seems likely to be driven by Hymer’s initial rejection of 
interest rates as a determinant of FDI in the late 1950’s.  Hymer stressed the 
advantages of direct foreign ownership control as a critical feature of the ability to 
exploit property rights in foreign markets (Hymer, 1960).  In historical context, 
Hymer’s arguments were indeed relevant as at that time only very large domestic, 
highly profitable corporations where engaged in FDI.  However, in the contemporary 
global economy, firms of all sizes are engaged in FDI and must compete for capital in 
a global market.  Given the role of financial markets in the recent global economic 
crisis, there is clearly a new incentive for considering the role of financial 
determinants of FDI at the firm level. 
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Financial Determinants of FDI  
 
The empirical studies of FDI have mostly focused on larger firms that 
typically had generated sufficient cash through sales in their home country, and were 
subsequently motivated to exploit their distinct ownership advantages in foreign 
markets. For example, Bhaumik et al have identified how Indian firms engaging in 
FDI are funded by very high sales of relatively generic products in their home 
markets (Bhaumik et al., 2009).  However, the financial capacity to exploit these 
conditions was not widely considered as a component of the basic FDI decision 
process. International operations were seen primarily as economic vehicles to exploit 
some distinct firm-level advantage or other form of intellectual property in a cross-
border setting.  However, it was Caves who organized the first formal industrial 
organization view of FDI theory that recognized that the cost of capital could have in 
limiting FDI opportunities (Caves, 1971).  In about the same period, Aliber stressed 
an alternative ‘financial’ theory of FDI where the exploitation of currency exchange 
rates provided firms with a comparative advantage in funding FDI, largely based on 
imperfections in capital markets (Aliber, 1970).   
 
To further develop the linkage between financing capacity and FDI within the 
traditional IB research streams, Oxelheim et al extend Dunning’s OLI framework 
with a set of testable hypotheses which overlay a set of finance specific factors which 
may be linked with OLI advantages (Oxelheim et al., 2001).  These include the 
exploitation of market mis-pricing, the ability to source capital globally, and reducing 
operating and transaction costs through FDI. These hypotheses are later tested by 
Forssbaeck and Oxelheim who find a significant relationship between the measures 
of financial strength and foreign acquisition (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2008).  Thus, 
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the multinational firm’s financial expertise is an important intangible asset that 
provides an ownership advantage over smaller or purely domestic firms.  In contrast 
to Hymer’s rejection of portfolio theory, financial strength can also be a type of 
location advantage by allowing the funding of FDI at lower costs compared to its 
foreign competitors in countries with weaker capital markets.  
 
A firm with comparatively higher net worth (i.e., greater total assets than total 
liabilities) has an increased ability to borrow or raise capital because it lowers their 
external finance premium, which is the cost of raising capital in external markets 
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1995).  Firms with a high net worth generally have greater 
creditworthiness, which is the capacity to assume interest bearing debt, and therefore 
more likely to receive favourable interest rates and repayment terms in their 
borrowing contracts. However, firm’s with excessive debt are also more likely to lose 
substantial market share in the event of a severe economic down turn (Opler & 
Titman, 1994).  In this context, firms with lower net worth may have difficulty in 
obtaining external financing for FDI if the company does not have sufficient new 
growth prospects to justify the investor’s expectations of future growth.  Moreover, 
the use of high debt levels often results in a distorted investment policy which may 
lead managers to allocate new capital to higher cash generating subsidiaries and 
thereby discouraging more long-term investments (e.g., FDI ) in favour of short term 
cash generating activities (Gifford, 2001).   So while foreign subsidiaries with greater 
debt bearing capacity may have a competitive advantage to exploit near term 
opportunities, they also present greater financial risk to the parent’s shareholder if the 
parents has to guarantee the loans taken from local, host sources (Kolasinski, 2009). 
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There is also a branch of literature which outlines the link between currency 
exchange rates and FDI (Aliber, 1970; Froot & Stein, 1991; Choi & Jeon, 2007). 
These empirical studies demonstrate how exchange rates provide foreign investors an 
advantage in the purchase of foreign owned assets because of the relative ‘wealth 
effect’ that is created by investing in a foreign market with a devalued currency.  
More recently, Buch and Kleinert have also argued that exchange rates create a 
wealth effect on the value of foreign assets that also affects the bidding price of 
foreign assets (e.g., the competitive bidding process for nascent FDI projects by 
foreign investors) (Buch & Kleinert, 2008).  This stresses the importance of financial 
capacity in competing for a finite set of suitable FDI opportunities. Moreover, larger 
multinationals with significant foreign currency exposures are more likely to employ 
currency hedging strategies, this may also be useful in offsetting undesirable effects 
of currency movements and increase their tolerance or capacity for foreign risk 
(Makar & Huffman, 2008).   Thus, a firm’s total financial strength and expertise in 
managing its debt capacity, foreign exchange exposures, and capital markets can be a 
competitive advantage over less sophisticated firms with lower financing capacity.   
 
Market Bubbles and FDI 
 
Gilchrist et al find that during periods of very high market valuations (i.e., 
market ‘bubbles’),  public firms can issue new equity shares to raise capital at much 
lower cost than by using increased debt financing (Gilchrist et al., 2005).   In a 
similar study, di Giovanni also finds a significant linkage between stock market 
values and the funding of new FDI transactions for M&A  (di Giovanni, 2005).  Most 
recently, empirical studies have sought to link high or ‘over-valued’ markets directly 
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with FDI flows.  For example, Aulakh and Mudambi show how higher market 
liquidity in the parent’s source country has a positive impact on inward FDI in a 
panel of UK firms, although notably from a single industry (Aulakh & Mudambi, 
2005).  Market liquidity is the market condition that reflects the ability to sell an 
asset without having a strong downward effect on its price.  It is also a condition 
which is directly related to ‘over’ valued markets (e.g., high price to earnings ratios 
of greater than 16)  since parent firms can sell these ‘over’ valued shares without a 
significant decline in the share price.   
 
Baker et al demonstrate that high market values in a parent firm’s source 
country can be a source of “cheap capital” to fund opportunistic FDI and supports 
these arguments by examining US outward FDI with aggregate firm data from 
national capital accounts (Baker et al., 2008).  These higher market valuations are 
assumed to provide lower-cost capital by enabling firms to issue new shares at 
inflated prices. These findings point to a general linkage between the global financial 
markets and FDI.  We can further illustrate the global scope of this linkage by 
looking at the total return of the S&P 500 over a 15-year period (See Figure 1-4).  
Note, that in 1997 at the time of the Asian financial crises, the total market return was 
over 30%, compared to the prior 40-year average of 11.4%. As shown in Figure 1-4, 
we see the changes in capital flows to FDI within the OECD closely follow the total 
return of the S&P 500 over this 15 year period.    
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Figure 1-4     Change in FDI Flows and S&P 500 Returns  
 
Most FDI has been seen traditionally as the exclusive venture of large, 
established firms with capacity for financing foreign expansion.  However, more than 
97% of firms in the OECD in 2007 were classified as small or medium size 
enterprises (SME) with revenues of less than $65M (Altman & Sabato, 2007). The 
typical SME now has a more sophisticated financial management system and access 
to a wider set of capital funding options than the ‘domestic’ giants that launched the 
large post-war FDI expansion 60 years ago.  Moreover, Fama and French show that 
the issuing of new shares is in fact commonplace in US firms and not necessarily 
restrained by firm size (Fama & French, 2005). They find that from 1993 to 2002, 
over 86% of firms in their study issued new equity.  Similarly, Gatchev et al  show 
that small firms, high growth firms, and firms with profit short falls tend to raise 
more capital externally by issuing new equities (Gatchev et al., 2009).  This trend 
may be linked to changes in regulations which govern the issue of new shares 
particularly in the US and EU which makes it easier for firms to issue shares in 
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shorter time frames as compared to pre-planned seasoned equity offerings (SEO) 
(Autore et al., 2008).   
 
Overall, parent firms should prefer equity as the primary source of capital to 
fund new FDI projects, but in fact most firms outside the US and UK generally prefer 
bank financing (i.e., debt or borrowing) for their internal growth programs because of 
their closely held ownership structures (Stulz, 2007).   Consider the composition of 
outward FDI from the US (the largest global FDI investor) between 1987 and 2007:  
reinvested earnings (59%), equity (36%) and debt (5%) (UNCTAD, 2009).  In other 
words, 87% of new capital flows to FDI from the US were funded with new equity.  
Likewise, Razin and Sadka also find from 1995 to 2004, over 60% of the total global 
FDI capital transactions are financed by issuing new equity shares to foreign 
subsidiaries (Razin & Sadka, 2007a).  However, when we look at the external capital 
raised by larger international corporations outside the US and UK we see they 
overwhelmingly prefer new debt.  For example, in a study of the largest global 
corporations from 1990 to 2001, it was shown that over 87% of actual new capital 
was raised from the issuance of debt, and only 9% was raised from new equity shares 
(Henderson et al., 2006).  In other words, while equities may be preferred to fund the 
internal needs of FDI (i.e., capital flows to FDI), debt and leverage is more 
commonly associated with the funding from external sources.   
 
The ‘cheap’ capital hypothesis leaves several issues for further exploration.  
First, the effects of commercial interest rates (i.e., the cost of borrowing) are not 
directly taken into account in the Baker et al model.  While we can see that high 
market values and stock cross-listings have empirical linkages with higher levels of 
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aggregated FDI flows; in practice, most firms actually prefer to fund FDI with debt 
because it is easier to control the repatriation of earnings and maximize cross-border 
tax advantages (Shapiro, 2010).  Interestingly, we also see the issuance of corporate 
debt is often timed with availability of low-interest rates (Barry et al., 2008) 
suggesting some gaps in the periods between sources of ‘cheap’ capital which must 
be bridged to sustain a continuous program of FDI. Secondly, the capital raised by 
the sale of over-valued stock is also subject to an internal, competitive allocation 
process in large firms where the external flow of new capital to the parent may not be 
simultaneous with internal capital flows to FDI.    
 
More importantly, what stock market ‘over-valuation’ as indicated by market-
to-book and PE ratios actually signals is the investor’s expectations of future growth.  
It is this expectation of growth in future earnings that motivates investors to pay a 
“premium” or “over-valued” price for the firm’s shares.  So, it is possible that the 
FDI which is linked with over-valuation in the parent’s source markets as seen in 
Baker et al simply reflects the increase in ex ante investments demanding more 
external capital rather than ‘cheap’ capital that is seeking (ex post) a foreign 
investment home opportunistically.  In either case, expectations about interest rates 
and asset prices must be linked to significant commitments of corporate capital to 
FDI. 
 
The link between capital markets and FDI should also be impacted by the 
dynamic shocks which typically accompany global business cycles.  In this context, a 
firm’s financial capacity may have a disproportionate influence on the FDI funding 
decision when new capital is “cheap” and the firm has a high level of funding 
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liquidity (i.e., little practical constraint in raising capital).  This can lead to a partial 
decoupling of the economic motives for foreign market entry when funding new FDI 
opportunities under certain dynamic market conditions.  By decoupling, we mean that 
speculation on future interest rates or asset price shocks may have an over-riding 
influence in the FDI funding decision so that the traditional economic motives may 
become secondary or discounted substantially in favour of ‘financially engineered’ 
FDI projects. This decoupling may be triggered by asset pricing bubbles or non-
market clearing conditions that limits the number of suitable FDI opportunities in a 
concentrated foreign market.  In practical terms, this may mean that firms with 
greater financial capacity and expertise may be better suited to increase 
diversification, seek non-core FDI, or tolerate higher operational risk in their FDI 
projects. It may also make them more disposed to manage multiple FDI opportunities 
like a portfolio of investments rather than as the strategic vehicles for exploiting 
cross-border ownership advantage.   
 
Investment Theory and FDI 
 
Within the long-standing theory of investment  (Keynes, 1951; Jorgenson, 
1963; Precious, 1987),  interest rates and the rate of investment have a strong 
reciprocal relationship.  Paradoxically, this directly contrasts the received traditional 
theory of foreign direct investment that largely discounts the importance of interest 
rates altogether. We argue that the linkage between these two investment theories is 
governed by the dynamic relationship between the internal and external capital 
markets of multinational firms.  To explore this linkage, we need to examine the 
capital flows and investments of foreign subsidiaries as independent, profit 
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maximizing entities whose capital demands and opportunities for growth may at 
times conflict with those of their parents or other competing subsidiaries.  
 
The role of expectations and uncertainty on future asset prices has long been a 
central concept within investment theory (Keynes, 1951).  In planning for high 
growth that is typical of new FDI projects, subsidiaries cannot simply adjust their 
levels of capital stock instantaneously to new target levels.  Firms must plan the 
funding for large FDI projects that is likely to make capital flow in larger increments 
or “lumps” with higher sensitivity to anticipated changes in interest rates.  
Furthermore, wage costs and fixed asset prices will also have a part in controlling 
capital adjustment costs (Precious, 1987).  So new capital flows are more likely to 
flow in response to near-term expectations of growth, asset prices and interest rates 
that are reflected in current and recent economic trends.  In contrast, new capital 
investments must also take into account future expectations of growth; possible 
changes in foreign risk exposures; the availability of suitable FDI projects; and the 
other aspects of irreversible investments (Desai et al., 2004; Antrás et al., 2009).    
 
Thus, the FDI funding decision and capital flows to FDI are far from a “one 
and done” product of a static market entry strategy, but a dynamic process which 
must take into account the cost of adjusting capital stock, the expectation of future 
asset prices, changes in interest rates, and the expectation of future growth.  
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Research Questions 
 
As we have argued, FDI capital flows are linked with capital market rates over 
the long term. However, new, net capital flows are more likely to fund near-term 
financing needs (i.e., planned or budgeted expenditures within a one year period) and 
are more likely to be affected by the expectations of current growth and changes in 
current asset prices and interest rates.  We also know that firms with stronger 
financial capacity are better positioned to exploit near-term interest rate 
opportunities. This leads us to a simple set of questions about the flow of new, 
(secondary) capital flows to foreign subsidiaries: 
 
R1-4: New, net capital flows are correlated with expectations about current 
growth, market interest rates, and the firm’s financing capacity. 
 
As new capital flows are likely to fund short-term demands for capital, the 
traditional economic motives for FDI that govern the market entry and location 
decision, may not be necessarily linked with the funding of long-term growth and 
expansion6. In contrast, it is new capital investments that are necessary to provide 
increased capacity to support growing market share.  They also require detailed 
planning and must anticipate the costly adjustment of capital stock.  This leads us to a 
simple test about the flow of new, capital investments within foreign subsidiaries: 
 
R2-4: New capital investments are correlated with expectations about future 
growth and the firm’s financial capacity. 
                                                 
6 Growth and expansion are related to the changes in capital stock.  Growth implies the firm is able to 
achieve a stable increase in output of revenues without additional capital investment.  In contrast, 
expansion signifies an increase in capital investment or capital stock needed to support higher output. 
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Modelling Capital Movements  
 
The basic types of capital flows to FDI are equity capital, debt or intra-
company loans, and reinvested earnings.   Equity and debt are more typically 
designated as ‘new capital’ as they are actual flows of real capital to the foreign 
subsidiary.  Reinvested earnings are those profits or earnings generated by the 
subsidiary which the parent ‘reinvests’ by allowing the foreign subsidiary to retain 
them rather than repatriating them back to the parent.  FDI flows may also be further 
classified as primary or secondary capital flows.  Primary capital flows are those 
funds that originated from the market-entry decision process to fund the start-up of a 
“Greenfield” operation or purchase a going concern.  Secondary capital flows are 
those flows that occur subsequent to the initial capitalization of the foreign subsidiary 
and include capital investments in fixed assets and to some lesser extent, exchanges 
of assets or shares between subsidiaries.  
 
In the case of primary capital flows to mergers and acquisitions (M&A), most 
of what are designated as ‘FDI’ for M&A are not really foreign direct investment at 
all; that is, they do not represent any foreign or direct investment in the host economy 
or even in a foreign subsidiary. These capital flows are the purchase price paid to the 
foreign sellers of the foreign subsidiary to pay for the change in ownership control. 
These funds may or may not be reinvested in the seller’s host country. 
 
 Secondary capital flows are also more likely to equal or exceed the primary 
capital flows over a typical 20-year horizon.  More importantly, secondary capital 
flows are also more likely to represent the bulk of the actual economic investment in 
a host economy.  This may be illustrated by the mixed results which the research 
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literature reports between FDI and positive externalities in host economies (Carkovic 
& Levine, 2005).  Primary FDI flows often represent the acquisition of land or 
property assets, and start-up costs that are likely to have little short-term economic 
impact on the host economy.  In contrast, the secondary flows tend to increase over 
time as the foreign enterprise grows and expands.  Furthermore, the higher returns to 
scale which result in lower average costs tend to occur later in the business cycle 
when output, productivity and capital investments are higher (Aharonovitz & Miller, 
2010).   
 
The current literature on the modelling of capital flows is largely based on 
transactional or balance of accounts methods of capital stock at the country-level. To 
model firm-level capital flows directly between parents and subsidiaries requires the 
integration of both country-level and firm-level variables.  As a starting point, the 
Baker et al model provides a simple, static, country-level model linked with firm-
level financial data of capital flows linked with the parent’s source country equity 
market and a composite measure of country-level economic factors in  Model 2.0  as 
follows: 
   

     Model  2.0  Capital Flows and FDI after Baker et al 1          
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The Baker et al model is essentially a demand function that links market-
based asset prices with aggregated ‘demand’ flows to FDI given the reciprocal 
relationship between the firm’s share price and its cost of equity capital. However, 
new capital flows may originate from debt or any combination of debt, equity or 
other liquid reserves. In addition, other firm-level factors may also condition the FDI 
response such as the firms’ financing capacity and other market structure variables.  
The cheap ‘equity’ capital model proposed by Baker et al explains why aggregate 
FDI flows during periods of higher market valuations, but it does not explain why the 
larger portion of foreign subsidiaries assets are in fact funded by debt.  
 
The funding of FDI transpires in different phases with distinct decision 
processes including market entry; growth; expansion, and market exit.  As we noted 
above, the start-up or market entry costs are typically those funds needed to purchase 
new ‘Greenfield’ assets.  The funding of subsequent growth and expansion requires 
new (i.e., secondary) capital flows or “new capital injections” to fund the increases in 
working capital (i.e., capital needed to pay for increasing operating expenses) 
required for higher levels of output.  We distinguish the term ‘expansion’ as the 
increase in the firm’s productive asset base through new capital investments such as 
new equipment, laboratories or other physical plant assets. On the other hand, growth 
reflects an increase in output with the current level of capital stock, implying an 
increase in the returns to scale.  Moreover, new capital flows do not necessarily 
represent any actual ‘investment’, but can be used to cover profit losses or changes in 
capital structure. In contrast, capital investments or the increase in the level of capital 
stock have a more direct effect on the host economy since it signals the demand for 
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more labour and other related capital purchases which are more likely to be sourced 
from the host economy.  
 
Our examination of capital flows and capital investments within the 
multinational firm requires some detailed accounting of the transactions between the 
parents and their foreign subsidiaries.  Unfortunately, trying to model all of the 
mechanical accounting transactions would be nearly impossible. First, there are 
heterogeneous lags in the chain of transactions of months or even years that can lapse 
over different accounting periods, and vary over local accounting standards.  
Secondly, there are idiosyncratic differences in the linkages. For example, not all 
firms will issue new public equity shares in response to high market valuations but 
may also issue them to employees or other non-public transactions.  Thirdly, the 
linkages may not necessarily be linear due to market rate shocks, internal allocation 
methods, or tax issues.  For example, newer firms with higher growth prospects may 
have higher working capital requirements and may divert more capital to pay growth 
related expenses.  In addition, it is not possible to distinguish within our data whether 
new debt comes from the parent or from local credit sources.  In many cases, inter-
company loans in the form of debt are found in subsidiaries within host economies 
where there are constraints in the host country’s credit markets  (Desai et al., 2004).  
For our purposes, we are simply modelling ‘external’ capital flows that are those 
which flow in excess of the available cash at the subsidiary. 
Model 2.1   New Capital Flows to Foreign Subsidiaries  
 
We develop an empirical, autoregressive, dynamic panel model from the 
literature to explain the drivers of new capital flows to foreign subsidiaries.  
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Following the work of Razin and Sadka, we modify the Baker et al  model for new 
capital flows to include annual sales growth as the proxy for firm-level output and 
provide additional firm-level controls (Razin & Sadka, 2007a).  The capital market 
factors provide the other proxies for the cost of capital as a function of current asset 
prices or their indirect effect on future interest rates.  We add explanatory variables 
for the firm’s market structure to link capital flows with the economic drivers of FDI.   
 
Defined Variables 
 
The dependent variable in Model 2.1 is the new, net capital flows of debt and 
equity to the foreign subsidiaries measured in constant, US dollars. In contrast to the 
model of Baker et al, we expressly exclude retained earnings as there are no actual 
capital flows in these cases.   We define our primary explanatory variable as the rate 
of sales growth.  Sales growth is a key driver of capital demand because it signals 
higher requirements for working capital and increases in variable inputs (i.e., labour 
and raw materials). It is also a capital driver in new firms in early stages of growth 
which have high cash demands and lower profits (Gatchev et al., 2009).   
 
We designate our market structure variables as; (a) firm size which is a proxy 
for economies of scales; (b) the relative market share of the firm in comparison with 
its NACE industry total market share in the sample (See Appendix for listing of 
NACE classifications); (c) the host Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which is a proxy 
of market size; and (d) the annual growth rate in the host’s GDP as a measure of 
changing market demand.   We also include the firm’s capital intensity given by the 
total assets divided by the annual sales as a measure of the relative barriers to entry 
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and also as a proxy of capital risk and the reliance on debt financing (Harris, 1988).  
We include host inflation rate as a signal of current growth and expectations about 
current asset prices which are typically correlated with inflation, particularly with 
respect to durable goods needed for physical expansion.  
 
The capital market variables include our global benchmark measure for capital 
market rates using the S&P 500 total market return as we have seen in Figure 1-4.  
This rate also serves as a proxy for the cost of equity capital.  The total return is 
calculated by the year over year change in the share price and any dividends paid, 
which makes it a basic measure of current global asset prices. The price to earnings 
(PE) ratio is our measure of market ‘over’ valuation; however, what the PE ratio also 
communicates is the expectation of future growth.  For new capital flows, we include 
the PE ratios for the parent’s home market as well as the global benchmark PE ratio 
for the S&P 500 as proxies for the market-to-book variable in the Baker et al model.  
The PE ratio also provides a link with investment theory, since expectations of future 
asset prices and growth have an effect on the rate of investment (Precious, 1985).   
 
The London Inter-Bank Overnight Rate (LIBOR) is provided as a proxy 
measure of the global benchmark of the interest rate for borrowing.  We also provide 
the parents and the subsidiary’s Altman Z credit score as a proxy for financial 
capacity, financial expertise or managerial effectiveness (Altman, 2007; Altman et 
al., 2004).   The control variables include the parent firm’s size in total assets so that 
we control for capital flows simply as result of the overall size of the enterprise; and 
the subsidiary’s profitability since new capital flows may not only signal new 
investment but also the need to fund profit losses. We modify the basic demand 
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model of Baker et al with these additional exogenous variables in a simple reduced 
form model in Model 2.0 as follows: 
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Model 2.1   New Capital Flows to FDI2 3  
 
Model  3.1   New Capital Investments by Foreign Subsidiaries   
 
We develop an empirical, autoregressive dynamic panel model from the 
literature to explain the key drivers of capital investments made by foreign 
subsidiaries.  Initially, we began with the same explanatory variables as Model 2.1; 
however, we substituted variables where the decision process which drives new 
capital for financing and new capital for investment is necessarily different. In model 
3.1, we use a modified investment function where sales growth is the measure for 
total firm output.  Precious provides an investment model based on the Cobb-Douglas 
production function and drawn on the earlier work of Keynes and Jorgensen as given 
in  Model 3.0 (Precious, 1987).   
                
                                                                     
Model 3.0   The Cobb-Douglas Production Function 4              
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According to Precious, the following equation shows that the firm sets their 
rate of investment in order to maximize their future expected discounted cash flows 
from capital investments and factor inputs as shown in Model 3.1: 
10
1
max (0) { ( , ) ( )}                                                   (3.1)
 discounted cash flow
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Model 3.1   Cash-flow Maximizing Investment 5 
  
We reorder and modify Model 3.1 with additional exogenous variables for 
market structure and capital market factors and label this as Model 3.2.  The 
dependent variable in Model 3.2 is the annual change in capital stock or the new, net 
capital investment. In contrast to Model 3.1, we specify the sales growth rate rather 
than a static production function as a driver of capital investments as it also transmits 
expectations about current growth and the requirements for short-term liquid assets or 
cash needed to fund working capital.   
 
The additional market structure variables include those variables that are more 
likely to be related to growth and higher demand for products and services including: 
firm size, market share, capital intensity, and the annual growth rate in the host’s 
GDP as measure of host market demand.  We include changes in host wages as the 
linkage between the capital and labour ratio as given in the investment function that 
shows wage increases can have an effect on rates of capital investment (Precious, 
1987). 
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The capital market variables share some common variables with Model 2.1.  
We include both the parent and subsidiaries Altman Z credit score as a proxy for 
financial capacity. The PE ratio of the parents’ home or source country stock market 
and benchmark S&P 500 PE ratio are provided as proxies for the expectation of 
future growth and market valuation.  We also include the LIBOR as a measure of the 
global benchmark on debt interest rates. 
 
The control variables include the subsidiaries firm’s size in total assets so that 
we control for capital investment regardless of the overall size of the enterprise. We 
also include controls for changes in leverage as we find on inspection of the 
descriptive features that the majority of the firms in the sample finance their assets 
with debt.  Finally, we include a control for external capital demand, which is the 
demand for capital in excess of the firm’s available cash, to control for firms 
investing with their own capital (Rajan & Zingales, 2001). This gives a model for 
firm-level capital investment as shown in Model 3.2: 
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Model 3.2   New Capital Investments by Foreign Subsidiaries 6 
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Data Set 
 
The data set for this study is comprised of an unbalanced panel of 6,969 firms 
from 22 countries in the OECD.  Our initial sample drew about 2.0 million firms 
from ORBIS® based on the availability of basic financial and demographical data for 
the period of 2000 to 2007.  We exclude all non-industrial firms such as banking or 
government services. The sample was then subjected to a screening process for the 
minimum availability of 50% of data points for key balance sheet and revenue data 
elements and a minimum annual revenue requirement of $5M.  This sample pool was 
then winsorized to control extreme outliers for firms with year over year changes of 
more than +/- 1000% in the key financial ratios such as the current ratio.  The final 
sample firm count was 6,969 subsidiaries and matched parents (13,938 total firms).  
In the descriptive statistics, we have aggregated firms by revenues:  small firms < 
$65M; large firms > $65M and < $1B; and very large firms > $1B.  
 
For this study, we require multinational parents to have at least 1 foreign 
subsidiary listed in the ORBIS® database that has foreign operations outside the 
source country, and has no other parent company ownership.   Foreign subsidiaries 
must have at least 1 parent firm listed in the database that owns not less than 50% of 
the subsidiary’s outstanding shares.  Also, all variables for the parent’s economic and 
financial data are matched for each observation period so that only one sample is 
drawn as opposed to regressing separate models for parents and subsidiaries.  
Additional data from other sources include the price to earnings ratio for each of the 
OECD countries from the Morgan Stanley global database, and the country risk 
ratings and host country economic factors are taken from the World Bank.  
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Estimation Method 
 
The construction of these models presents several challenges following an 
examination of the structure and features of our working data set.   First, we should 
expect some endogeneity in most of our firm-level explanatory variables, given that 
they are linked with common revenue generating activities and  production or 
demand functions and therefore are also likely to suffer from serial correlation.  To 
handle these problems, we employ the two-step ‘system’ generalized methods of 
moments (GMM) estimators (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
These methods are frequently used with unbalanced panels with endogenous 
explanatory variables and heteroskedasticity in the error terms7.   The two-step 
estimator is less sensitive to the larger number of internal instruments that are present 
due to the larger number of explanatory variables in the models. 8 Additionally, we 
use the natural log of the dependent variable and some of the explanatory variables in 
the case where we identified non-linearity in their responses.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The ‘difference’ GMM est imator can purge fixed effects by differencing, but this also removes the 
constant term.  The ‘system’ estimator uses both differencing and lagging in levels to provide instrument 
orthogonality and preserve the constant for econometric projections.  Moreover, the instruments provided 
in the difference method are also known to be weak and not suitable for more strongly endogenous 
variables.  One-step estimation has also been reported to have some bias in coefficient if the number of 
instruments is too high so in this case we chose the two-step method. 
 
8 The two-step system GMM method has some reported downward bias in the standard errors that 
may be weakened for the purposes of drawing inferences.  We apply the Windmeijer  correction to 
the standard errors to improve the reliability of our models for statistical inference  (Windmeijer, 
2005). We report the second order auto correlation results as first order autocorrelation is expected 
and it p resence is uninformative.  We employ the forward orthogonal deviations in t he estimates, 
which helps the unbalanced gaps in the data set.  We also report the Hansen test for exogeneity of 
the instrument matrices for the two-step estimation methods.  We  should also note that the firm 
count for each regression result would be lower than the total firm count in the sample as the 
system uses use observations in the sample for internal instruments.  
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Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter Four  
 
The descriptive statistics for the sample are shown in Table 1-4.   In looking at 
the firms in the sample, we see that over 60% of the foreign subsidiaries are small or 
medium enterprises (SME) that is with annual sales under $65M.  Moreover, larger 
subsidiaries have proportionally larger capital flows and capital investments that 
suggest that deeper financing capacity may have a stronger effect on firm growth than 
economies of scale alone.  On average, about 27% of new capital flows were funded 
from equity which also reflects the higher weighting of international firms in the 
sample who prefer bank financing as discussed above.  Consequently, most all of the 
foreign subsidiaries have high leverage ratios; that is, they overwhelmingly fund 
foreign operations with debt, and more importantly, they have much higher leverage 
ratios than their parent’s ratio. This may reduce the risk to the parent’s shareholders 
by using more host credit which is discussed in Chapter Five (Desai et al., 2008).   
 
On average, the new capital flows were about 4% of the average total asset 
base each year and the new capital investments were about 8% of the total asset base 
each year that suggests about half of the new capital investments are funded by new 
capital flows with the rest coming from local funds.   It is also evident that larger 
firms have relatively higher rates of growth associated with significantly higher rates 
of new capital flows and capital investments.  
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Descriptive Statistics Means Sample Small Large  V. Large 
Firm Count  7,219 4,354 2,590 275 
   
Subsidiary Sales  ($M)* 207.7 25.7 220.0 2,949.0 
Subsidiary Sales Growth*  18.0% 15.0% 21.0% 37.7% 
Profitability 6.3% 6.3% 6.1% 7.7% 
Subsidiary Profit Growth* 1.6% 1.4% 1.9% 2.4% 
   
Total Foreign Owned Assets 237.1 28.7 220.0 3,664.3 
   
New Capital Investments* 17.7 1.2 10.7 344.4 
New Capital Investment 7.5% 4.1% 4.9% 9.4% 
   
New Debt Flows 54.8 5.2 34.3 942.2 
New Equity Flows 20.1 3.3 26.1 267.6 
Total New Capital Flows 74.9 8.5 60.4 1,209.8 
FDI Rate % (Flows / FOA)/year 3.9% 3.7% 3.4% 4.1% 
   
Debt Ratio  0.68 0.68 0.69 0.71 
Parent Debt Ratio 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.54 
   
Subsidiary Capital Intensity  1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6 
   
(*) annual averages   
 
Table   1-4    Descriptive Statistics for Chapter Four        2   
 
 
Estimation Results for Model  2.1  
 
The result of estimation for Model 2.1 appears in Table 2-4.  The lagged 
dependent variable is both large and significant showing prior year flows have an 
effect on current year capital flows, a consequence of annual budgeting processes 
designed to normalize capital demands.  This suggests a smooth and continuous 
funding activity in response to the demand for capital to fund current growth, or in a 
few cases to fund profit losses.   
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Table  2-4     Estimation of Model 2.1      3       
 
 The primary explanatory variable is the sales growth rate, which is small but 
significant with an elasticity of 0.10 %. This may reflect the fact that most normal 
growth is actually funded by retained earnings in profitable firms.  We also find a 
relatively weak but significant correlation with the benchmark for the S&P 500 total 
return with an elasticity 0.22%, so that a 1% increase in global asset prices is linked 
with a 0.22% increase in capital investments. This smaller elasticity is most likely the 
 
Variable  Name Description 
Coefficient / 
 z-values 
Elasticity
Dependant Variable (ln)  New Capital Flows FDI (Secondary)   
Lagged Dep. Variable (ln)    
1.221 
24.95 
11.0% 
Firm-Level  
Determinants  
Growth Revenues 
0.356 
4.01 
0.10% 
Firm Size Economies of Scale 
-1.83e-07 
-2.43 
-0.06% 
Market Share 
Relative 
NACE Share 
23.216 
2.37 
0.03% 
Host GDP (ln) Size of Economy 
-0.031 
-0.64 
 
GDP Growth (ln) Growth Rate 
0.038 
.058 
 
Capital Intensity Barriers to Entry 
0.097 
2.72 
0.15% 
 
Market Structure 
Factors 
Inflation  Host Asset Prices   
14.266 
2.81 
0.32% 
S&P 500 Total 
Return (*) 
Global Asset Prices 
1.789 
3.88 
0.22% 
Parent Market PE Future Growth  
-0.061 
-0.35 
 
S&P 500  PE Future Growth 
0.045 
2.26 
1.01% 
Parents’ Altman 
Credit Score 
Financing Capacity 
0.008 
1.75 
 
Firm’s  Altman 
Credit Score  
Financing Capacity 
0.188 
3.35 
0.63% 
Capital Market  
Factors 
LIBOR Cost of Borrowing 
64.613 
2.17 
0.15% 
Parent Size Revenues   
-6.26e-09 
-2.86 
-0.04% 
Controls 
Firm Profitability Operating Profits 
-1.242 
-2.56 
-0.02% 
Intercept   
-3.287 
-2.02 
 
Wald chi2  Joint Significance  0.000  
Autocorrelation Test AR(2)   0.383  
Hansen Test for Exogeneity   0.584  
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result of the variety of different firm types in the sample, as we should naturally 
expect industry effects to be significant for both capital flows and capital 
investments.   What is interesting and important is that this result is significant across 
multiple industries and across 22 countries.  It has been established within the 
literature that there are strong co-movements between the capital market rates of most 
of the industrialized countries (Berben & Jansen, 2005).  Likewise, there appears to 
be significant co-movement of asset prices and capital flows to FDI across our highly 
diversified sample. (See Figure 2-4 shown in whole USD) 
 
 
Figure  2-4     New Equity Capital Flows and S&P 500 Returns   3  
 
The correlation between capital flows and the parent’s market PE ratio was 
not found to be significant, but the correlation with the global benchmark PE ratio 
was significant in suggesting a link with the expectation about broadly generalized 
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prospects for future growth.  In Baker et al, the aggregate capital flows correlate with 
the parent’s market-to-book ratios, which is a similar measure of market ‘over’ 
valuation to PE ratios.  This absence of a significant correlation is the result of 
decomposing capital movements into its constituent parts; that is the actual capital 
flows and retained earnings.  When we only test new capital movements rather than 
firm accounts aggregated at the national level, the ‘over-valued’ PE ratios in the 
parent’s markets may not necessarily be strongly linked to ‘FDI’ like those found in 
Baker et al.9  This is because new capital flows also finance current capital demands 
like inventories, working capital and other near-term financing activities that do not 
necessarily link with economic investment. In contrast, the subsidiary’s financial 
strength was indeed found to be correlated with new capital flows with an elasticity 
of 0.63% suggesting that the firms with high debt capacity have stronger capital 
flows.   
 
The two most consistent economic determinants of FDI in the research 
literature are host GDP and growth in host GDP (Chakrabarti, 2001).  It is interesting 
to see that neither the total host GDP nor the growth in host GDP is correlated with 
new capital flows.  This is because new capital flows often fund ‘financing’ activities 
and not necessarily any real economic investment.  Moreover, firm size, as a proxy 
for economies of scale has a small, negative correlation and is the result of the over-
weighting of small firms.  However, the largest correlation of all the market structure 
variables is the values for host inflation with an elasticity of 0.32% that signals a 
linkage with expectations about both current growth in output and asset prices, 
particularly the price of physical assets in the host economy.   
                                                 
9 There is likely to be simultaneity issue from aggregating retained earnings in the Baker et al models; that 
is, higher retained earnings may be also driving the higher market values in the Baker et al model.   
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New capital flows were also positive and weakly correlated with the LIBOR; 
however, given the 5% drop in the LIBOR from 6% to 1% in 2002, this weakness 
may be reflecting an asymmetry in the debt flows (or borrowing ‘shock’) which 
began after the rates fell to their lowest level in 2003 (See Figure 3-4 shown in  
USD).  Finally, all our controls were all significant but with very small elasticities.  
 
We should also consider the general availability and access to commercial 
credit in an efficient capital funding process (Currie & Morris, 2002).  The common 
measure of commercial credit availability or liquidity is the interest rate spread 
between risk-free securities (i.e., government bonds) and the prevailing commercial 
interest rates to corporations such as the LIBOR, and also known as the ’TED’ 
spread10.  If the spread in this rate increases, it indicates a drop in credit market 
liquidity as investors move their capital to the safety of risk-free securities. During 
the period of our study, this spread remained about 1%, suggesting that in spite of a 
market driven asset-price shock in 2000, the liquidity in the credit markets remained 
relatively stable and most firms had access to commercial credit.    
 
 
                                                 
10 TED spread meant originally the ‘treasury bill and euro-dollar’ spread.  
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Figure  3-4     New Debt Flows to FDI  and LIBOR   4 
   
 
 
Estimation Results for Model 3.2 
  
The results of the estimation of Model 3.2 are shown in Table 3-6.  In this 
table, we see that prior year capital investments do not correlate with the current year 
levels.  This is confirmed by the large, asymmetrical flows in capital investments in 
the data set that tend to occur in large “lumps” every 2 to 3 years (See Figure 4-4). 
This is likely to be linked with the long planning cycles and in the inability of firms 
to adjust, instantaneously, their capital stock levels to new target levels.   
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Figure  4-4     Capital Investments of Parents and Affiliates   5           
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Table  3-4     Estimation of Model 3.2  4             
 
Large fixed capital investments are by nature, irreversible and require capital 
funding strategies to handle expectations in future financing constraints (Caggese, 
2007).  The correlation of new capital investments with the sales growth rate and 
market share were positive but small contributors to expectations about current levels 
Variable  Name Description 
Coefficient /         
z-values 
Elasticity 
Dependant Variable New Capital 
Investment  (ln) 
FDI (Secondary)   
Lagged Dep. Variable   
-0.161 
-0.42 
 
Firm-Level  
Determinants  
Growth Revenues 
0.392 
2.24 
0.09% 
Firm Size Economies of Scale 
-1.48e-07 
-1.76 
 
Market Share (ln) 
NACE Sector 
Concentration 
0.154 
1.91 (1) 
0.15% 
Growth Host GDP Growth in Market 
33.464 
2.81 
1.04% 
Capital Intensity Barriers to Entry 
0.028 
0.57 
 
 
Market Structure 
Factors 
Change in 
Host Wages 
Substitution of 
Capital 
-0.060 
-0.04 
 
S&P 500  PE Future Growth 
0.059 
1.90(1) 
1.29% 
Parent Market PE+ Future Growth 
0.267 
2.33 
4.56% 
Parent’s Altman 
Credit Score (ln) 
Financing Capacity 
0.192 
2.35 
0.19% 
Firm’s  Altman 
Credit Score 
Financing Capacity 
0.024 
0.41 
 
Capital Market  
Factors  
LIBOR Cost of Borrowing 
-9.966 
-0.10 
 
Change in Leverage Control 
0.015 
2.37 
-0.00% 
External Capital 
Demand 
Capital Investment 
in Excess of Cash 
8.96e-07 
3.39 
0.05% Controls  
Asset Base Total Assets 
-1.28e-07 
-2.28 
-1.06% 
Intercept  Constant 
-8.234 
-2.58 
 
Wald chi2 p-value Joint Significance  0.000  
Autocorrelation Test AR(2) p-value  0.947  
Hansen Test for 
Exogeneity 
p-value  0.157  
 (1) Significance 0.056  
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of growth on investment.  The correlation with the parent’s credit score was small but 
also significant.   
 
Capital investments were collinear with the global benchmark for asset prices 
(i.e., the S&P total return) and not reported in Table 3-4.  However, looking at Figure 
5-4, where we map the capital investments with the S&P 500 total return, we see a 
strong co-movement.  Moreover, we can compare the firm-level capital investments 
in Figure 5-4 with the global changes in OECD FDI flows as seen in Figure 1-4. We 
see a strong parallel between capital flows and asset prices world-wide thus showing 
the linkage between capital flows and capital investments.  On the other hand, the 
most significant driver of new capital investments is the parent’s market PE ratio, 
which has a highly significant correlation with an elasticity of 4.5%. The correlation 
with the global PE ratio with an elasticity of 1.29% but with a slightly lower 
significance of p = 0.056.  These are both signals of future growth expectations and 
market liquidity. While we cannot distinguish whether or not this linkage is entirely 
direct, (i.e., the parents issue over-valued stock that directly funds the purchase of 
new capital investment) we can see that only half of new capital investments are 
being funded from internal subsidiary funds.   In either case, it strongly suggests the 
arbitrage mechanism of Baker et al or a similar “wealth effect” afforded by high 
valuations in the parent’s home stock market. 
 
The rate of capital investment was also related to growth in the Host GDP 
with an elasticity of 1.04% suggesting that expectations about current economic 
growth also support capital investments.  Thus in contrast to Baker et al, it is new 
capital investments rather than new capital flows which appear to be linked with 
‘over’ valued markets. This also suggests that ‘cheap’ capital is more likely to flow to 
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investment activities rather than ‘financing’ activities.  Therefore, we can infer some 
support of the ‘cheap’ capital hypothesis exactly where it ought to be found, in 
correlation with actual physical, economic investment in a foreign economy.   
 
Figure  5-4     Capital Investment in FDI and S&P 500   6             
 
 
The correlation with the LIBOR was not significant and with a negative 
coefficient due to the irregular timing of capital flows and the LIBOR shock as seen 
in Figure 3-4. Finally, our controls were significant but smaller than we would expect 
perhaps due to the differences in the number of different industrial sectors in the 
sample. The correlation of excess capital demand is significant in that it shows that 
there are external funding flows supporting the new capital investments, not just 
reinvested earnings. 
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We also observe that within the data set the rates of capital investments tend 
to be smaller and smoother within industries with lower capital intensity such as 
Retail or Manufacturing over the sample period as seen in Figure 6-411. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-4     Capital Investment in NACE Industries   7    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Capital flows in whole USD and the capital intensities are in brackets. 
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Comparison of the Estimates Models 2.1 and 3.2 
  
The basic difference between Models 2.1 and 3.2 is the differences in the 
effects of expectations on the rate of investment as given in the general investment 
theory (Keynes, 1951; Precious, 1987).  A comparison of the key elasticities of these 
two models appears in Table 4-4.  In the case of Model 2.1, the expectations of near-
term changes in output levels associated with current growth in host demand, and the 
changes in current asset prices (i.e., via the inflation proxy) have a stronger influence 
on current capital flows.  In contrast, some generalized expectations about future 
growth in the general business cycle may be reflected in the correlation of new 
capital flows with the Global S&P 500 PE ratio which should not be as strong as the 
parent’s market PE ratio.  This is because parents are likely to hold their most 
significant connections with their respective capital markets in their home country.  
In contrast, Model 3.2 showed us that prior year effects of capital investment are 
irrelevant as are wages and price levels, but future expectations of growth are linked 
with the parent’s home market PE ratio are highly correlated.  This is consistent with 
our argument that new capital flows are more likely to fund current, near-term 
financing activities whereas new capital investments fund fixed asset investment in 
long-term, foreign economic activity.   
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Economic 
Signal 
Signal 
Strength 
Variable of Interest 
New Capital 
Flows 
New Capital 
Investments 
   Model 2.1 Model 3.2 
Future Growth 
Expectations 
Stronger Parent Market PE Ratio  4.54% 
Weaker Global Market PE Ratio 1.01% 1.29% 
Current Price 
Levels 
Weaker S&P 500 Total Return 0.22%  
Stronger Host Inflation 0.32%  
 
Table  4-4   Comparison of Elasticities for Capital Flows and Investments   5     
 
Chapter Summary 
 
While economic motives and determinants of FDI govern the market entry 
decision and primary capital flows to FDI, capital markets and the foreign 
subsidiary’s market structure have an influence on funding the growth and expansion 
of FDI.  We find some limited evidence to support the Baker et al arbitrage theory 
that multinational firms may exploit market over-valuation to support new capital 
investment in foreign economic activities across a diverse sample of foreign 
subsidiaries in multiple industries and 22 countries in the OECD.  We also find 
support for our research questions that new capital flows to foreign subsidiaries are 
linked to expectations of current growth through correlation with of current asset 
prices where a 1% increase in total market return of the S&P 500 is correlated with a 
0.22% increase in new capital flows.  We also find support for our research question 
that capital investment are also linked more strongly with expectations of future 
growth where an increase of 1% in the parent’s market PE ratio is correlated with a 
4.5% increase in capital investment. The correlation of capital investment and future 
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growth expectations reflects the longer planning cycles of irreversible, discontinuous 
investments which are more sensitive to interest rate risk. 
   
Our findings stress a meaningful difference between the different components 
of capital flows for FDI.  We show that new capital flows are a measure of the 
investment in the growth of the foreign enterprise that may support an increase in the 
returns to scale, whereas new capital investment measures investment in the 
expansion of foreign economic activities with an increase in capital stock. With the 
secular trends in the global financial markets for asset price bubbles followed by 
deflationary asset price crashes, the linkage between capital markets and FDI will 
play a critical role in developing the capacity for future economic recovery cycles.  
Market bubbles are not only cyclical, but also a predictable feature of open market 
economies. Firms that are able to buffer and exploit these cycles can more vigorously 
exploit their financial market capacity as a competitive advantage.  Finally, we see 
that a final ‘theory’ of foreign direct investment should not be considered complete 
until it includes the basic underpinnings of the traditional investment theory where 
the role of interest rates and future expectations of asset prices is fully integrated.  
 
Areas for further research may include the exploration of the impact on FDI 
from the changes in national monetary policies from the worldwide recession of 
2009.  With more national governments redirecting fiscal policy to support domestic 
economic conditions and the severe constraints in commercial credit markets, it is 
unclear whether multinationals will be inclined to do more or less leveraged or 
market-driven FDI when the current economic cycle fully recovers.   
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CHAPTER FIVE       CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY  
 
 
 
 
The different motives of foreign direct investment seek to exploit varying 
advantages and competencies in foreign markets.  The firm’s basic entry motive is 
linked with an operating strategy with a unique set of business risks.  Subsidiaries 
balance the added financial risk of using higher leverage to support growth with 
the business risks that attend these operating strategies to maximize their risk to 
return ratio.  Financial leverage in the foreign subsidiary provides both higher 
returns and some added shareholder protection through risk sharing with host 
creditors.  We find support for a modified, dynamic trade-off model in which the 
capital structure of foreign subsidiaries is linked with their operating strategy and 
the risk factors in the subsidiary’s host environment.  
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Introduction 
 
The foreign subsidiaries of the world’s largest corporations engage in almost 
50% of world trade and about 60% of the assets of these foreign subsidiaries are 
financed by debt (UNCTAD, 2009).  Funding the steady growth in global FDI with 
increasing levels of debt has also brought ever-higher levels of financial risk to 
global shareholders.  Financial risk is created by the firm’s use of interest-bearing 
debt or leverage, which is the use of debt to fund investment.  This financial risk is 
borne primarily by the firm’s equity shareholders (Karma & Sander, 2006).  On the 
other hand, the financial risk created by the use of leverage also provides a type of 
asset substitution where the equity holders transfer wealth to themselves through the 
use of their creditor’s capital (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In contrast, business risk is 
a general term for all non-financial risks which exists in the firm’s operating 
environment regardless of whether it uses leverage or not.  For example, labour 
strikes or geographical areas prone to natural disasters such as floods are general 
business risks.  Foreign subsidiaries must balance both financial and business risk in 
order to maximize their risk and return profile. 
 
We investigate how financial risk and business risk act as opposing forces in 
the foreign subsidiary’s capital structure, which in turn is linked to the firm’s 
operating strategy.  Desai, Foley and Hines have shown that multinationals frequently 
use higher leverage (i.e., assume greater financial risk) within their foreign 
subsidiaries as a means of mitigating foreign political risk (i.e., another type of 
business risk) to protect the parent’s shareholders (Desai et al., 2008).  This naturally 
assumes that a significant portion of the subsidiary’s debt is guaranteed by local 
sources, thereby shifting financial risk to the host creditors.  With the market crashes 
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of 2000 and 2008, and the credit crash of 2009, many international firms which were 
dependent on access to bank financing and lines of credit were faced with raising 
capital with substantially more restrictive terms.  Given than most foreign 
subsidiaries outside the US and UK are financed by debt and bank financing, there is 
a new and important research agenda in developing a framework which explains 
more fully how foreign subsidiaries manage financial risk in an environment of 
scarce business credit.  We develop the linkage between the motives for different 
types of foreign direct investment (FDI), their basic operating strategies, and the 
related business risk factors that motivate the use of leverage as risk mitigating 
strategy.   
 
 Multinationals often choose a mode of entry into foreign markets which 
balances both the cost and risk associated with the host market structure (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009).  The various motives and entry modes for foreign direct investment 
necessarily create differences in the alignment of the subsidiary’s resources within 
these foreign market opportunities that increases the parent’s risk exposure.  Driffield 
and Love provide a simple and robust model to mapping the basic motives for FDI 
onto firm and sectoral level characteristics based on the interaction between two 
critical resources: namely, labour and technology (Driffield & Love, 2007).  These 
FDI motivations can be linked with a basic operating strategy that anticipates 
differing business risk exposures within the host environment.    
 
We draw on different streams of literature in international business, 
economics, and finance to build a framework for modeling the foreign subsidiary’s 
capital structure.  We use this to develop a risk-return model from the current 
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literature on dynamic capital structure trade-off models.  We demonstrate how 
specific FDI motivations are linked with specific business risk factors in the host 
environment and how the subsidiary’s capital structure or leverage responds to those 
risks.  We show that subsidiaries have leverage ratios in excess of their parent’s 
levels that are modified by the business risk factors in the firm’s market structure.  
We contribute to the research literature in business finance by developing the 
determinants of capital structure for foreign subsidiaries with a broad empirical 
investigation of firm-level subsidiary accounts from 38 OECD and emerging 
countries using contemporary econometric estimation methods.   
 
Capital Structure Concepts in the Literature   
  
Capital structure theory has wide and universal treatment in the literature 
since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).  Since 
that time, several theories appear to persist in the literature: namely, the pecking 
order, trade-off, and agency theories.  A brief discussion of these theories follows.  
First, Myers argued that firms prefer to use capital based on a qualitative rationale or 
a ‘pecking order’ tied to their beliefs about the costs and risks associated for each 
type of capital (Myers, 1977).  Myers argued that firms would use cash in preference 
to debt or equity under certain conditions, but that tax deductible interest payments 
also  make debt preferable to equity capital under other conditions.  More recently, 
there is a growing body of literature which recognizes the limited capacity of the 
pecking order theory to explain capital structure choice under highly dynamic market 
conditions (Fama & French, 2002).   
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In contrast to the pecking order theory, the original static trade-off theories 
(Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973) and (Myers, 1984) argued that firms trade the higher 
risk of bankruptcy cost and the tax benefits of higher debt against the higher financial 
risk of leverage which provides higher rates of returns. The static trade-off theory 
also argues that tangible assets can be used as collateral and therefore firms with 
higher growth opportunities would tend to borrow less since as growth prospects 
cannot be efficiently securitized or collateralized.  One of the deficits of the static 
trade-off model is that it predicted higher profitability with leverage which has since 
been largely discounted in the literature.12 Fama and French provide a comparison of 
the pecking order and static trade-off theories and show the significant limitations in 
their explanatory power (Fama & French, 2002).   
 
More recently, the development of dynamic trade-off models have been 
advanced which attempt to correct for many of the short-comings in the static model 
and provide greater reliability in explaining capital structure decisions under dynamic 
market conditions (Hovakimian & Titman, 2002).   Finally, the agency theory of 
capital structure  (Jensen, 1986) argues that debt is a disciplinary instrument used to 
motivate managers to remain profitable instead of deploying capital into less 
constructive outlets (e.g., using excess free cash for “empire building”).  It has 
somewhat less explanatory power in modeling capital structure, but has a strong, 
intuitive appeal.  
 
It is a widely held, stylized fact within financial theory that the use of excess 
leverage is positively related to higher levels of operating risks (Myers, 1984).  For 
                                                 
12 Firms often have higher return on sales with higher use of leverage but with lower return on assets. 
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example, foreign subsidiaries in countries with higher political risk will have higher 
leverage than other similar foreign subsidiaries with lower risks (Desai et al., 2004).  
In contrast, multinational parents are more likely to reduce their own leverage in 
response to foreign risk (Desai et al., 2008).  This means that foreign subsidiaries in 
higher risk environments may have leverage ratios that exceed their parents leverage 
ratios.  Moreover, this higher level of both operating and financial risk commands a 
risk premium from the firm’s investors (Brigham & Erhardt, 2002).  In the case of 
foreign subsidiaries, the parent firm or its stockholders will demand a risk premium 
for the added risk of foreign investment that we call the FDI risk premium.  This 
would be the difference in the return on equity of the parent and the foreign 
subsidiary; that is, the premium paid for investing the shareholder’s equity in foreign 
risk.   
 
A subsidiary’s capital structure with excess leverage, (i.e., in higher 
proportion to the parents leverage ratio) which contains more non-guaranteed debt 
allows more financial risk to be shifted to local creditors and away from the parent’s 
shareholders.  This provides lower financial risk for the same level of returns.  This 
capital structure modification improves the risk and return performance of the 
combined parent-subsidiary portfolio.  For example, a parent firm with a 50% debt 
ratio, and a subsidiary with a 68% debt ratio has a higher proportional share of 
financial risk than its parent does.  If 50% of debt is free of guarantees by the parent 
firm by using more unsecured debt or trade credit, there has been a significant shift of 
financial risk from the parent shareholders to the host creditors, thus improving the 
parent’s overall risk-return ratio (See Figure 1-5).      
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will have a greater challenge in balancing their highly leveraged operations with the 
business risks in the host economy where host credit constraints are significantly 
higher.  
 
Business Risk and FDI 
 
Business Risk and Diversification  
   
The most basic method of mitigating business risk in an enterprise with global 
operations is to diversify its product segments and services across different markets 
or industries.  Firm’s which diversify into different business activities which are 
unrelated to its core business are said to be using a portfolio approach to manage risk 
(Rugman, 1976).  Diversification may come through foreign investments in different 
countries or regions (geographical), different industry sectors, or different product-
lines.  However, product-line diversification in recent studies shows only a weak 
relationship with modification of capital structure which would suggest it has limited 
use as a financial risk mitigation strategy (Singh et al., 2003).  In some cases, a 
multinational may successfully combine both geographical and product 
diversification as a strategy to lower overall risk of default (Chkir & Cosset, 2001).  
Moreover, there appears to be a non-linear relationship between geographical 
diversification and performance where more highly diversified firms may eventually 
achieve poorer performance over longer time periods as the excess diversification 
leads to greater inefficiencies (Geringer et al., 1989) and (Palich et al., 2000).  Thus, 
in many respects, diversification is not a very efficient or practical mitigation 
measure for dynamic business risks. 
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 Diversification is also frequently motivated by a lack of growth opportunities 
in the firm’s core industry (Campa & Kedia, 2002).  This may result in more capital 
being transferred from less profitable core business activities to more highly 
profitable non-core businesses  (Doukas & Kan, 2008).  For example, a study of US 
firms from 1980 to 1992, over 60% of new (i.e., Greenfield) foreign direct 
investments were related to non-core business activities.  Moreover, many of these 
non-core Greenfield investments were found to have some negative effect on 
shareholder returns (Doukas & Lang, 2003).  Furthermore, enterprise-wide 
diversification strategies are cumbersome, costly, and slow to implement or reverse.  
Highly levered foreign operating strategies need risk mitigation measures that 
anticipate how business risk factors link to the dynamic conditions of the host 
market. 
 
Operating Strategy and Business Risk 
 
The determinants of FDI are one of the most widely studied areas in 
international business, but generally, they address those business risks that impede 
access or control of market share, or the exploitation of ownership advantage.  The 
market entry decision that frames the first expectation of business risk is part of the 
firm’s market internalization process.  In this process, the parent seeks to align its 
profit objectives in an imperfect foreign market with the resources it can exploit in 
the host economy through ownership or control of operating assets (Buckley & 
Casson, 1976).  Each type of market entry exposes the firm to different business risks 
in the nascent foreign operation that must be mitigated through managerial controls 
or by risk diversification.  Blonigen summarizes the research on the economic 
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determinants of FDI which include: labour costs; access to market share; exchange 
rates; openness to FDI;  and tax shelters (Blonigen, 2005). The research literature has 
recently expanded to consider financial factors such as the availability of low-cost 
equity capital (Baker et al., 2008) and the firms’ overall financial strength as 
financial determinants of FDI (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2008).   In contrast,  
Chakrabarti’s study of the literature shows that only a single economic determinant of 
FDI is uniformly consistent in the literature; namely, market size or GDP 
(Chakrabarti, 2001).  Each of these ‘determinants’ of FDI has some direct 
corresponding business risk.  For example, FDI motivated by access to local labour 
pools is naturally coupled with the risk of labour strikes or training programs to 
provide workers with basic skills.  
 
As the economic determinants of FDI such as market size, market growth, 
access to low-cost labour, exchange rates, etc. motivate the various entry modes of 
FDI and the primary or initial capital funding decision, they may be unrelated to the 
actual business risks that follow entry where the majority of capital flows are likely 
to occur.  In the IB literature, market entry modes are thought to provide most of the 
business risk mitigation through the form or structure of asset ownership such as 
direct investment or joint venture (JV) as opposed to exporting or licensing.  
However, business risks also have a significant impact on direct investment as well.  
What the IB theories often lack is a framework that identifies the basic differences in 
profit maximization strategies of foreign subsidiaries and how those link with 
different business risk factors.  To build a rationale for developing a dynamic trade-
off model of capital structure for foreign subsidiaries that contemplates business risk 
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factors, we need to provide a framework for characterizing the different FDI 
motivations and their attendant business risks.   
 
Driffield and Love have developed a taxonomy whereby the parent firms seek 
to exploit the differences in two critical resources in the host economy: comparative 
labour costs, and the availability of technological resources which impacts nearly all 
classes and industrial segments of FDI (Driffield & Love, 2007).  They categorize 
FDI motivations into 4 types.  The Type 1 firms seek to exploit markets where the 
host labour costs are comparatively lower and host technological resources are 
greater than in the source country.  In this category, firms seek to exploit host 
conditions where they have some form of comparative location advantage.  The Type 
2 firms are those in which the host labour costs are relatively higher as are the 
availability of technological resource making these firms more likely to be engaged 
in some aspects of technology seeking.  That is, they seek to exploit spillovers from 
host country competitors and other adjacent industries.  The Type 3 firms are those 
where host labour costs are comparatively lower as are the availability of 
technological resources, thus firms would more likely be pursuing some form of 
efficiency seeking.  Finally, the Type 4 firms are those where hosts labour costs are 
comparatively higher and technological resources are comparatively lower than the 
source country so firms may pursue some form of competitive ownership advantage.  
While this taxonomy is intended to provide a tool for describing market entry and 
common economic factors for motivating FDI, it can also serve as a simplified 
framework for understanding the business risk components in foreign operations. 
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Linking Business Risk with FDI Motivations  
 
Expectations of Risk in FDI 
  
Foreign direct investments are a comparatively higher risk strategy than 
exporting, licensing and other less capital-intensive market entry modes and require a 
flexible strategy which can cope with the higher uncertainties of operating in a 
foreign economy (Buckley & Casson, 1998).  This expectation of risk in FDI affects 
both the market entry and sustaining funding decisions of the inside investor (i.e., the 
managers of the firm) and the outside investors (i.e., the shareholders or investors) 
who have direct ownership and potential risk of loss of capital.  The inside and 
outside investors of the firm must agree on some level of acceptable foreign risk or 
the firm’s growth potential will be limited (Stulz, 2007). Like other major, 
irreversible  investments, FDI requires an active and continuous risk-management 
strategy to balance the dynamic trade-offs between risk factors to achieve long-term 
superior returns (Andersen, 2008).  Thus, the parent’s overall FDI strategy reflects its 
choices about how it allocates capital and aligns resources with the dynamic risks in 
the host economy.   
 
Earlier studies showed that firms with more extensive international experience 
sought out higher risk countries as a competitive advantage to less experienced firms 
(Davidson, 1980).  Furthermore, the foreign subsidiaries of larger parents are often 
better positioned to assume more risk in the host environments since they can rely on 
their parents for supporting resources (Poynter & White, 1984).  For example, foreign 
subsidiaries often borrow more from their parents if they are in countries where there 
are weaker capital markets, and in host economies where there are limited or no 
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common law court practices (Desai et al., 2004).  In contrast, FDI in developing 
countries may also represent an opportunity for local sources of capital to engage in 
risk sharing investment with local foreign subsidiaries where they would otherwise 
have limited investment prospects (Albuquerque, 2003).    
 
The modification of the foreign subsidiary’s capital structure in conjunction 
with the experience or the expectation of risk has been empirically supported in the 
literature.  As many foreign subsidiaries have the ability to self-fund their capital 
requirements through retained earnings, their capital structure often reflects more 
about the local host risk factors than the parent’s exposure to risk (Shao, 1997).  
Moreover, multinationals have been shown to use higher subsidiary leverage; that is, 
they are willing to accept a higher level of financial risk where there is higher 
political risk in the host environment (Henisz, 2002) and (Desai et al., 2008).  Other 
studies have shown how foreign subsidiaries modify their capital structure to mitigate 
tax policy risk (Smith, 1997) or in response to a major foreign currency risk 
experience like the Asian financial crisis of 1990’s  (Allayannis et al., 2003).   To 
develop a risk-adjusted capital structure or leverage model, we need a basic 
framework for linking operating risk with basic market structure of the firm. 
 
 
 
Linking Business Risk with the FDI Taxonomy 
 
The four FDI motivations given by Driffield et al can provide a simple 
framework for understanding the potential business risk factors in a capital structure 
trade-off model.  Each of the FDI motives may be linked with a unique operating 
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strategy that reflects the subsidiary’s basic approach to maximizing profit in an 
imperfect market.  A summary of these factors are shown in Table 1-5. 
 
 
 
FDI Type 
 
 
Comparative 
Host 
Advantage 
 
 
Basic 
Operating 
Strategy 
 
Key 
Resource 
Dependency 
Significant Risk Factors  
Explanatory 
Variables 
of Interest 
 
Risk 
Return 
Ratio 
 
Overall 
Operating 
Risk 
 
Capital 
Risks 
(Firm) 
Operating 
Risks 
(Market) 
Economic 
Risk 
(Country) 
 
Location 
Advantage 
Type 1 
 
Lower 
Labour / 
Higher Tech 
Value 
Addition 
Factor 
Markets 
 
Technological 
Scale Effects 
Location 
Specific 
Risks 
 
GDP 
Growth 
 
Country 
Risk 
22.6% Low 
 
Technology 
Seeking 
Type 2 
 
Higher 
Labour / 
Higher Tech 
Resource 
Conversion 
 
 
Competitor’s 
Intellectual 
Property 
 
Capital 
Intensity 
(1/MPK) 
Efficient IP 
Transfer 
 
Asset Efficiency 
 
 
MPK 
 
Asset 
Utilization 
 
10.6% Moderate 
 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Type 3 
Lower 
Labour / 
Lower Tech 
Cost 
Reduction 
Basic Labour  
 
Labour Costs 
 
Volume 
Scale Effects 
 
 
Wage Risk 
 
Revenue 
Growth 
7.7% High 
 
Ownership 
Advantage 
Type 4 
 
Higher 
Labour / 
Lower Tech 
 
Pricing 
Power 
Intellectual 
Property 
 
 
 
Market 
Share 
GDP 
Growth 
21.3% Low 
 
Table  1-5     Business Risk and FDI Types   6     
 
 
Two of these operating strategies may also be called high value-added 
strategies as they are based on some form of comparative or competitive advantage 
(Kogut, 1985), whereas low value-added strategies may rely more heavily on scale 
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effects or cost control.  We rank the FDI types in order of their overall risk as 
value-adding operating strategies, beginning with the higher risk types. 
 
Efficiency-seeking firms (Type 3) have higher operating risk based on their 
low value-added strategy.  They often rely on scale effects to reduce cost margins 
on commodities and other low valued-added products in more mature stages of 
production where profit margins narrow considerably.  They are also more likely to 
be sensitive to host labour rates and revenue growth, which are the drivers of 
volume-related economies of scale.  Their basic operating strategy is cost reduction 
or control.  Consequently, core subsidiaries (i.e., subsidiaries operating in the same 
basic industry as the parent) may not necessarily have higher excess returns over 
the parent’s core business activity because of transfer pricing effects.  The business 
risk factors for this type might include strong collective bargaining units; poor 
educational infrastructure; high transportation costs; and generally poor market 
demand conditions.  Efficiency-seeking firms are generally more sensitive to 
external factors in the host economy such as risks in wage costs and revenue 
growth. 
 
Technology-seeking firms (Type 2) have moderate operating risk as they can 
also a have a limited value-added strategy.  These firms require some redundancy of 
capital investment and training to facilitate the absorption of knowledge and skill 
spillovers from the host economy that make them sensitive to capital investment 
risk.  We could say their basic operating strategy is resource conversion; that is; 
they seek to obtain competitive technologies through spillovers within the host 
economy.  In other words, they seek to obtain new technologies without having to 
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invest internally in these technologies themselves.  The risks that Type 2 firms are 
exposed to include: limited absorptive capacity for technology transfers, and high 
capital investment in under-utilized assets used to transfer and emulate technology 
from the host environment.  Technology-seeking firms are likely to be more 
sensitive to factors over which they have some limited control, in particular, the 
level of capital investment and capital risks relating to the productive utilization of 
assets.    
 
Location-advantaged firms (Type 1) have moderate to low overall risk as an 
operating strategy as it is based on a high value-added strategy.  They may often 
rely on basic labour savings combined with access to technological spillovers or 
infrastructure.  The Type 1 firms often have an internal competency that allows 
them to exploit scale effects within a technological framework.  Their basic 
operating strategy is value addition through combined scale effects in both cost and 
technology (Kogut, 1985). The risk factors for the Type 1 firms might include 
reliable factor markets and limited market growth potential, both of which affect the 
ability to achieve technological scale effects.  Location-advantaged firms are likely 
to be more sensitive to operating risks that are linked with location specific risks 
that affect the ability to perform within the host economy. 
 
Ownership-advantaged firms (Type 4) have the lowest operating risk as they 
are based on a high value-added capacity combined with some competitive 
advantage.  Their ability to control market share through firm-specific advantages 
reflects an operating strategy based on pricing power.  The business risk factors 
associated with these firms might include uncontrolled spillover of the firm’s 
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intellectual property to host competitors; high volatility in the host business cycles 
or GDP; or any other factor that impairs access or control of host market share.  
However, the ownership-advantaged firms are also more likely to have better 
tolerance for host risk factors than other types, as they possess high pricing power 
(i.e., inelastic pricing).  The Type 4 firms represent the most desirable type of FDI 
operating strategy; however, since they already possess pricing power advantage in 
the host market, the core subsidiaries are unlikely to have much substantially higher 
excess returns than their parents.  Ownership-advantaged firms are more likely to 
be sensitive to the risks that affect the stability of their market share in the host 
economy.  
 
 Debt Maturity and Financial Risk   
  
Capital structure has another important dimension that affects the firm’s 
foreign risk mitigation strategy; this is the ratio of long-term to short-term debt, or 
the firm’s debt maturity ratio.  Long-term debt is more frequently issued at fixed 
rates with maturities over 5 years, whereas short-term debt typically matures in 
shorter periods, often in less than 1 year.  There are different risk factors associated 
with debt maturity that impact the firm’s target leverage ratio.  First, consider that 
the foreign subsidiary’s primary creditor is the parent firm and not external 
bondholders or creditors.  Many larger parents have the ability to provide low-
interest or interest-free inter-company loans where capital is unavailable from the 
host economy.  This generally means most foreign subsidiaries have very low 
liquidity risk; that is, they generally have little risk of not being able to obtain 
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financing or refinancing of debt with the parents back-stopping their borrowing 
capacity. 
 
The primary sources of interest-bearing debt for non-financial firms includes 
public debt where the corporation sells bonds (e.g., it borrows from bondholders) 
and pays interest on the loan, and bank debt where firms borrow from commercial 
or investment banks.  Larger public firms also have better access to public debt and 
may often use it in higher proportions than smaller firms do.  Firms with higher 
creditworthiness tend to use more short-term debt (e.g., commercial paper) or 
borrow from banks with short-term loans since their liquidity risk is also low.  In 
contrast, firms with higher credit risk issue more longer maturity public debt or take 
out more collateral-backed bank loans (Diamond, 1991).  Likewise, banks can 
require collateral, set higher interest rate payments or repayment terms that are 
more restrictive or limit the debt maturity of higher credit risk firms.  Consequently, 
using public debt is much more preferable to managers as it is less actionable (i.e., 
limited by the bondholders) (Berger et al., 2005).   
 
 In the case of the foreign subsidiary, the shorter debt maturity structure can 
also serve to lower financial risk.  Firms with high growth opportunities may 
choose more short-term debt as a refinancing strategy which limits gains to the host 
creditors on new projects  (Barclay & Smith, 1995). Shorter debt maturities are also 
not as sensitive to some business risks because they must be repaid quicker and 
often at higher interest rates (Johnson, 2003).  However, some foreign subsidiaries 
may obtain short-term financing simply because the host creditors themselves have 
shorter structured debt maturities.  For example, Valev shows that 66% of the 
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international banking debt provided to foreign countries with higher country risk 
have a debt maturity of less than one year (Valev, 2007).   
 
Parents may also use more short-term debt than domestic firms because of 
the higher agency costs involved in foreign operations (Doukas & Pantzalis, 2003).  
Furthermore, foreign subsidiaries may also be incentivized to use more trade credit 
(i.e., the working capital provided by host suppliers who supply products on credit 
terms) to fund near term obligations, which further decreases their overall debt 
maturity.  More importantly, this short-term trade debt is much less likely to be 
guaranteed by the parent firm.  Thus, some combination of the these factors may 
motivate the foreign subsidiary to have more short-term debt as a risk-sharing 
strategy which has the effect of concentrating more financial risk on host creditors.   
 
Mitigating Financial Risk in Foreign Direct Investments 
 
Empirical studies show that political risk in the host environment is 
correlated with higher volatility in the foreign subsidiary’s returns (Desai et al., 
2008).  Moreover,  Kolasinski shows that firms seek to protect their common 
shareholders and other profitable divisions from a foreign subsidiary with higher 
operating risk by increasing its use of leverage (Kolasinski, 2009).  Kolasinski also 
finds that subsidiaries with higher operating risk will tend to use more non-
guaranteed debt (i.e., debt not collateralized or backed by the parent) which adds 
protection to the parent’s shareholders.    
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The business risk factors that the parent firm would seek to mitigate can also 
vary across different countries or industries.  For example, the telecommunication 
and transportation industries have large fixed investments in hosts economies which 
are more irreversible or difficult to redeploy and therefore have higher leverage as a 
result of exposure to local political risk factors (Desai et al., 2008).  Likewise, 
many firms in countries without a common law legal system will also tend to have 
higher overall leverage  (Lopez-Iturriaga & Rodriguez-Sanz, 2008). 
 
FDI, as a direct investment activity reflects some aspects of irreversibility 
and the inherent risk in an irreversible investment necessitates some form of 
contemporaneous risk reduction or diversification.  Irreversible investments require 
the investor to make a trade-off between the expected future returns and the value 
of waiting for additional information which may lower its risk (Bernanke, 1983).  
Moreover, FDI like other large, irreversible  investments are more likely to be 
irregular or “lumpy” in size or scale and with different periodicity (Pindyck, 1988) 
as confirmed in Chapter Four.  For example, capital flows to FDI may be highly 
opportunistic as a result of cyclical availability of low-cost capital (Baker et al., 
2008).  FDI may also be part of a sustained program of foreign investment that 
anticipates future business cycles.  In any case, FDI that is largely comprised of 
illiquid fixed assets are prone to some unique business risk factors that cannot be 
insured, mitigated with diversification, or reduced with managerial controls. 
 
The irregularity or ‘lumpiness’ of FDI opportunities requires a flexible form 
of business risk mitigation which is more suitable for discontinuous investment 
cycles.  We argue that the use of excess or high leverage particularly with a high 
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composition of short-term debt in the foreign subsidiary provides a financial risk-
reduction vehicle which may be more cost effective, easier to control, and simpler 
to implement than other forms of risk reduction or mitigation such as insurance, 
geographical or product diversification.  Moreover, the increased use of short-term 
debt forces a discipline of higher excess returns to provide shareholders with a 
foreign risk premium.  Excess or high subsidiary leverage may also serve other 
financial risk reduction functions such as a hedge against high inflation in some 
host countries, or as a vehicle to ‘park’ or hold surplus capital reserves in the form 
of inter-company loans for later repatriation under more favorable tax conditions 
(Krull, 2004).  
 
Research Questions 
  
The following research questions seek to explain how foreign subsidiaries 
modify their leverage to compensate for changes in their business risk experience 
that attends their operating strategy which can be tested using our data set:  
 
Firms with a high valued-added operating strategy and location-specific 
comparative advantage are more sensitive to operating risks associated with the 
host location:   
 
R1-5:  Type 1 firms modify their leverage for operating risks linked with 
location-specific risks 
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Firms with a low value-added operating strategy and that rely on capturing 
technological spillover effects from the host economy are more sensitive to fixed 
asset investments and asset utilization: 
 
R2-5:  Type 2 firms modify their leverage for capital risks related to the 
productive use of assets    
 
Firms with a low value-added operating strategy focusing on cost reduction and 
cost control are more sensitive to basic labour factors and stability in revenue 
growth that drive economies of scale: 
 
R3-5: Type 3 firms modify their leverage for wage risks and revenue growth  
 
Firms with high value-added operating strategies that have competitive pricing 
advantage are more sensitive to market growth and competitive restraints in the host 
economy:  
 
R4-5: Type 4 modify their leverage for market share risk in the host economy   
 
Modeling Capital Structure and Business Risk 
 
We model the foreign subsidiary’s leverage directly from the subsidiary’s 
balance sheet and test the responses to different business risk factors.  Model 4.0 is 
a dynamic, autoregressive panel model that characterizes the differences in the 
types of FDI and identifies responses to risk factors.   
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 Model 4.0   Capital Structure and Risk Factors   7   
 
We develop the capital structure model specification with some explanatory 
variables and risk factors as found in (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) and (Flannery & 
Rangan, 2006)  and (Frank & Goyal, 2009).  We must however, make some 
modifications for our study of foreign subsidiaries.  First, most foreign subsidiaries 
do not have separate outstanding shares available for public purchase, individual 
share prices, or distinct market debt values.  The equity in the subsidiary’s balance 
sheet may be the residual of inter-company transactions and not necessarily a 
proportional share of the parent’s actual market equity.  Therefore, we are 
constrained to the use of book leverage or the debt-to-asset ratio as our primary 
measure of leverage.  The dependent variable, the debt-to-asset ratio, tends to be 
backward-looking as opposed to the firm’s market-to-book ratios of debt which are 
affected more directly by market volatility and future price expectations which are 
contained in market debt ratios (Barclay et al., 2006). This may lead the model to 
reflect more about historic responses to risk experience and firm performance rather 
than future expectations of risk.  This assumes an ex post relationship between 
leverage adjustment and risk experience.  
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The key explanatory variables are listed in Table 2-5.  We intentionally 
exclude some other factors noted in the literature on capital structure including; a 
finance-deficit variable as most subsidiaries do not raise external equity market 
capital directly, but through their parents and some local banking creditors (Frank 
& Goyal, 2009). We also exclude R&D expenses as the accounting for R&D 
expense varies too widely and is reported only infrequently in our data sample.  We 
specify controls for: (a) the industry median leverage for the subsidiary’s NACE 
classification, (b) earnings before tax and interest (EBIT), and (c) the log of the 
firm’s total assets as a measure of firm size.  The model is estimated in constant, 
pre-tax US dollars. 
 
Defined Variables    
  
We have stated that business risks are the non-financial risks which can 
affect all types of FDI such as: high inflation; poor operating plans; high employee 
turnover; low growth in GDP; wage stability; anti-competitive pricing; and general 
political instability (Doff, 2008). We broadly define business risk for this study into 
three categories: (a) capital risk, (b) operating risk, and (c) economic risk.   
 
(a) Capital risk is the potential for the loss of the investment principle.  It is 
measured by capital ratios and credit ratings.  It is also generally under the direct 
control of the firm.  We define the firm’s capital risk as the product of the firm’s 
capital intensity and default risk (i.e., following the basic concept of risk 
measurement as the impact of future loss multiplied by the probability it will 
occur).  Capital intensity is the ratio of total assets to revenue (i.e., the amount of 
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capital needed to produce 1 dollar of revenue) which can also reflect the future risk 
to income stability (Barton & Gordon, 1988).  Its reciprocal value is directly related 
to the marginal productivity of capital (MPK).  It also provides a broad, relative 
measure of capital risk and as a proxy for the reliance on debt financing (Harris, 
1994).  For this study, we define the firm’s default risk  as the reciprocal of the 
firm’s Altman’s Z credit score (Altman & Sabato, 2007).  We also specify the 
tangible asset ratio, which is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, as a proxy for 
the ability of the firm to adapt the changing market conditions.  Firms with large 
fixed capital investments in machinery or technologies may be slower to respond 
quickly to changing market dynamics.   
 
(b) Operating risk is the risk of loss (e.g., to profits or revenues) due to 
failed or inadequate resources, plans or external events (Jarrow, 2008).  In the case 
of the foreign subsidiary, these risks impair the ability to perform in the host 
environment and are not entirely under the control of the firm and not always 
directly measurable.  They include risk factors such as collective bargaining 
agreements or ineffective marketing campaigns.  However, we can approximate 
operating risk indirectly through aggregate performance variables such as revenue 
growth rates, asset utilization and volatility in returns (Rubinstein, 1973).  Revenue 
growth rates may be a proxy measure of the risk to the firm’s ability to achieving 
scale effects.  Moreover, high revenue growth rates can be a major source of 
operating risk as it signals the requirement for higher levels in working capital 
investment.  Volatility in returns, which we define as the three-year moving average 
of the standard deviation of return on assets is also measure of ability to adapt to 
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changing market dynamics.  We also specify the return on assets (ROA) as measure 
of asset utilization, and as a broad indicator of operating efficiency.  
 
(c) Economic risks are the general systemic risks in the host economy such 
as inflation which are measured directly and which have significant effects on FDI  
(Meldrum, 2000).  Volatility in wages measures the risk of high wage instability in 
the host economy and is defined as the three-year moving average of the standard 
deviation of the per capita wages in each host economy.  In a similar fashion, we 
also measure volatility in the host growth in GDP as a measure of the risk of market 
demand that is also a proxy for risk to market share since a contraction in GDP 
would be a growth risk to most non-monopolistic competitors.  We also provide a 
similar measure of host inflation risk with the volatility in inflation rates.  We 
specify the firm’s IRCG Country Risk composite rating in which a higher score 
indicates lower country risk.  
 
Our calculation for the firm’s risk-return ratio is a relative measure (i.e., 
properly speaking it is the ratio of returns to risk as a higher numerical value is 
more desirable) and is obtained by dividing the FDI risk premium by the firm’s 
capital risk.  Finally, we define the subsidiary’s excess leverage ratio as the 
percentage of leverage of the foreign subsidiary that exceeds the parents leverage 
ratio, as a proxy measure for foreign business risk-mitigation. 
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Data Set 
 
The data set for this study is comprised of an unbalanced panel set of 7,219 
foreign subsidiaries (or a total of about 14,400 parent and affiliate firms as some 
parents have multiple subsidiaries in the data set) from 38 countries, 22 from the 
OECD, and 16 from the developing world.  Our initial sample drew about 2.0 
million firms from ORBIS® based on the availability of basic financial and 
demographical data for the period of 2000 to 2007.  We excluded all non-industrial 
firms such as banking or government services.  The sample was then subjected to a 
screening process for the minimum availability of 50% of the key data points for 
the balance sheet and income statement, and minimum annual revenues of $5M.  
This also eliminated firms that either entered or exited the sample during the sample 
period and so reduces survivor bias.  This sample pool was then winsorized to 
control extreme outliers for firms with year over year changes of more than +/- 
1000% in the key financial ratios such as debt-to-asset and return on assets.   
 
For this study, we also require the multinational parents to have at least 1 
foreign subsidiary listed in the ORBIS® database that has foreign operations 
outside the source country, and has no other parent company ownership.  Foreign 
subsidiaries must have at least 1 parent firm listed in the database that owns not less 
than 50% of the subsidiary’s outstanding shares.  Additional data from other 
sources include the country risk ratings and host country economic factors taken 
from the World Bank.  These selection criteria resulted in a final sample of 7,219 
firms.  The sample has 4,354 small and medium subsidiaries (with annual revenues 
of < $65M), 2,590 large subsidiaries (> $65M and < $1.0B), and 275 very large 
subsidiaries (> $1.0B). 
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Estimation Method   
 
In choosing an estimator, our preliminary inspection of the sample data with 
fixed effects estimation showed the significant presence of endogeneity and 
autocorrelation that would violate the assumptions of a fixed effect or instrumental 
variable method.  In this instance, we found few suitably strong external 
instruments that are consistent across different firm categories and industries.  As 
such, we employ the one-step ‘system’ generalized methods of moments (GMM) 
estimator for panel data (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell 
& Bond, 1998). 13  
Results    
  
We divide the 7,219 subsidiaries into three subgroups for descriptive 
analysis: (a) by FDI types, (b) by the NACE industrial classification and the FDI 
types within each industry, and (c) by core and non-core subsidiaries. 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Chapter Five 
 
A table 2-5 and 3-5 summarizes the important descriptive statistics for the 
data set.  Some of the notable risk features of the different FDI types with each in 
industrial classification which are supported by the data are discussed below. 
                                                 
13 This method is suitable for unbalanced panels with endogenous explanatory variables and 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms.  The ‘system’ estimator uses both differencing and lagging in 
levels to provide instrument orthogonality and preserve the constant for econometric projections.  
The one-step estimation method has also been reported to have some bias in coefficient if the 
number of instrument counts is too high.  In this case, our instruments do not exceed 13% of the 
firm count so we can use the one-step estimator.  We also apply a robust error correction to 
improve the inferential reliability, and we also report the Hansen test for exogeneity of the 
instrument matrices.  We use the forward orthogonal deviations, which increases the observation 
count available for estimation in panel data sets with gaps.  
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Location 
Advantaged  
FDI 01 
Technology 
Seeking 
FDI 02 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
FDI 03 
Ownership 
Advantaged 
FDI 04 
Capital Risk 
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.30 
Capital Intensity 1.49 1.88 1.60 1.68 
Default Risk 0.52 0.25 0.30 0.30 
Capital Risk .82 .88 .64 .92 
Operating 
Risk 
Components 
Asset Utilization ROA 7.0% 6.5% 7.1% 8.3% 
Revenue Growth 15.0% 21.6% 19.8% 23.0% 
Volatility in Returns 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 
Economic 
Risk 
Components 
Wage Volatility 0.0009 0.0012 0.0009 0.0016 
GDP Growth Volatility 0.0088 0.0106 0.0098 0.0111 
Inflation Volatility 0.0046 0.0088 0.0057 0.0132 
Country Risk (%) 0.68 0.72 0.61 0.71 
Parent Country Risk (%) 0.73 0.66 0.73 0.70 
Host Risk – higher/(lower) 6.8% (9.0%) 16.4% (1.4%) 
Debt Maturity 
and 
Liquidity 
Long-Term Debt 11.7% 15.9% 12.0% 14.2% 
Short-Term Debt 55.9% 52.1% 57.1% 54.2% 
Current Ratio 1.75 1.74 1.64 1.61 
 
Leverage 
Ratios 
 
Industry Median Leverage 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.69 
Parent Leverage 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.47 
Subsidiary Leverage 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.68 
Excess Leverage 39.5% 27.3% 25.4% 44.6% 
Return on 
Equity 
ROE 26.6% 26.6% 27.7% 37.3% 
Parent ROE 9.8% 17.0% 23.6% 17.0% 
FDI Risk Premium 18.6% 9.3% 4.9% 19.6% 
Risk / Return Ratio 22.6% 10.5% 7.7% 21.3% 
 
Table  2-5     Descriptive Statistics of Chapter Five  7                          
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The average FDI risk premium for all firms in the sample is 13.3% while the 
average excess leverage is 35.2%.  About 12.8% of total assets were financed with 
long-term debt and 55.4% with short-term debt with the balance funded by equity.  
In contrast, the parent’s average short-term debt was 42.4% for OECD parents and 
34.5% for developing world parents.  Overall, these foreign subsidiaries have 
substantially higher debt ratios and much shorter debt maturities than their parents 
that suggest highly leveraged growth and financial risk mitigation by using more 
short-term debt.    
 
Type 1 Location Advantaged. This type has the highest average risk-return 
ratio of 22.6% that is supported by having a very high FDI risk premium of 18.6%.  
Type 1 has the lowest capital intensity ratio of 1.49 that stresses high marginal 
productivity of capital of 67%.  The host country risk rating was 6.8% higher risk 
than that of the parent country suggest some location specific risks is part of their 
operating strategy and interestingly, these firms also have the lowest annual rate of 
revenue growth of 15.0%.  These suggest firms are dependent on growth and 
operating efficiency to maximize profits with location specific business risk.  
 
 Type 2 Technology Seeking.  The Type 2 firms have a modest risk return 
ratio of 10.5% as well as a moderate FDI risk premium of 9.3%.  The host country 
risk ratings are 9.0% better (i.e., they have lower risk) than the parent’s source 
country which is consistent with the strategic motivations underlying this type that 
is seeking to exploit technological spillovers in the host economy.  They use only 
27.3% excess leverage which is somewhat lower than average.  In contrast, they 
have the highest capital intensity of 1.88 and lowest asset utilization of 6.5% which 
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shows some sensitivity to capital investment risk.  This seems consistent with this 
type’s operating strategy of absorbing technologies and skills from the host 
environment or competitors where redundancy in assets may be needed to transfer 
knowledge.  
 
Type 3 Efficiency Seeking.  The Type 3 firms have the lowest risk-return 
ratio of 7.7% (i.e., the lowest financial return for the risk taken) and also the lowest 
FDI risk premium of 4.9% coupled with the highest comparative country risk that is 
16.4% higher risk than the parent’s source country.  The higher revenue growth rate 
of 19.8% together with the lower performance values suggests the importance of 
growth and economies of scale in maintaining profitability for this type.  Although 
they use a modest level of excess leverage of 25.4%, they also have a higher short-
term debt ratio of 57.1% that may attenuate the risk of growth on leverage because 
it is less sensitive to some types of business risk.  Type 3 is over-weighted with 
manufacturing and retail firms which comprise 41.6% and 33.1% of the sample 
respectively and which may be more sensitive to market demand risk where they are 
supplying goods and services directly into the host economy.   
 
Type 4 Ownership Advantaged.  The Type 4 firms have a very good overall 
risk-return ratio of 21.3% in spite of having a high capital risk value of 0.92 since 
they have the highest FDI risk premium of 19.6%.  Although Type 4 has very high 
revenue growth of 23.0% that suggests elevated operating risk, it is coupled with 
superior return-on-equity of 37.3% and the highest asset utilization of 8.3% (i.e., 
the return on assets).  In contrast, Type 4 firms have the highest excess leverage 
averaging 44.6% that is affected by the transportation and communication firms 
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within this sample that both have an average excess leverage over 50%.  These data 
points reflect the features of an operating strategy supported by pricing power, but 
also suggest that market share and price stability may be significant risk factors for 
sustained performance.   
 
Descriptive Statistics of the NACE Industrial Classifications  
 
Industry specific characteristics have a strong influence on the process of 
internalization and the alignment of firm resources within the host economy 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976).  There are also unique industry characteristics within 
each of the FDI types in our sample.  We subgroup the descriptive statistics by the 
standard NACE industry classifications and discuss the unique features of the FDI 
types within these subgroups.  The comparative analysis shows the FDI taxonomy 
of Driffield et al is useful in differentiating features that would otherwise be 
overlooked by using only an industrial classification alone.  The descriptive 
statistics of these groupings is shown in Table 3-5.   
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 Firms  
NACE 
01 
NACE 
15 
NACE 
30 
NACE 
40 
NACE 
60 
NACE 
70 
All Firms   
Firm Count 7,219 154 2,975 302 2,278 492 1,018 
ROE 26.3% 51.5% 18.7% 25.8% 31.7% 17.2% 37.5% 
ROA 6.8% 16.9% 6.0% 5.4% 7.7% 3.8% 7.4% 
Capital Intensity 1.68 2.36 1.26 2.39 1.26 1.87 3.46 
Tangible Assets 27.4% 49.5% 32.0% 31.4% 18.7% 30.3% 27.1% 
Revenue Growth 18.0% 30.7% 15.5% 27.7% 17.2% 18.4% 22.2% 
Excess Leverage 35.2% 4.8% 25.1% 35.3% 44.3% 38.5% 42.6% 
FDI Risk Premium 13.3% 23.4% 12.9% 10.6% 17.4% 3.2% 10.4% 
        
Type 1 FDI        
Firm Count 1,354 22 535 62 462 116 157 
ROE 26.6% 35.5% 23.3% 31.8% 30.6% 13.8% 32.9% 
ROA 7.0% 14.4% 6.6% 4.7% 8.3% 3.3% 6.8% 
Capital Intensity 1.68 2.31 1.10 1.88 1.04 2.18 3.41 
Tangible Assets 26.4% 50.7% 32.0% 34.6% 16.3% 26.4% 30.4% 
Revenue Growth 15.0% 19.4% 13.2% 28.0% 13.8% 16.2% 18.2% 
Excess Leverage 39.5% (7.7%) 25.6% 32.1% 54.1% 46.5% 58.5% 
FDI Risk Premium 18.6% 24.1% 14.6% 14.6% 26.3% 1.9% 23.2% 
        
Type 2 FDI        
Firm Count 274 10 71 29 92 40 32 
ROE 26.6% 37.7% 25.9% 37.2% 28.5% 28.6% 6.7% 
ROA 6.5% 12.1% 6.6% 5.9% 6.9% 4.8% 5.6% 
Capital Intensity 1.88 1.93 1.35 3.39 1.25 2.20 3.14 
Tangible Assets 31.6% 30.4% 32.8% 46.2% 21.1% 41.1% 23.9%
Revenue Growth 21.6% 54.3% 13.8% 26.3% 16.6% 80.7% 34.8% 
Excess Leverage 27.3% (1.3%) 21.7% 20.9% 31.2% 22.8% 56.5% 
FDI Risk Premium 9.3% 7.0% 12.6% 22.3% 9.0% 235.0% -9.3% 
        
Type 3 FDI   
Firm Count 1,193 11 497 63 396 81 145 
ROE 27.7% 19.2% 20.9% 24.9% 33.0% 19.3% 43.7% 
ROA 7.1% 11.9% 6.7% 6.5% 7.3% 5.1% 8.9% 
Capital Intensity 1.60 2.09 1.35 1.52 1.28 1.70 3.29 
Tangible Assets 24.9% 53.4% 32.1% 19.2% 16.5% 28.3% 21.0% 
Revenue Growth 19.8% 22.3% 16.2% 22.7% 23.2% 19.4% 21.3% 
Excess Leverage 25.4% (4.0%) 22.7% 14.2% 37.6% 20.9% 19.7% 
FDI Risk Premium 4.9% (22.7%) 10.5% 7.6% 2.1% 4.1% -6.0% 
        
Type 4 FDI        
Firm Count 550 13 184 50 194 32 77 
ROE 37.3% 77.3% 35.1% 11.6% 48.9% 21.1% 29.9% 
ROA 8.3% 12.7% 8.1% 9.1% 9.8% 5.5% 7.5% 
Capital Intensity 1.68 1.79 1.36 2.30 1.32 2.24 2.70 
Tangible Assets 30.3% 40.1% 36.0% 41.8% 20.0% 35.6% 31.5% 
Revenue Growth 23.0% 20.3% 23.1% 31.8% 14.1% 22.0% 40.8% 
Excess Leverage 44.6% 26.1% 28.0% 64.9% 52.6% 65.4% 46.2% 
FDI Risk Premium 19.6% 68.5% 14.4% 2.8% 28.7% -2.7% 21.5% 
 
Table  3-5     Descriptive Statistics for Industry and FDI Types 8                       
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NACE 01 Agriculture and Mining.  The firm count for this subgroup is 154 
or 2.1% of the sample, the smallest subgroup overall.  Within this subgroup, we 
find the lowest overall use of excess leverage averaging only 4.8% across all FDI 
types.  This subgroup has a very high tangible asset ratio of 49.5% and a high 
capital intensity of 2.36.  This limited use of excess leverage may be related to the 
fact that land-based resources, an important risk factor for this group cannot be 
expropriated, although access to those resources can be restricted or withheld.  This 
subgroup has the highest return on equity of 51.5% and the highest FDI risk 
premium of 23.4%.   
 
NACE 15 Manufacturing.  The firm count for this subgroup is 2,975 or 
41.2% of the sample and the largest of the subgroups.  The capital intensity of these 
firms averages 1.26 and is consistently low across all the FDI types and typical of 
industries with higher labour inputs.  Within this subgroup, there is a consistent use 
of excess leverage with the average being 25.1%.  This subgroup has a lower than 
average return on equity of 18.7% and modest FDI risk premium of 12.9%.  
 
NACE 30 Energy and Construction.  The firm count for this subgroup is 302 
or 4.1% of the sample.  This group has wide range of the use of excess leverage 
across the different FDI types ranging from 14.2% to 64.9%.  In contrast, these 
firms have a much higher average capital intensities of 2.39.  
 
NACE 40 Retail.  The firm count for this subgroup is 2,278 or 31.5% of the 
sample.  In this subgroup is the highest overall use of excess leverage of 44.3%.  As 
we should expect with retail businesses, this subgroup has the lowest tangible asset 
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ratio of 18.7% and likewise consistently low capital intensity ratios of 1.26.  In 
comparison, this subgroup has a high return on equity of 31.7% and a good FDI risk 
premium of 17.4%.   
 
NACE 60 Transportation and Communication.  The firm count for this 
subgroup is 492 or 6.8% of the sample.  Within this subgroup, we see a high range 
of excess leverage averaging 38.5%.  This subgroup has the lowest return on equity 
of 17.1% and the lowest asset utilization of 3.8% and the lowest FDI risk premium 
of 3.2% that reflects the highly competitive nature of this industry.  
 
NACE 70 Communication Services.  The firm count for this subgroup is 
1,018 or 14.1% of the sample.  There is a very high use of excess leverage in this 
subgroup of 42.6% due likely to the highly competitive, technological obsolescence 
sensitivity of this industry.  This subgroup has the highest capital intensity of any 
industrial class at 3.46 and a very high return on equity of 37.5%.  
 
Descriptive Statistics for Core and Non-Core Subsidiaries  
 
 
 In Table 4-5, we provide additional descriptive statistics for core and non-
core subsidiaries, and the differences in the FDI types within these subgroups.  This 
sub-sample of 3,371 firms is truncated from the main sample due to gaps in the 
NACE classification data in the sample.  Generally, the core subsidiaries represent 
37.3% of the sample which roughly agrees with Doukas and Lang’s findings 
(Doukas & Lang, 2003).  The Type 4 firms have the highest core ratio of 41.5% and 
high growth of 27.1% which agrees with Doukas and Kan that core firms with high 
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growth invest in more core activities (Doukas & Kan, 2008).  Overall, the non-core 
FDI types show higher capital risk, higher risk-return, and higher excess leverage 
ratios than the core subsidiaries.  As noted above, the FDI risk premiums for all 
core subsidiaries except FDI Type 1 are slightly negative, meaning the core 
subsidiary’s return on equity is a percent lower than its parents return; that is, core 
or intra-industry FDI does not provide a significant FDI risk premium.  Likewise, 
core subsidiaries also use much lower excess leverage as we should expect given 
that these subsidiaries are operating in the same basic industry as the parent and 
therefore less exposed to unique or unanticipated risk factors.  
 
  All Types FDI 01 FDI 02 FDI 03 FDI 04 
Firm Count 
Core  1,256  448  94   486  228 
Non-Core  2,115  906  180   707  322 
Subtotal  3,371  1,354  274  1,193  550 
Core Ratio  37.3% 33.1% 34.3% 40 .7% 41.5% 
Excess Leverage Ratio 
Core 23.2% 29.8% 25.4% 15 .1% 29.2% 
Non-Core 40.0% 21.1% 29.3% 34 .8% 55.7% 
ROE 
Core 20.3% 21.7% 15.1% 21 .8% 16.5% 
Non-Core 29.0% 32.7% 31.9% 31 .9% 51.9% 
Revenue Growth 
Core 20.0% 14.9% 27.5% 19 .9% 27.1% 
Non-Core 18.7% 15.0% 18.4% 19 .7% 20.2% 
FDI Risk Premium 
Core 4.1% 18.3% -1.0% -4.2% -1.0% 
Non-Core 18.8% 18.7% 15.0% 11 .4% 34.3% 
Capital Risk 
Core   0.60  0.43  0.91   0.53  0.94 
Non-Core  0.77  1.01  0.86   0.73  0.91 
Risk-Return  
Ratio 
Core 6.8% 42.5% -1.0% -7.9% -1.0% 
Non-Core 23.7% 18.5% 17.4% 15 .6% 37.6% 
 
Table  4-5     Descriptive Statistics for Core and Non-Core Subsidiaries  9                      
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Estimation Results for Model 4.1 and 4.2 
 
 
 We employ a fixed effect estimation with the FDI type and NACE 
classification dummy variables to Model 4.0 to compare the descriptive value of 
these taxonomies, and we label these Models 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.  These 
models compare the ability of the typologies to identify the determinants of capital 
structure as shown in Table 5-5.  The overall result for the total sample (i.e., all FDI 
types) shows a within-group R value of 0.41 for our Model 4.1 specification, but 
with a strong endogeneity of (0.31).  In contrast, our estimates of the industrial 
subgroups show a within-group R values of 0.29, as compared to the 0.27 for the 
FDI taxonomy.  Both groups have significant endogeneity of 0.23 and 0.24 making 
the fixed effect models inappropriate for inference about capital structure.  
However, it does suggest that the two taxonomies have a similar capacity in the 
identification of risk factors. 
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Subgroup  Firms  R-Within  R-Between R-Overall cor x, u_i  Rho Constant 
Model 4.0         7,219        0.4175       0.3921       0.2875      (0.3178)       0.7685 10.98 
        
Model 4.1        
FDI 01         1,354        0.6057       0.7546       0.4563      (0.7307)       0.9264 5.96 
FDI 02           272        0.2359       0.1822       0.1822         0.1191        0.6938 1.72 
FDI 03         1,193        0.1210       0.1191       0.1164         0.0505        0.6808 1.14 
FDI 04           539        0.1329       0.0874       0.0972      (0.0251)       0.6861 1.93 
Averages        0.2739       0.2858       0.2130         0.2314        0.7468       2.68 
Model 4.2        
NACE 01           153        0.1702       0.1510       0.1409         0.1014        0.6748 4.67 
NACE 15         2,968        0.6108       0.3175       0.4562         0.0527        0.6097 6.78 
NACE 30           300        0.3679       0.4724       0.4199         0.2069        0.5389 1.85 
NACE 40         2,276        0.0912       0.1584       0.1227         0.1461        0.6810 2.27 
NACE 60           489        0.1383       0.3693       0.2321         0.2756        0.5868 4.35 
NACE 70         1,012        0.4174       0.7346       0.3765      (0.7087)       0.8455 3.11 
Averages        0.2993       0.3672       0.2914         0.2486        0.6561       3.83 
 
Table  5-5   Fixed Effect Estimation Comparisons of Models 4.1 and 4.2 10           
 
Estimation Results for Model 4.3   
 
  The results for Model 4.3 for all the FDI types have significant Wald 
statistics, intercepts, and Hansen tests for exogeneity of the internal instruments 
provided by the GMM estimator and also provides reasonable correction for 
autocorrelation (Arellano & Bond, 1991).  While the Hansen tests are all 
significant, the Type 3 value is somewhat lower than expected.  This is due to the 
complexities of the instrumentation matrixes and over-controlling for different 
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variables within each FDI type so that the same econometric model can be applied 
to all sample groups.  
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 FDI Type FDI 01 FDI 02 FDI 03 FDI 04 
Model 
 
4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 
 
 
All Location 
Advantaged 
Technology 
Seeking 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Ownership 
Advantaged 
    R1-5 R2-5 R3-5 R4-5 
Firm Count 
 
 
 
7,219 1,354 274 1,193 550 
Leverage 
Lagged Dependent 
Variable 
0.713 
11.75 
[0.713%] 
0.632 
6.71 
[0.636%] 
0.693 
17.54 
[0.702%] 
1.102 
9.52 
[1.117%] 
0.612 
6.36 
[0.620%] 
Capital Risks 
Tangible Assets Ratio 
-0.421 
-3.08 
[-0.168%] 
-0.116 
-3.37 
[-0.045%] 
-0.179 
-2.89 
[-0.083%] 
-0.003 
-0.10 
-0.067 
-3.82 
[-0.028%]
Capital Intensity 
0.000 
0.57 
-0.000 
-1.58 
0.007 
2.00 
[0.022%] 
0.000 
1.35 
0.000 
0.41 
 
Default Risk 
 
-0.015 
-0.44 
-0.027 
-0.99 
0.001 
0.49 
-0.001 
-0.48 
-0.027 
-1.12 
Operating Risks 
 
Asset Utilization 
ROA 
-1.438 
-3.00 
[-0.145%] 
-1.650 
-5.70 
[-0.174%] 
-1.69 
-2.60 
[-0.159%] 
-0.231 
-4.41 
[-0.023%] 
-0.434 
-5.56 
[-0.055%] 
Revenue Growth 
0.014 
2.12 
[0.003%] 
0.066 
4.78 
[0.014%] 
0.121 
2.63 
[0.029%] 
0.230 
3.36 
[0.546%] 
0.000 
0.26 
Volatility in 
Returns 
0.225 
0.75 
0.179 
0.82 
-0.403 
-1.03 
-0.104 
-1.25 
-0.109 
-.095 
 
Economic Risks 
 
 
 
Volatility 
in Wages 
5.832 
1.32 
14.272 
2.15 
[0.021%]
7.607 
0.94 
30.839 
2.74 
[0.044%] 
14.084 
2.69 
[0.032%] 
Volatility in Host 
GDP Growth 
-0.469 
-0.77 
-3.657 
-3.76 
[-0.044%]
0.030 
0.06 
-0.812 
-1.46 
-5.462 
-2.37 
[-0.083%]
Volatility in 
Host Inflation 
0.952 
2.42 
[0.008%]
2.137 
2.25 
[0.014%]
0.504 
1.22 
-0.477 
-0.70 
0.201 
1.57 
ICRG Country 
Risk Rating 
0.009 
1.60 
0.020 
2.56 
[0.024%]
-0.011 
-0.89 
0.041 
1.85 
-0.000 
-0.12 
Controls 
Industry Median 
Leverage 
-0.187 
-1.75 
-0.078 
-0.54 
-0.161 
-0.69 
-0.312 
-2.61 
0.222 
2.14 
Profit 
1.83e-07 
2.55 
1.56-e07 
2.55 
1.91e-07 
1.38 
1.52e-07 
2.19 
6.51e-08 
0.88 
Firm Size 0.014 
3.43 
0.002 
.048 
-0.001 
-0.20 
-0.005 
-2.49 
0.001 
.037 
Intercept Constant 0.347 
2.57 
0.401 
3.19 
0.474 
2.09 
0.137 
2.84 
0.197 
2.38 
Joint Significance Wald Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Autocorrelation AR(2) p-value 0.880 0.251 0.491 0.756 0.332 
Instrument 
Exogeneity 
Hansen p-value 0.185 0.148 0.149 0.070 0.786 
Coefficients above and z-values below significant elasticities [brackets] 
 
Table  6-5     Estimation of Models 4.3 to 4.7  11         
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The lagged dependent variable is significant for Model 4.3 and all other 
models and with elasticities ranging from 0.62% to 1.11% suggesting prior year 
levels have a greater influence on current-year capital structure levels that is more 
than any other factor.  The annual percentage adjustment of the firm’s capital 
structure is a dynamic process where firms typically adjust about 20% per year 
toward their target capital structure levels (Flannery & Rangan, 2006).  Thus, the 
prior year levels and the gap between the firm’s current and target levels of capital 
structure are the most significant determinants of capital structure.  We should also 
therefore expect the elasticities of the other factors that affect capital structure 
levels to be relatively small within a very large, diverse sample if the firms are at or 
near their target capital structure levels.  Indeed, the average elasticity of all the 
significant risk factors in the estimation results is about 0.10%.  In other words, 
only a fraction of the total annual change in capital structure may be modified in 
response to risk experience in any one year, but the cumulative response may be 
substantially higher over longer periods.  Furthermore, there are also multiple 
industries within each FDI type and we should expect some industry-specific effects 
of varying degrees that may cancel out stronger responses.  That these elasticities, 
albeit small, are significant across several thousand firms, multiple industries and 
38 countries signifies the common sensitivity that business risk factors have on 
modification of capital structure on a diverse, international sample of firms.   
 
The results show a negative correlation between leverage and asset 
utilization (ROA) that is also a measure of profitability for all models as predicted 
in the literature.  There is also a positive relation between leverage and an increase 
in the volatility of inflation, that is higher response to the risk of inflation than 
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absolute inflation levels.  Indeed, higher leverage may be desirable in host markets 
with higher inflation as it devalues the real value of debt if denominated in local 
currencies.  The results also show a positive correlation between leverage and firm 
size which is also consistent with the literature (Fama & French, 2002).  All of the 
models have positive correlation of leverage and revenue growth.  This is in 
contrast to the static trade-off theory which predicts actual growth should reduce 
leverage (Frank & Goyal, 2009).  This is because foreign subsidiaries may also use 
higher leverage for financial risk mitigation, and because growth in most industrial 
firms often requires higher levels of working capital that is funded by short-term 
debt.  All the controls in the aggregate Model 4.3 were significant except for 
median leverage, which was significant at a confidence value of p = 0.080. 
 
Estimation Results for Model 4.4 
 
In Table 6-5, our model for research question R1-5 is labeled ‘Location 
Advantage Type 1.’  The firm count for the Type 1 firms is 1,354 or 18.7% of the 
sample.  The location-advantaged firms with their value-added strategy should 
demonstrate sensitivity in modification of capital structure in response to operating 
risks that are location specific.  The estimation results for Type 1 firms shows 
significant correlations for two operating risk factors: revenue growth, and asset 
utilization (or RTS) with elasticities of 0.014% and -0.174% respectively.  With 
higher revenue growth, more operating assets and working capital create higher 
demand for higher levels of short-term leverage.  In contrast, as asset utilization or 
returns to scale increases, the level of operating risk falls, as does the level of 
leverage needed to fund operations.  Type 1 also has the only significant response 
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to the IRCG country risk with an elasticity of 0.024%, which in this case is positive, 
indicating a slightly higher use of leverage in lower risk countries.  This would 
appear on first glance to conflict with Desai et al (i.e., firms should have more 
leverage in countries with higher political risks).  However, most all our FDI types 
do have significantly higher leverage ratios than their parents with the exception of 
a few firms in the NACE 01 industrial class.  That Type 1 firms have higher 
relative leverage in countries with lower risk reflects that these countries may 
simply have a more stable economic or financial risk in comparison to other 
countries in the sample.  Further, these Type 1 firms have the lowest default risk 
rating and are likely to get better credit terms meaning they have deeper capacity 
for debt.  
 
The link between operating risk and location may be seen in the sensitivity 
to the volatility in host GDP growth that signals a dependence of stable host 
economic conditions.  In this case, the negative elasticities of -0.08% would suggest 
an unexpected result in that higher GDP growth risk results in lower leverage, 
however, there is a global recession in the sample from 2001 to 2003 where GDP 
growth rates contracted significantly from 3% to 1% overall thus influencing the 
sign of the coefficient.  The Type 1 firms have the lowest capital intensity of all 
FDI types of 1.49 (Table 3-5)  or in other terms, a 67% marginal productivity of 
capital (MPK )which means they require the least amount of capital to produce a 
dollar of revenue, another feature of the operating strategy that centers on scale 
effects in technologies.  These results provide some support for the R1-5 research 
question that the Type 1 firms modify leverage with increased sensitivity to 
operating risks associated with location specific conditions.  
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Estimation Results for Model 4.5 
 
In Table 6-5, our model for research question R2-5 is labeled ‘Technology 
Seeking Type 2.’  The firm count for Type 2 firms is 274 or 3.7% of the sample.  
The technology-seeking firms that rely on the conversion of host resources should 
modify their leverage in response to capital risks relating to their productive use of 
assets.  The estimation results for Type 2 shows significant correlations with two of 
the three capital risk components.  The leverage response to tangible assets has a 
negative elasticity of -0.08% that like Type 1 firms also suggests that a large, 
redundant fixed asset base required to absorb technology from the host economy 
may be a risk factor.  Indeed, outsized tangible or fixed assets can impair the rapid 
adaptation to changing market conditions.  The leverage response to changes in 
capital intensity is fairly weak at 0.02%; however, these firms already have the 
highest capital intensity of 1.88 of all FDI types.  There is also a stronger, negative 
correlation with asset utilization with an elasticity of -0.159%.  These results might 
be stronger if the firm count were larger; however, they lend some limited support 
to our R2-5 research question that Type 2 firms modify their leverage in response to 
capital risks associated with efficiencies in the productive asset base.   
 
Estimation Results for Model 4.6 
 
In Table 6-5, our model for research question R3-5 is labeled ‘Efficiency 
Seeking Type 3.’  The firm count for Type 3 firms is 1,193 or 16.5% of the sample.  
The efficiency-seeking firms with their cost control operating strategy should show 
a modification of leverage in response to labour risk and scale effects as a function 
of market demand.  The estimation results for Type 3 show the strongest correlation 
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between leverage and revenue growth with an elasticity of 0.54%   (the largest 
elasticity in the estimation results), and a positive correlation to volatility in wages 
with an elasticity of 0.04%.  This reinforces the argument that Type 3 firms are 
more dependent on labour and economies of scale and supports the R3-5 research 
question that Type 3 firms modify their leverage in response to wage and growth 
risks. 
 
Estimation Results for Model 4.7 
 
In Table 6-5, our model for research question R4-5 is labeled ‘Ownership 
Advantaged Type 4.’  The firm count for the Type 4 firms is 550 or 7.6% of the 
sample.  The ownership-advantaged firms that have significant pricing power are 
more likely to depend on market share demand in the host economy for profitable 
growth and modify their leverage accordingly.  The estimation results for Type 4 
shows a negative correlation between leverage and volatility in host GDP growth of 
-0.08% as similarly noted in Type 1 above.  The Type 4 model also shows a weakly 
positive correlation with wage volatility with an elasticity of 0.02%.  Firms with 
intellectual property may be able to command their market share with pricing 
power, but they also may have some dependency on labour factors to build those 
products and Type 4 has a high percentage of manufacturing and retail firms (see 
Table 3-5).  These results support the R4-5 research question that Type 4 firms 
modify their leverage in response to elevated risk in factors that affect market 
share.  
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Risk Elasticities and the Risk-Return Ratio  
 
In an alternative comparison of the FDI type models in Table 7-5, we also 
find an important and significant link between the elasticities that measure the 
response of capital structure to business risk factors and the risk-return ratios of the 
FDI types.  First, if we take the average total of the absolute values of the 
statistically significant elasticities for the risk factors, we have a value that 
represents the relative impact of all business risk factors on capital structure as seen 
in Item 1 of Table 7-5.14 As we should expect, firms with higher uses of leverage 
(Item 2) have higher or more favorable risk-return ratios (Item 3).  In a seeming 
contradiction to the notion that risk and return are positively correlated, firms with 
higher risk profiles as measured by their higher responses to  business risk factors 
(Item 1), have significantly lower (i.e., poorer) risk-return ratios (Item 3).  In other 
words, the higher risk FDI types (i.e., efficiency and technology seeking) have 
poorer risk return ratios.  This is in part because we are using the excess return on 
equity provided by the subsidiary for the risk-return ratio and not the total return on 
equity.  Restated, while higher leverage provides higher returns, higher risk 
environments in themselves do not provide better returns.  Higher returns require 
some form of competitive advantage regardless of what business risk is present. 
 
The higher financial risk of excess leverage in the foreign subsidiary can 
reduce risk on the parent to the extent which it is free from guarantees from the 
parents.  If we consider that most of the excess leverage is comprised of short-term 
obligations and trade credit, we can see that excess leverage provides both higher 
returns for the subsidiary and lower financial risk for the parent.   
                                                 
14 We multiply by 100 to covert to basis points for clarity of presentation. 
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Item 
 
All 
Firms 
FDI 01 FDI 02 FDI 03 FDI 04 
  
 
 
Location 
Advantaged 
 
Technology 
Seeking 
 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
 
Ownership 
Advantaged 
1 Mean Elasticities 
for all  Risk Factors 
(Basis Points) 
81 48 73 152 39
2 Excess Leverage 35.2% 39.5% 27.3% 25.4% 44.6%
3 Risk-Return Ratio 15.5% 22.6% 10.6% 7.7% 21.3%
 
Table  7-5    Comparison of different FDI Types in Models 4.4 to 4.6 12                
 
 
Chapter Summary  
 
We have investigated how foreign subsidiaries have unique operating 
strategies and how they modify their leverage to mitigate foreign business risks in 
the host environment.  On average, the firms in our sample modified their capital 
structure by 0.08% for every 1% increase in a typical business risk factor each year.  
The small relative size of these risk elasticities is due to: (a) firms adjust only a 
fraction of their capital structure each year toward their target, (b) firms that are at 
or near their target capital structure ratios have very small adjustments, and (c) 
industry effects vary widely across different strategic groupings in the sample.  In a 
cross-examination of our results, we also find that the FDI types that have higher 
average elasticities of response to business risk factors in the host economy also 
have lower average risk-return ratios confirming the linkages between business risk, 
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leverage and operating strategy.  Our findings agree with those of Desai et al, in 
that we find that foreign subsidiaries use an average of 35.2% more leverage than 
their parent firms do.  The use of excess leverage varies slightly with respect to 
firm size: for small and medium subsidiaries, 36.5%; for large subsidiaries, 29.2%; 
and 30.7% for very large subsidiaries.  These firms also provided an average 
foreign investment risk premium on their shareholders equity of 13.3%.  Moreover, 
we find the non-core foreign subsidiaries have generally higher risk premiums of 
18.0%, which reflects an FDI strategy based on differential rates of return. 
 
We also find foreign subsidiaries have consistently shorter debt maturities 
averaging about 20% more short-term debt than their parents do.  This further 
demonstrates the role of capital structure in the mitigation of foreign risk.  We find 
support for the use of a modified, dynamic trade-off model in developing the 
determinants of capital structure within foreign subsidiaries in explaining the 
response of risk factors in the capital structure decisions.  The empirical results 
provide a contribution to capital structure theory in the area of parent and 
subsidiary firms where foreign risk links with firm-level operating conditions.   
  
Several key areas could serve as grounds for further research.  For example, 
the dynamics of short-term debt in foreign markets, the effects of private equity 
funding, and the influence of ownership structure need further investigation.  For 
example, foreign creditors or private equity holders may have an influence on the 
structure of the debt maturity ratio through unique covenants.  
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CHAPTER  SIX      PROFIT AND GROWTH MAXIMIZATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sustaining long-term growth is a serious challenge for the multinational 
firm.  The growth provided by foreign subsidiaries relies on an efficient operating 
strategy that aligns the firm’s resources with its market structure.  However, 
foreign market risk demands a risk premium that must be generated to compensate 
the investor’s exposure to foreign market risk.  To provide adequate funding for 
growth, firms must trade off reinvestment and generating short-term returns.  We 
find that the linkage between growth and shareholder returns relies on how the 
foreign subsidiary modifies its profit maximization strategy to achieve alignment 
with its host market condition.  We find superior shareholder returns from the 
foreign subsidiaries results from stable growth maximization with high asset 
efficiency. 
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Introduction 
 
 Do multinational firms pursue growth at the expense of shareholder value, or 
does growth result from an effective profit maximizing strategy?  Foreign direct 
investments (FDI) are the vehicles through which the multinational can achieve its 
growth objectives necessary to attract external investment capital.  The top 500 
public multinationals control over 50% of the world’s international trade (Cohen, 
2007).  This makes the topic of growth and shareholder value important in 
understanding the link between FDI and global economic activity.  In a recent study 
of corporate growth, Laurie et al found that the average annual revenue growth rate 
of firms was 28% at the time of entry into the Global Fortune 50, which fell 
precipitously to an average of 2% in the remaining years after entry (Laurie et al., 
2006). These trends point to the basic challenge of the multinational firm; namely, 
how to sustain long-run, profitable growth while delivering competitive shareholder 
returns in the short-run.  Surprisingly, only a few empirical studies have focused on 
the firm-level dynamics of the growth of foreign affiliates (Belderbos & Zou, 2007).   
 
The importance of sustaining firm growth is particularly important in highly 
industrialized economies with low, secular GDP growth, high structural 
unemployment and restrictive industrial policies (Canals, 2000).  Moreover, much of 
the growth in productivity in industrialized countries is the result of the growth of its 
very large firms (Solvay et al., 2007).   Further to this point, a survey in 2001 of 
multinationals found that only 6% of firms were able to achieve growth primarily 
through organic growth alone; that is, through internal growth initiatives and 
investment rather than by mergers and acquisitions (McGrath, 2007).  Moreover, 
most of the empirical research on the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on 
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shareholder value strongly suggests that M&A is either value neutral or value 
destroying (Hitt et al., 1991).  Similarly, Zook and Allen report that fewer than 14% 
of firms succeed in sustaining both growth in revenues and growth in profits (Zook & 
Allen, 2000).  Thus, sustainable, profitable growth is the exception to the rule in 
many industries. 
 
Sustainable, long-term growth is becoming the most serious strategic 
challenge for the multinational firm.  In a study of more than 1,000 US companies, 
Foster and Kaplan found that the firm’s longevity does not always correlate with 
performance, and moreover, that the life span of public corporations is getting 
increasingly shorter.  At the current rate, they estimate that the average life of a 
corporation in the S&P 500 in 2020 will be less than 10 years (Foster & Kaplan, 
2001).  These conditions of lower rates of corporate survival may also drive demand 
for near-term earnings and an incentive for firms to pursue short-term growth 
maximization rather than lower returns from long-term strategic investment more 
typically needed to build long-term shareholder value.  However, when growth itself 
becomes the over-arching strategy without a profit constraint, shareholder value may 
ultimately be diminished in the long-run (Ramezani et al., 2002).     
  
We examine the linkage between growth and the shareholder value created by 
foreign subsidiaries for their parent firms as the final link between capital markets 
and FDI.  We build on the current literature within international business and 
strategic management to show how the multinational firm modifies the profit 
maximization strategy of their foreign subsidiaries in response to the dynamics in its 
market structure to achieve a balance of high growth and high rates of return.  We 
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build on the very limited studies of firm-level research of subsidiary growth and 
performance with our empirical investigation of matched parent and subsidiary 
accounts from 7,219 foreign subsidiaries in 30 countries in the OCED and developing 
world with contemporary econometric estimation methods.  We contribute to the 
literature on the determinants of firm growth and the optimization of the profit 
maximization strategy in the special case of the foreign subsidiary.    
 
Growth and Shareholder Value in the Research Literature 
 
 The research literature on firm-level foreign subsidiary growth and 
performance is relatively small compared to the extensive, country-level or industry-
based literature on the economic motivations to exploit foreign markets through FDI.  
However, growth and performance research at the multinational parent-level has 
extensive significant treatment in the literature and provides context for developing 
our model of subsidiary growth.  For example, the total return on the shares of US 
multinationals generally outperformed the overall returns for the S&P 500 index  
(Mikhail & Shawky, 1979).  In a later example, multinationals were shown to have 
higher returns because of the growth opportunities of their foreign subsidiaries 
(Bodnar & Weintrop, 1997).  Similarly, the multinational’s performance is generally 
thought to be more profitable than their domestic counter parts because of their 
access to wider, international market demand (Gomes & Ramaswamy, 1999).    
 
Multinationals were often viewed in the earlier literature as an alternative to 
holding foreign financial assets as a means of portfolio diversification as a result of 
the foreign market exposure of their subsidiaries (Mathur & Hanagan, 1983).   In 
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contrast, it was later shown that generally investors did not value the multinational 
for their ability to provide risk diversification, tax havens or transfer pricing (Morck 
& Yeung, 1991).  Further, the findings of subsequent studies showed that more 
highly diversified firms traded at a discount (i.e., their share prices were lower) than 
more focused businesses (Lang & Stulz, 1994).  More recently, it has been shown 
that the managers of multinationals are much better at foreign investment project 
selection and targeting acquisitions than their domestic country counterparts which 
improves the delivery of higher returns for the shareholders (Razin & Sadka, 2007b).  
Thus, diversification strategies are more likely to mitigate risks to the top-line 
revenues and market share by modifying the profit maximization strategy of the firm.  
 
Business diversification may often be a strategic choice which results from 
low growth opportunities in the firm’s core business activities (Campa & Kedia, 
2002) and (Mackey & Barney, 2006).  Moreover, a ‘diversification discount’ may  
result from poor cross-subsidization of internal growth opportunities (Billett & 
Mauer, 2003).  For example, large firms with many diverse business units tend to 
allocate more capital resources to high performers, and if low performers are not 
divested, the diversification costs are likely to be higher (Rajan & Servaes, 2000). On 
the other hand, geographic diversification may actually improve shareholder value 
when it is focused on core business activities (Doukas & Lang, 2003).  Finally, while 
industry or business model diversification may reduce the near-term share price, it 
does not necessarily result in the destruction of real long-term value creation 
(Villalonga, 2004). Thus, we can argue that the pressure for top-line revenue growth, 
which often drives diversification can be a factor that can affect the multinational’s 
profit maximization strategy. 
 - 140 -
The relationship between firm growth and shareholder value has few direct 
empirical studies at the firm level and no significant treatment at the foreign 
subsidiary level.  Berry’s study of US firms shows that shareholders provide more 
rewards to firms that engage in FDI with higher knowledge intensity (Berry, 2006).   
Likewise, investment in new, “Greenfield” FDI is more generally rewarded by 
shareholders; whereas M&A is often penalized because of excessive control 
premiums paid by the acquiring firms (Lopez-Duarte & Garcia-Canal, 2007).  But the 
managerial preference for strong revenue growth provides an incentive to seek M&A 
in unrelated or non-core activities which can result in lower shareholder value 
(Doukas & Lang, 2003).  These findings suggests that a regular program of FDI 
projects may be viewed by the external shareholder as part of the multinational’s 
long-term growth strategy from which they may expect to participate in its future 
streams of revenues.   
 
More critically, the pursuit of excessive growth can create an opportunistic 
mindset that focuses resources on short-term profit-maximizing investments with 
higher cash returns (Bhattacharya, 2008).  In summary, while growth is a high 
priority for the multinational parent, it has not been adequately modeled for the 
foreign subsidiary where the critical source of its overall growth is generated. 
 
Endogenous Growth in Foreign Subsidiaries  
 
 
 In building an economic model to explain the factors of growth in foreign 
subsidiaries, we should consider both internal firm-level and external (country or 
industry-level) drivers of growth.  The internal drivers include capital investment or 
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R&D; and the external drivers include host country economic growth, market share, 
and price inflation.  In contrast, the most significant external economic driver of 
investment in FDI is total market size or country GDP; and in second place is the 
growth in host country GDP (Chakrabarti, 2001).  In the OECD, normal growth in 
GDP is commonly associated with monetary inflation, but it can also signal 
increasing demand in the host economy for goods and services.  However, the linkage 
of inflation and growth in GDP may not be particularly strong.  For example, a 40-
year study of the US economy shows only weak co-movement of inflation and GDP 
(Maria-Dolores & Vazquez, 2008).  Similarly, a modest rate of inflation does not 
appear to have a significant negative effect on future GDP growth (Arai et al., 2004). 
Thus, we could argue that FDI would achieve higher growth in host economies with 
modest and stable inflation and GDP growth, and we should expect some reasonable 
pro-cyclicality with respect to revenue growth and host GDP growth in competitive 
foreign subsidiaries. 
 
The foreign subsidiary’s market share is also affected by its external market 
structure that in turn, affects its capacity for growth.  There is a significant thread of 
research in the strategic management literature which links the firm’s market share 
with its profitably (Laverty, 2001).  Firms that have a higher portion of market share 
have more pricing power and can maintain market share in the presence of 
competition if it is coupled with the capacity to sustain growth over time.  Greater 
market share does not necessarily indicate greater internal efficiencies and the link 
between scale effects and market share may not strong  (Allen & Hagin, 1989). In 
contrast, foreign subsidiaries are more likely to have a distinct form of competitive or 
comparative advantage that provides higher rates of return even under relative price 
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discounting pressures in the host market.  For example, Gschwandtner shows that 
profits persist and are sustained above the ability of new entrants to readily capture in 
highly concentrated industries where there is also high growth (Gschwandtner, 2005). 
 
  The internal or firm-level factors that support firm growth include managerial 
capacity; marketing campaigns; R&D programs; firm size; economies of scale; and 
productivity.  The earliest treatment of firm growth in the strategic management 
literature argued that firms must maintain excess resources in their managerial 
capacity in order to increase growth rates (Penrose, 1959).  In contrast, Geroski 
argues that firm growth rates are largely random and are more the result of 
technological and economic shocks (Geroski, 2005).  Similarly, Buckley and Casson 
argue that the firm’s internal investment in R&D, new technologies and product 
innovations are critical to firm growth (Buckley & Casson, 1976).   
 
Firm size is also treated extensively in the literature as a critical growth factor 
where it is commonly believed to facilitate economies of scale.  However, the 
empirical results for this commonly stylized fact are widely inconsistent.  For 
example, in a study of the world’s largest firms, Buckley et al showed only a weak 
relationship between firm size and growth but strong dependence on industry-specific 
factors on growth (Buckley et al., 1978).  However, it may also be the case that firm 
size may simply reflect the firm’s effective market share, and except for those cases 
where foreign subsidiaries actually produce identical commodities or product 
substitutes for their host economy, their firm size is highly related to their market 
share.  
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Balancing Growth and Shareholder Value 
 
The powerful market incentives which drive short-term earnings may also 
drive investments in high growth opportunities which may lead to the premature 
slowing of firm growth through over-investment and over-extension of resources  
(Mackey & Vlikangas, 2004).  For example, firms with fewer growth opportunities 
are also more likely to be acquired by firms in non-core related industries to sustain 
their overall long-term growth objectives (Doukas & Kan, 2008).  Moreover, the 
threat of hostile outside take over for firms with poor growth opportunities may 
create a moral hazard relationship between the firm’s managers and shareholders 
(Tirole, 1988).  Similarly, Olson and Van Bever discuss how firm growth may stall 
and decline through failures in strategic planning to realign firm resources into new 
products or markets (Olson & Van Bever, 2008).  Thus, we argue that there should be 
an incentive for the foreign subsidiary to maintain some flexibility in its profit 
maximizing strategy that can balance growth and profit in the short-run and optimize 
capital costs and shareholder returns in the long-run. 
 
Under dynamic market conditions and asymmetrical competitive responses, 
some firms may elect to maximize their sales or revenues by sacrificing some profit 
margins in the short-run.  These firms are also known as growth maximizers, which is 
in contrast to profit maximizers who will always maximize their price and profit 
margins (Baumol, 1962).  Growth or sales maximization is also more likely to be 
seen in industries that are more concentrated.  In practical terms, many firms may 
seek to maximize growth with some minimum profit constraints with a balanced 
growth strategy by modifying their short-term pricing and investment policies. 
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The firm’s pricing policy enables it to choose or change between growth and 
profit maximization, or to maximize growth with a minimum profit constraint.  
Although, switching between profit or growth maximization strategy is not an 
irreversible decision, investment policies are more irreversible and the long-run effect 
of switching between profit and growth maximization can also alter the market 
structure in concentrated markets.  Thus, the firm’s profit maximization strategy must 
be capable of adjusting for dynamic conditions to balance opportunities for growth 
with the shareholder’s expectations. 
 
Dynamic Profit Maximization 
 
  
 The central argument of industrial organization is that the firm’s shareholders 
will want their managers to maximize future or expected profits.  Also within this 
paradigm, the firm’s external economic environment determines its  market structure 
which affects the firm’s conduct or strategy and performance (Scherer, 1970).  In the 
case of the foreign subsidiary, there are several issues that add a layer of complexity 
to the development and deployment of the profit strategy including foreign exchange 
rates, volatility in international trade, and changing governmental policies.  Thus, the 
foreign subsidiary’s profit maximization strategy should be dynamic and share these 
common, competitive elements:   
 
(a) market selection; 
which is how the firm raises growth capital, which foreign markets will 
the firm enter, and in which entry mode or form or ownership;   
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(b) business model or operating strategy; 
which is how the firm will organize its factors of production and 
manage risk to its operating factors and sources of capital; 
 
(c) price discrimination; 
  which is how the firm will balance growth and profitability; and 
 
(d) investment policy; 
which is how the firm allocates capital investment resources to support 
future expansion. 
 
A brief discussion of these four components follows.    
 
(a) The  market selection hypothesis requires that the firm be able to raise 
investment capital and generate positive profits in the target markets (Dutta & 
Radner, 1999).  In the context of the FDI decision process, market selection must also 
address the choice of geographical location and mode of market entry such as direct 
investment or licensing.   
 
(b) The economic motivations for market entry contemplate a general 
operating strategy of how the foreign subsidiary will organize its factors of 
production and generate profits.  Driffield and Love provide a taxonomy where the 
basic economic motivations for FDI may be classified according to the comparative 
availability of two critical resources within the host market structure: labour and 
technological intensity or capacity (Driffield & Love, 2007).  For example, a foreign 
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subsidiary which has lower labour cost and lower technological sophistication than in 
the parent’s source or home country is more likely to have an operating strategy 
based on some type of efficiency seeking.  There are also business risks which attend 
each type of operating strategy which in turn may be mitigated by adjustment of the 
foreign subsidiaries capital structure (Desai et al., 2008).    
 
(c)  Price discrimination or pricing policy is the primary feature of the firm’s 
profit maximization strategy and largely influenced by its competitive market 
structure.  For example, firms producing nearly identical commodities have virtually 
no ability to raise prices without the loss of volume.  In the case of most foreign 
subsidiaries, most firms possess some pricing power at the margin.  The notable 
exceptions are those core subsidiaries that are horizontal or intermediate producers 
that may produce no risk premium because of inter-company transfer pricing. 
 
(d) The firm’s investment policy determines how it will allocate resources for 
future expansion and growth with investments in R&D or capital equipment.  It must 
also anticipate the costly adjustment of capital stock and the value of waiting for 
further information before committing to irreversible investments.   
 
On the one hand, the market selection and operating strategy components of 
the business model or profit strategy are more irreversible features of the profit 
maximization strategy because they entail: (a) the choice of a relatively fixed foreign 
locations, and (b) significant investment in physical assets.  They are also coupled at 
a relatively fixed point in the early FDI decision process.  In contrast, pricing and 
investment policy are more fluid and reversible decisions that can be adjusted with 
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very near-term effects to the firm’s dynamic market structure and performance 
feedback mechanisms.  We shall focus on the foreign subsidiaries’ operating strategy 
as a critical determinant of its short-run profit maximization strategy. 
 
Operating Strategy of Foreign Subsidiaries  
 
In the broadest terms, business strategy is the concept of how a firm 
dynamically adapts to changing markets, positions itself and its products in the 
market place, and aligns its resources with its strategic objectives (Teece, 2007).  By 
comparison, the foreign subsidiary’s operating strategy generally outlines how the 
firm organizes its factors of production; its scale, capital assets, and its external 
connections with other host factor markets.  The firm’s basic operating strategy also 
defines how it allocates internal resources in response to expected changes in the 
demand for its products and services.  The foreign subsidiaries’ operating strategy is 
by definition, closely linked with its profit maximization strategy since an efficient 
alignment of internal resources and external demand should result in profit-
maximizing growth (Ke & Shuntian, 2007).  However, not all foreign subsidiaries 
will have a short-run, profit-maximizing strategy.  In some cases, they may serve in a 
subordinate or intermediate production role within the parents overall long-run profit-
maximizing strategy (Tirole, 1988).    
 
Within the earlier industrial organization theories, Porter provides a 
framework for clustering firms within industries according to their strategies which 
helps to define their common, competitive factors (Porter, 1981). He extends this 
concept to show that most firms pursue one of three basic strategies: cost control, 
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product differentiation, or a strategy focused on a firm-specific advantage  (Porter, 
1991).  In a contemporary context, Driffield and Love provided a new taxonomy for 
grouping foreign subsidiaries by their basic economic motivations for market entry.  
This FDI taxonomy is based on the comparative availability of labour and 
technological infrastructure between the host (subsidiary) and source (parent) 
countries (Driffield & Love, 2007).  The taxonomies of Porter and Driffield et al can 
be over-laid in the context of developing a basic scheme of operating strategies for 
the foreign subsidiary.  For example: (a) the location-advantaged and technology-
seeking FDI types are different forms of strategic focus which are segmented 
regionally, (b) the efficiency-seeking motive strongly parallels the cost control 
strategy, and (c) the  ownership-advantaged firms are directly comparable with 
product differentiation strategies.   
 
In providing further context, these operating strategies can be also grouped by 
their relative economic value; which are high value-added and low value-added 
strategies.  High value-added strategies are based on some form of comparative or 
competitive advantage which are parallel with the location advantage and ownership-
advantaged types of FDI respectively (Kogut, 1985).   We discuss the observable 
factors within the Driffield and Love taxonomy of FDI types where the foreign 
subsidiaries operating strategy supports growth in response to increased demand.   
 
Type 1 or location-advantaged firms seek to exploit markets where the host 
labour costs are comparably lower and host technological resources are greater as 
compared to the source country.  In this category, firms seek to exploit host 
conditions where they have some form of comparative location advantage.  These 
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firms rely on lower labour costs combined with use of technological scale effects or 
spillovers.  The Type 1 firms have an internal competency that allows them to exploit 
scale effects or productivity initiatives within a technological framework.  Their basic 
operating strategy may be classified as value-added production through combined 
scale effects in both cost and technology (Kogut, 1985).   To support growth, these 
firms would tend to increase investment into new productive assets to support higher 
product demand.  The combined effects of capital and labour productivity will result 
in a higher marginal productivity of capital and we should expect these firms to 
maximize growth with a profit constraint.  
 
Type 2 or technology-seeking firms are found where the host labour costs are 
relatively higher as are the availability of technological resources.  These firms are 
more likely to be engaged in some aspects of technology seeking to exploit spillovers 
from host country competitors and other adjacent industries.  These firms require 
redundancy of capital investment and training to facilitate the absorption of 
knowledge and skill spillovers from the host economy that make them sensitive to 
higher capital investment risk.  We could say their basic operating strategy is 
resource leveraging or conversion; that is; they seek to obtain competitive 
technologies through spillovers within the host economy.  These spillovers are 
realized primarily through transferable skills which may be hired from the skilled 
labour pool and also through the access to advanced materials or intermediate 
products such as standardized electronic subcomponents (Love, 2003).  To support 
growth in the short-run, these firms will necessarily invest in higher surplus or 
redundant fixed capital assets necessary to capture technological spillovers that may 
be transitory in nature.  The assumption in this asset substitution model is that the 
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costs of surplus fixed assets are less than the cost of duplicating the competitor’s 
intellectual property. We should expect these firms to maximize profits even though 
they may have to bare short-term investment losses during initial stages of operation. 
 
Type 3 or efficiency-seeking firms are found where host labour costs are 
comparatively lower as are the availability of technological resources.  These firms 
would more likely be pursuing some form of efficiency seeking.  They rely on scale 
effects and organization of the product cycle to reduce cost margins on commodities 
and other low-valued products in more mature stages of production with lower profit 
margins.  They are more likely to be sensitive to host labour costs that drive internal 
productivity or economies of scale.  However, we should note that lower labour rates 
are not necessarily the same as total labour costs, as overall labour productivity may 
actually be lower in countries  with lower overall wages (Narayan & Smyth, 2009).  
The Type 3 firms’ basic operating strategy is total cost reduction or control.  To 
support growth, these firms will organize the production cycle to minimize costs 
through economies of scale or productivity. We should expect these firms to be 
growth maximizers.  
 
Type 4 or ownership advantage firms, are found where host labour costs are 
comparatively higher and technological resources are comparatively lower than the 
source country and these firms may more likely succeed with some form of 
competitive ownership advantage.  Their ability to control market pricing through 
firm-specific advantage reflects an operating strategy of differentiation based on 
some proprietary technology or exclusive intellectual property.  However, highly 
differentiated products by definition also have fewer substitutes and therefore 
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sustaining market demand is critical to growth.  In the long-run these firms must 
maintain their product position in the market through increased investments in R&D, 
marketing, advertising or customer support services and other factor related to high  
value-added products and services.   
 
Type 4 investments in sustaining market share are generally treated as 
operating expenses and not as tangible assets.  For example, over 90% of R&D 
expenditures are expensed in the same year as they are incurred in most OCED 
countries (Hall & Reenen, 2000). Therefore, we would not necessarily see higher 
fixed asset investment but should expect higher rates of reinvestment of profits, or in 
the case of the foreign subsidiary, higher reinvested earnings.  We should expect 
these firms to be profit maximizers.  As summary of these operating strategies and 
FDI motives are shown in Table 1-6. 
 
FDI Type / Motive Operating Strategy Growth Factors 
Type 1 
Location Advantaged FDI 
Valued Added Production Productive Assets 
Type 2 
Technology Seeking 
Resource Conversion Redundant Assets 
Type 3 
Efficiency Seeking 
Cost Control 
Asset / Labour 
Utilization 
Type 4 
Ownership Advantaged 
Pricing Power / 
Proprietary Products 
Reinvestment 
 
Table  1-6    Drivers of Growth within the FDI Types  13      
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Research Questions  
  
Foreign subsidiaries modify their profit maximization strategies for changes in 
their economic environment and market structures: 
 
 Type 1 firms rely on scale effects in cost and technology requiring continuous 
capital improvements in physical productive capacity to sustain growth:  
 
H1-6: Growth in location-advantaged FDI is supported by investment in 
productive assets.  
 
 
Type 2 firms will invest in redundant capacity to support absorption of technology:   
 
H2-6: Growth in technology-seeking FDI necessitates investment in surplus 
capacity. 
 
Type 3 firms will minimize cost of production to support growth rates:  
 
H3-6: Growth in efficiency-seeking FDI is supported by improvements in 
productivity. 
 
Type 4 firms will exploit product differentiation to support growth and maintain 
market demand through investments in intangibles such as, marketing, customer 
service and R&D:  
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H4-6: Growth in ownership-advantaged FDI is supported by higher rates of 
reinvestment. 
 
Modeling Growth and Shareholder Value 
 
Model  5.0   Growth in Sales/Revenues    
  
We specify and multivariate, autoregressive dynamic panel model allowing 
for time varying and individual fixed effects for the annual change in revenues in 
Model 5.0: 
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Model 5.0   Firm-Level Growth in Sales 8     
 
Model 5.0 is a dynamic, aggregate model for all FDI types and those 
unclassified firms as well.  The autoregressive model allows the cumulative effects of 
continuous production on productivity and internal efficiency are captured though the 
introduction of the lagged dependent variable (Islam, 1995).  In addition, Model 5.0 
contains 8 annual time dummies to control for changes over time such as the global 
GDP contraction across most OECD countries in 2000 – 2001.  Thus, Model 5.0 
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identifies the drivers of growth that are common to all types of FDI regardless of 
time-varying effects.  Model 5.1 controls for effects of the different FDI types by 
regressing growth on the FDI type dummies as independent explanatory regressors.  
To control for collinearity, we drop one of the four FDI type dummies in the model 
rather than regressing all four FDI types through the origin.  We also constrain the 
sample to only those firms that have a known FDI type classification in the sample.  
This model compares the differences of the FDI types on growth.  Models 5.2 to 5.5 
regresses growth on the four FDI types separately, which explains which drivers are 
mostly likely to affect each of FDI type. 
 
Model  6.0   Vector Autoregressions on Key Growth Drivers  
  
To estimate the impact of a shock of the key growth factors on revenue 
growth, we specify an ordered, four-variable vector autoregressive model which 
allows for individual fixed effects and includes 4 of the significant growth drivers 
from the estimation of Model 5.0 including: capital investment, inflation, GDP and 
productivity in a reduced form as follows15: 
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Model 6.0   Vector Autoregression of Growth Variables 9            
                                                 
15 A more detailed explanation of the VAR process for panel data is provided in the Appendix. 
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Model 7.0   Linking Growth and Shareholder Value  
 
We define shareholder value as the excess return generated by the foreign 
subsidiary.  We specify purely descriptive three-factor, autoregressive, dynamic panel 
model of shareholder value (i.e., the FDI risk premium) allowing for individual fixed 
effects and controlling for profitability or asset efficiency (i.e., a weak proxy for 
returns to scale, as we do not have suitable data points for a true production 
function).  The strategic intent of the model is to determine whether we can maximize 
shareholder value without a profit constraint. 
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Model 7.0   Foreign Risk Premium and Growth  10       
 
 
Defined Variables  
 
Firms can create new, external demand through marketing campaigns, 
increased selling activities such as advertising, investment in new products, R&D and 
so forth.  However, most of these activities are largely opaque to the external 
shareholder, particularly with respect to the host market demand generating activities 
of foreign subsidiaries.  From the shareholder’s perspective, the primary variables of 
interest in assessing the relative value generated by the parent’s investment in foreign 
market risk are the observable factors (i.e., those that are externally verifiable) which 
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support growth.  We generally constrain our variables of interest to those most likely 
to be accessible to the shareholder (e.g., as available through annual reports, etc.). 
 
Financial theory argues that managers should return any excess capital (i.e., 
any surplus liquid capital funds) to the shareholders if they cannot provide the 
minimum required rate of return on the shareholder’s equity (Brigham & Erhardt, 
2002).  In other words, if a firm is not able to meet the market rate required by the 
investors that is comparable to return by the firms competitors, it should return its 
excess cash to the investors so they can invest in other alternatives.  To measure 
shareholder value in the context of a foreign subsidiary, we must first recognize that 
with very few exceptions, most foreign subsidiaries do not have unique issues of 
public shares and therefore it is difficult to determine or estimate an accurate and 
distinct market-based value for each subsidiary.  This leaves the use of a profit-based 
return as a primary measure of shareholder value such as the return on equity (ROE) 
as a sensible proxy.  We should also be concerned whether the foreign subsidiary’s 
return actually exceeds that of the parent.  For example, a foreign subsidiary with a 
return on equity of 15% and the parent’s return on equity of 10% in the same period 
would be providing a 5% premium on investment of the shareholder’s equity in 
foreign risk.   
 
We define this excess return as the ‘FDI risk premium’ that is the primary 
measure of shareholder value for foreign investment since it represents the premium 
paid for investing the shareholder’s equity in foreign risk.  We also specify the 
tangible asset ratio, which is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets as the measure of 
the firm’s capital investment which also serves as a proxy for the ability of the firm 
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to adapt to changing market conditions.  Firms with large fixed capital investments in 
machinery or production-based technologies may be slower to respond to rapid 
changes in market dynamics. 
 
 We define the firm’s capital intensity as the total assets divided by annual 
revenues, which is the amount of capital required to produce a dollar of revenues 
which also can reflect the future risk to income stability (Barton & Gordon, 1988).  
The reciprocal of capital intensity (i.e., the annual sales divided by total assets) is an 
approximate measure of the firm’s marginal productivity of capital (MPK) (Gilchrist 
& Himmelberg, 1998).   We also define several proxy measures for firm-level 
functions and activities that are not directly observable in the data set.  For this study, 
we define a proxy for managerial effectiveness by the use of the firm’s Altman’s Z 
credit score (Altman & Sabato, 2007).   The raw data set does not decompose 
variable costs factors into discrete inputs such as labour and material, so we provide a 
proxy for the measurement of productivity that is given by the year-over-year change 
in the total cost of goods sold and total change in annual capital inputs adjusted for 
inflation.  This composite measure captures the approximate, overall effects of 
productivity and economies of scale which affect the total cost basis of the firm’s 
output.  We specify the firm’s log of total assets for firm size since in this sample, the 
unchanged (i.e., the level values) will impose linearity on the model.  The annual 
return on sales is specified for a control for profitability.   
 
 
 
 
 
 - 158 -
Data Set 
 
For this study we have prepared an unbalanced panel data of 7,219 foreign 
subsidiaries from 38 countries; 22 from the OECD, and 16 from the developing 
world.  Of the 7,219 firms in the sample, 46% or 3,371 of the firms are coded for the 
type of FDI since they have complete country-level accounts that permit 
classification.  Our initial sample required the availability of basic financial and 
demographical data for the period of 2000 to 2007.  We excluded all non-industrial 
firms such as banking or government services.  The sample was then subjected to a 
screening process for the minimum availability of 50% of the key data points for the 
balance sheet and income statement, and minimum annual revenues of $5M.  This 
also eliminated firms that either entered or exited the sample during the sample 
period and so reduces survivor bias.  This sample pool was then winsorized to control 
extreme outliers for firms with year over year changes of more than +/- 1000% in the 
key financial ratios such as debt-to-assets, and return on assets.  For this study, we 
require multinational parents to have at least 1 foreign subsidiary listed in the 
ORBIS® database, which has foreign operations outside the source country, and has 
no other parent company ownership.  Foreign subsidiaries must have at least 1 parent 
firm listed in the database, which owns not less than 50% of the subsidiary’s 
outstanding shares.  Additional data from other sources include the host country 
economic factors taken from the World Bank.    
 
Estimation Method  
 
 
Model 5.0   Dynamic Estimation of Growth Rates 
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In choosing an estimation method, we expect the presence of endogeneity and 
autocorrelation in these financial panel data sets that would violate the assumptions 
of fixed effects estimation. In this instance, we have few suitably strong external 
instruments that are consistent across industry or FDI types that could be used in an 
instrumental variable method.  In addition, the likelihood of dynamic panel bias will 
require more complex instrumentation to be  managed.  We employ the one-step 
‘system’ generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano, 
Bond, Bover and Blundell (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Blundell & Bond, 1998).  This method is suitable for unbalanced panels with 
endogenous explanatory variables and heteroskedasticity in the error terms.16  In 
addition, since the sample contains a small market shock following the global 
financial recession in 2001-2002, we provide time dummies in Model 5.1 to control 
for changes over time for the aggregated model.   
Model  6.0   VAR of Drivers of Growth 
  
While the estimation of the parameters for our variables of interest tells us 
which factors are relatively important to growth, they do not tell us the impact or 
duration of a shock to those variables has over time.  In the formulation of a profit 
maximizing strategy where we must trade off growth against possibly lower returns, 
we need to know the duration and amplitude of our prospective strategic alternatives.  
                                                 
16 The ‘system’ estimator uses both differencing and lagging in levels to provide instrument 
orthogonality and preserve the constant for econometric projections.  The one-step estimation method 
has been reported to have some bias in coefficient if the number of instrument is too high.  In this 
case, our instruments do not exceed 5% of the sample firm count or total observation groups.  We also 
apply a robust error correction to improve the inferential reliability, testing for second-order auto-
correlation, and we also report the Hansen test for exogeneity of the instrument matrices.  All models 
are estimated in constant, pre-tax US dollars. 
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For example, if we increase capital investment by 1%, when should we expect to see 
an improvement in the revenue growth rate and how long will it last?  In this context, 
our panel estimators have little predictive power in forecasting future responses to 
our pricing or investment policy initiatives. 
 
Vector autoregression (VAR) is an important tool in macroeconomic modeling 
but it generally requires a very large set of observations to provide efficient 
estimation.  Moreover, it is relatively new in financial economics and only a handful 
of financial, firm-level panel data studies have employed this technique (Gilchrist & 
Himmelberg, 1998).  VAR modeling is useful in estimating the effects of shocks on 
the response variable over time, and useful in examining the relationship between 
different explanatory variables.  Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen developed an 
estimation method which allows panel data with fewer time periods and larger 
individual observations to be used in vector autoregressive estimations  (Holtz-Eakin 
et al., 1988). This method uses pooled-cross sections that allow different lags in the 
coefficients to vary over time.  It also allows for individual heterogeneity and does 
not require the absence of unit roots.  This technique has been adapted for empirical 
investigations with the use of contemporary computer-based GMM estimation tools 
by Love and Ziccino for firm-level dynamic panel data sets (Love & Zicchino, 2006).   
 
For Model 6.0, we specify an ordered, four-vector growth model with four 
explanatory variables from Model 5.0:  capital investment; productivity; host GDP 
(as opposed to the host GDP growth rate in Model 5.0); and host inflation.17  This 
                                                 
17 We specify a 2 period lag order and the 5% impulse response bands shown in Figure 1-3 are 
estimated by Monte Carlo simulation of 200 recurrences.  A further discussion of this technique is 
provided in the Appendix. 
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model is for all firms in the sample and not aggregated by firm type since we expect 
these factors of growth to be significant for all FDI types.    
 
 
Model 7.0   Dynamic Estimation of Shareholder Value 
 
 Our specification for Model 7.0 is a simplified version of Model 5.0, as we 
want to have the broadest possible conditions to recover the shareholders return in a 
highly diverse sample.  We specify a purely descriptive three-factor model for 
shareholder value.  Our simple strategy for modeling shareholder value is to show 
that growth without a profit constraint results in lower excess returns to the 
shareholder.  The dependent variable is the FDI risk premium, and our explanatory 
variables are the annual rate of growth in revenues and the 3-year moving average of 
the standard deviation in the rate of revenue growth as a measure of volatility.  The 
firm’s annual return on assets as measure of assets efficiency is used to control for 
profitability and more indirectly other dimensions of productivity such as returns to 
scale.  
Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics in Chapter Six  
 
 In Table 2-6, the total firm count in the aggregated sample of all FDI types is 
7,219 firms, of which 3,371 or 46.6% are classified by their FDI types.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 - 162 -
  FDI Type FDI 01 FDI 02 FDI 03 FDI 04 
 
 
All Location 
Advantaged
Technology 
Seeking 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Ownership 
Advantaged
Firm  
Statistics 
 
 
 
Firm Count 
7,219 1,354 274 1,193 550
Average Firm Size 
($M) 
$188M $173M $285M $167M $205M
Leverage 
.68 .69 .68 .69 .68
Capital Intensity 
(MPK) 
1.68
59.5%
1.49
67.1%
 
1.88 
 
53.1% 
 
 
1.60 
 
62.5% 
 
1.68
59.4%
Tangible Assets Ratio 
.27 .26 .31 .25 .30
Credit Score 
3.89 4.13 3.81 3.84 3.96
Change in Profitability
148% 174% 482% 48% 436%
Profitability 
8.6% 8.4% 9.8% 8.5% 11.1%
Productivity (Cost) 
5.0% 3.7% 13.4% 3.4% 4.1%
ROE 
26.3% 26.6% 26.6% 27.7% 37.3%
Parent ROE 
16.5% 9.8% 17.0% 23.6% 17.0%
FDI Risk Premium 
13.3% 18.6% 9.3% 4.9% 19.6%
Host Economic  
Factors 
GDP 
1,320 B 1,620 B 1,150 B 1,060 B 632 B
GDP Growth Rate 
2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 2.3%
Inflation 
2.5% 2.2% 2.3% 2.8% 2.6%
Growth  
Rates  
All Firms 
18.2% 15.2% 21.9% 20.0% 23.7%
Very Large Firms 
38.2% 17.7% 20.3% 29.8% 80.8%
Large Firms 
21.4% 18.2% 24.2% 24.6% 30.5%
Small & Medium 
Firms 
15.1% 13.3% 20.3% 16.4% 17.2%
Core 
20.4% 15.4% 28.3% 20.0% 28.0%
Non-Core 
17.7% 15.1% 18.6% 20.1% 20.6%
 
Table  2-6    Descriptive Statistics for Chapter Six 14              
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The most striking feature of the data set is that larger foreign subsidiaries have 
significantly higher rates of growth: 15.1% for small and medium; 21.4% for large; 
and 38.2% for very large subsidiaries, which also suggests a relationship between 
market share and growth.  Generally, core subsidiaries have slightly higher growth 
rates of 20.4% compared to 17.7% for non-core subsidiaries.  The average GDP 
growth rate of 2.4% and the modest inflation rates of 2.5% during the sample period 
appear to support growth in all the FDI types.   
 
 The count for the Type 1 location-advantaged is 1,354 firms or 18.7% of the 
total sample.  They are located in the largest host economies averaging $1,620B.  The 
results show a good growth in profitability of 174% and a very good FDI risk 
premium of 18.6%.  This type also has the highest credit score of 4.13; an indication 
of how well these subsidiaries manage their internal resources with their external 
(i.e., locationally dependent) market structure.   
 
The count for the Type 2 technology-seeking firms is 274 or 3.7% of the total 
sample.  While the average annual cost productivity of all subsidiaries was 5.0%, the 
Type 2 technology-seeking firms have a higher productivity rate of 13.4%, a 
phenomenon of this type.  In part, it is related to the simultaneous high growth rate in 
sales and profitability and as noted above, where host economies with high 
technological spillovers have strong impact on firm-level productivity.  The average 
firm size for the Type 2 FDI is the largest, averaging $285M in annual revenues.  
They also have the highest capital intensity of 1.88, and the highest tangible asset 
ratio of 0.31 of all types.  These factors together suggest a linkage between spillover 
effects, economies of scale and productivity that are consistent with the economic 
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motives of this FDI type.  Type 2 also show the strongest growth in profitability of 
482% (i.e., they are becoming more profitable over the sample period, but not 
necessarily more efficient).  
 
 The count for the Type 3 efficiency-seeking firms is 1,193 or 16.5% of the 
total sample.  These subsidiaries have the smallest overall firm size averaging $167M 
and poorest growth in profitability of only 48%, which is to say they are becoming 
less profitable over time and provide the lowest FDI risk premium of only 4.9%.18   
 
 The count for the Type 4 ownership-advantaged firms is 550 or 7.6% of the 
total sample.  These subsidiaries have the strongest growth rate of 23.7%, a very 
good growth in profitability of 436% and the highest FDI risk premium of 19.6%.  
They also tend to be located in smaller host economies averaging only $632B. 
 
Estimation Results for Model 5.0  
  
In Model 5.0 (shown in Table 3-6), the annual growth in revenues for the 
aggregated sample of all 7,219 firms with all known and unknown FDI types show 
the response to firm size; productivity; inflation; and managerial effectiveness (i.e., 
via the credit score proxy) while controlling for changes over time in the 8 year 
sample.  The tests for autocorrelation and the exogeneity of the instrument matrixes 
are satisfactory and significant for all model variants.  
 
 
                                                 
18 A 100% growth in profitability is a constant (unchanging) rate of profitability, 48% would indicate 
profitability is decreasing over the sample period. 
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Table  3-6   Estimation of Models 5.0 to 5.5  15        
 
  FDI Type  FDI 01 FDI 02 FDI 03 FDI 04 
Model  5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 
FDI Category 
 
All Firms 
All coded 
Types 
Location  
Advantaged 
Technology 
Seeking 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Ownership 
Advantaged
Firm Count  
In Sample 
 
 
 
7,219 3,371 1,354 274 1,193 550 
Revenues 
Growth Rate 
Lagged 
dependent 
Variable 
0.014 
0.09 
0.147 
1.64 
-0.082 
-0.44 
-0.219 
-1.60 
-0.115 
-0.92 
-0.161 
-1.35 
Internal 
Drivers 
Capital 
Intensity 
-0.002 
-2.54 
0.012 
2.33 
-0.002 
-1.71 
-0.015 
-2.31 
0.003 
1.44 
-0.014 
-1.73 
Capital 
Investment 
0.215 
1.09 
0.433 
2.15 
0.760 
2.57 
0.965 
2.04 
0.545 
1.65 
-0.125 
-0.67 
Earnings 
Reinvestment 
0.074 
1.38 
0.060 
0.84 
0.049 
0.84 
0.427 
4.39 
-1.123 
-1.48 
0.530 
2.50 
Financial 
Leverage 
0.035 
1.63 
0.049 
0.62 
0.097 
2.21 
0.258 
1.69 
0.474 
4.12 
0.024 
0.23 
Credit Score 
0.018 
2.12 
0.029 
2.50 
0.039 
2.08 
0.021 
1.66 
0.144 
4.36 
0.012 
3.21 
Productivity 
0.063 
4.20 
0.039 
3.96 
0.038 
3.15 
0.048 
1.77 
0.192 
2.32 
0.027 
1.24 
 
External 
Drivers 
 
 
 
Growth in 
Host GDP 
2.597 
1.82 
4.23 
4.64 
3.288 
2.58 
-3.110 
-1.13 
4.934 
2.02 
10.106 
3.60 
Wages % 
Host GDP 
0.014 
1.32 
0.066 
2.95 
0.065 
3.37 
-0.088 
-1.89 
0.106 
2.24 
-0.353 
-2.73 
Inflation 
1.735 
2.27 
2.694 
2.30 
2.475 
2.87 
0.936 
0.70 
3.783 
2.40 
1.408 
0.35 
Controls 
Firm Size 
0.032 
2.79 
0.010 
0.79 
0.008 
0.57 
-0.040 
-1.32 
0.037 
1.93 
0.035 
1.05 
Profitability 
-0.012 
-1.55 
-0.021 
-1.57 
-0.003 
-0.64 
0.061 
1.20 
-0.004 
-0.47 
-0.041 
-0.80 
FDI 
Effect 
Dummy 
FDI 01  
0.009 
0.37 
    
FDI 02  
-0.076 
-2.02 
    
FDI 04  
-0.017 
-0.36 
    
Intercept Constant  
-0.632 
-3.70 
-0.677 
-3.81 
0.835 
2.00 
-1.262 
-2.91 
1.547 
2.23 
Time 
Dummies 
 Y N N N N N 
Auto 
correlation 
AR(2) p-
value 
0.698 0.316 0.485 0.552 0.519 0.621 
Instrument 
Exogeneity 
Hansen p-
value 
0.826 0.582 0.558 0.491 0.767 0.125 
Coefficients above and z-values below 
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Estimation Results for Model 5.1 
 
Model 5.1 shown in Table 3-6 shows the different effects of the FDI types on 
firm growth through regressions on the FDI dummies as explanatory variables.  In 
this instance, we have regressed on the FDI Types 1, 2 and 4 dummies; therefore, the 
constant in this model is the coefficient of the dropped FDI dummy for Type 3.  The 
results show that controlling for FDI motives or types; growth in host GDP, inflation, 
capital investment, and productivity have a significant influence on growth.  This is 
the basis for selection of our variables for Model 6.0. 
 
Estimation Results for Model 5.2 to 5.5 
 
 Models 5.2 to 5.5 are shown in Table 3-6 are the four separate estimation 
results, one for each FDI type.  All of these models have significant responses in both 
internal and external drivers of growth with the exception of the Type 2 technology-
seeking firms.  The Type 2 firms only shows growth in response to internal growth 
drivers that may indicate a partial decoupling of this firms growth with its external 
market structure.  A likely result of this type growth being more dependent on 
spillover effects rather than by market competition.  Models 5.2 to 5.5 have 
significant intercepts and satisfactory tests for autocorrelation and good exogeneity in 
the instrument matrixes.    
 
Estimation Results for Model 5.2 
 
 In Model 5.2, the Type 1 location-advantaged firms show a positive response 
of growth to capital investment with an elasticity of 1.01%; to productivity with an 
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elasticity of 0.21%; and to host GDP growth of 0.49%.  The elasticity of wages (as a 
percentage of host GDP) of 1.88% suggests growth is stronger in countries with 
relatively higher wages and may be likely the results of higher labour productivity.  
The elasticity of growth in response to inflation of 0.36% could suggest that the 
firm’s prices may be more inelastic.  The lower price elasticity in Type 1 would be 
consistent with firms with higher growth in profitability that reflects the ability to 
maintain prices in response to changes in demand.  These results support our 
argument that the Type 1 firms support growth through increased capital investments 
linked with productive utilization of assets.  
 
Estimation Results for Model 5.3 
 
 In Model 5.3, the Type 2 technology-seeking firms showed only limited 
responses to internal growth drivers.  This may be partly due to the smaller sample 
size.  However, the interpretation of the growth factors in this model is somewhat 
challenging as the economic motives inherent in this operating strategy are more 
complex.  The response of growth to a 1% increase in fixed capital investment of 
1.71% is strong.  These firms have the highest capital intensity of all types of 1.88 
(i.e., 12% higher than all other FDI types) suggesting that a relatively higher asset 
base are linked with the ability to capture technological spillovers from the host 
economy.  The absence of any response to other internal and external drivers is also 
informative.  The descriptive statistics show Type 2 firms have higher productivity 
and relatively larger firm sizes suggesting economies of scale are present; however, 
scale effects are not likely to be the sole causal drivers of growth but the result of 
obtaining technology-driven cost improvements from spillovers rather than from 
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internal funded sources.  We find limited support for our argument that growth in 
Type 2 firm is supported by investment in surplus assets.  
Estimation Results for Model 5.4 
 
 In Model 5.4, the Type 3 efficiency-seeking firms show growth in response to 
productivity, host GDP growth, and inflation.  The response of growth to a 1% 
increase in productivity is 1.03% and the absence of significant growth in response to 
fixed asset investment suggests stronger dependencies on labour cost related effects.  
In contrast to Type 1, the elasticity of growth in response to inflation of 0.94% may 
indicate greater price elasticity (i.e., the lack of pricing power) and is more consistent 
with commodities that are associated with Type 3 production.  The presence of some 
economies of scale are suggested in the weakly significant correlation between firm 
size and revenue growth (with confidence p = 0.053) with a small elasticity of 0.19%  
The elasticity of growth in response to host GDP growth of 1.01% also suggests a 
closer link between market structure and performance.  This also shows that these 
firms are not all intermediate producers but have significant revenue generating 
capacity within the host economies.  Like Type 1, the elasticity of growth in response 
to host wages as percentage of GDP is 2.09% suggest stronger growth in economies 
with relatively higher wages and suggesting some linkage with work force 
productivity.  These results support our argument that Type 3 firms support growth 
with improvement through scale effects and higher productivity.  
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Estimation Results for Model 5.5 
 
In Model 5.5, the Type 4 ownership-advantaged firms show a higher growth 
in response to growth in host GDP with an elasticity of 1.45%, more than any other 
type and an indicator of the link between growth and market structure.  The elasticity 
of growth on the rate of internal investment of 0.70% is a significant response for this 
type given the absence of a response in fixed capital investment and high growth in 
rate of profitability ( i.e., firms are becoming more profitable over the sample 
period).  This suggests earnings are being reinvested in some unobservable, 
intangible activities such as product development, marketing plans, or R&D.  
Likewise, there are no responses of growth to productivity or inflation suggesting 
possibly that growth is linked more strongly with pricing power.  This provides some 
conditional support of our argument that the Type 4 firms achieve growth by 
reinvesting in intangible activities in the development of market share and demand.    
 
Differences in Growth and Profit Maximization  
 
Finally, we can approximate the difference between growth and profit 
maximization by examining the elasticities in Table 4-6.  Holding profitability 
constant to allow for changes in price elasticity of demand, a profit maximization 
strategy may be inferred by a positive elasticity of < 1% on the rate of reinvested 
earnings, which in this case is the rate of profit growth.  In other words, for a 1% 
increase in rate of profit growth, there is less than 1% increase in the rate of sales 
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growth.19  We can infer from the results in Table 4-6 that Type 2 and Type 4 are 
stronger profit maximizers and they have the only positive elasticities for reinvested 
earnings and the highest change in profits.  Type 2 is profit maximizing but they may 
be sacrificing some returns to pay for the cost of capturing spillover effects from the 
host economy as they have the lowest marginal productivity of capital.  The Type 4 
firms are more strongly profit maximizing as we might expect.  Type 3 does not have 
a significant reinvestment value but the negative sign of the coefficient indicates that 
is would be growth or revenue maximization as we might also expect.  The reinvested 
earnings are not significant in Type 1 location-advantaged firms, but the coefficient 
sign and z values indicate it may be more growth maximizing with a profit constraint 
if we consider the positive change in their profitability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 As the rate of profitability is increasing faster than the rate of sales growth, this would indicate profit 
maximization, as price increases were likely to be a factor in maintaining revenues.  It could also be a 
result of a different composition of products and services with different profit margins. 
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 1% Increase Growth  Response 
FDI Type  
Time Effect
Controlled 
FDI 01 
 
FDI 02 FDI 03 FDI 04 
Category  All 
Location 
Advantaged
Technology 
Seeking 
Efficiency 
Seeking 
Ownership 
Advantaged
Change in 
Profitability Rate
 
148% 174% 482% 48% 436%
Growth Rates  
18.2% 15.2% 21.9% 20.0% 23.7%
Profit / Growth 
Maximization 
 Balanced(*) Profit Growth Profit  
Model  5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
Firm-level 
Elasticity 
Capital Intensity -0.02% -0.17% 
Capital Investment 1.01% 1.71% 
Reinvestment Rate 0.11% 0.70%
Leverage 0.38%  0.47%
Productivity (Cost) 0.35% 0.21%  1.03%
Firm Size  0.18%  
Country-Level 
Elasticity 
GDP Growth 0.49%  1.01% 1.45%
Inflation 0.29% 0.36%  0.94%
Wages % GDP 1.88%  2.09% -9.99%
(*) Growth Maximization with a Profit Constraint 
 
Table   4-6    Significant Elasticities of Models  5.1 to 5.5 16               
 
Estimation Results for Model 6.0   
  
The results of the estimates for responses of growth to shocks for all FDI 
types are shown in the impulse-response diagrams in Figure 1-6.  Productivity and 
host GDP have significant t-values with their effects on sales or revenue growth (See 
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Table A-1 in Appendix).  A 1% productivity shock has a modest, short-term 1.5% 
effect on revenue growth of 1 to 3 years.  A 1% host GDP shock has a moderate, 
negative effect of -4% on the sales growth rate over 1 to 2 years.  The negative 
response of the growth rate of revenues is likely to be the result of higher price 
elasticity of demand.  Recall, that the response variable is the revenue growth rate, 
which means that the rate of growth may decrease or slow, but not necessarily that 
that rate of growth will be negative.  As the typical demand curve shifts in an 
expanding economy, price levels increase, which lowers total revenues until the 
supply curve shifts and restores price levels to equilibrium.   
 
The t-values for capital investment and inflation are lower than expected, but 
largely due to the transformation of the data sets, that purges fixed effects.  A 1% 
capital investment shock would result in a smooth response in revenues growth of 1% 
over a 1 to 3 year period.  An inflation shock of 1% has a small, short-term effect 
about 2% over 1 to 2 years on the revenue growth rate.   
 
Productivity and host GDP shocks are the most statistically significant factors 
in revenue growth as we would expect across a widely diverse sample of firms but we 
should also expect capital investments and inflation are also very likely to be 
significant for different groups within the sample.  A review of the panel VAR 
estimation techniques and a table of coefficients are provided in the Appendix. 
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foreign subsidiaries that maximize the stable growth in revenues with good asset 
utilization.   
  Coefficient z-value p elasticity 
Response  FDI Risk 
Premium 
 
Lagged Value FDI Risk 
Premium 
0.367 2.28 0.023 0.36%
Growth  Revenues 
Growth 
0.861 2.35 0.019 0.88%
Volatility  Std. Dev. (ln) 
Growth 
-0.138 -2.56 0.010 -0.87%
Control Profitability 
(ROA) 
1.529 3.24 0.001 0.71%
Intercept Constant 
 
-0.400 -2.69 0.007 
Autocorrelation  AR(2)  0.109 
Instrument 
Exogeneity  
Hansen Test 0.774 
 
Table   5-6    Estimation of Model 7.0 Shareholder Value for all FDI Types 17          
 
Ranking of Shareholder Value  
 
 
 Finally, in Table 6-6, we categorize our samples into two different groups for 
analysis of their shareholder performance based on the results of Model 7.0 with 
some arbitrary assignments of relative value.  First we classify them by their FDI 
type, and secondly, by their NACE industrial classification codes.  We also force 
rank the performance of our firms to categorize their relative, overall shareholder 
value based on a simple 6 point scale.  We allocate 1 point for a below average 
volatility in revenues (i.e., high volatility in growth rates tend towards inefficient 
allocations of resources and lost productivity from higher learning curves); 2 points 
for higher than average growth rate in revenues; and 3 points for higher than average 
FDI risk premium, which is our basic measure of shareholder value.  As we might 
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expect, the FDI types with high value-added operating strategies, Types 1 and 4 have 
higher shareholder value ratings of 4 and 5 respectively.  In contrast, only NACE 
Classification 01 for agriculture and mining has a point rank of 5.  This industry 
classification combines technological capacity with the capacity to exploit natural 
resources of host economies.   
 
 Revenues 
Volatility 
Revenues 
Growth 
FDI Risk 
Premium 
Shareholder 
Value Rank 
 Low = 1 
points 
High = 2 
points 
High = 3 
points 
 
FDI 01 
Location Advantaged 
Lower Lower Higher 4 
FDI 02 
Technology Seeking 
Lower Higher Lower 3 
FDI 03 
Efficiency Seeking 
Lower Higher Lower 3 
FDI 04 
Ownership Advantaged 
Higher Higher Higher 5 
     
NACE 01 
Mining & Agriculture 
Higher Higher Higher 5 
NACE 15 
Manufacturing 
Higher Lower Lower 2 
NACE 30 
Energy & Construction 
Lower Higher Lower 3 
NACE 40 
Retail 
Lower Lower Lower 1 
NACE 60 
Transport & 
Communication 
Lower Lower Lower 1 
NACE 70 
Communication Services  
Lower Higher Lower 3 
Table   6-6    Ranking of Shareholder Values 18           
 
A comparison of the influence of volatility on the rates of growth within the 
NACE and FDI types is shown in Figure 2-6.  A further comparison of the effect of 
growth rates on the foreign (FDI) risk premium is shown in Figure 3-6.20  As we note 
                                                 
20 The axis’s of these charts is set to the mean of the sample data set. 
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in Table 4-5, about a third of the firms in the sample are core subsidiaries, which 
generate on average a small risk premium of 4.1%.  On the other hand, the two-thirds 
majority of the firms in our sample that are non-core subsidiaries generate an average 
FDI risk premium of 18.7% (i.e., 18.7% above the ROE of the parent company).  It is 
the non-core foreign subsidiaries which have inherently higher capital and operating 
risks and which should necessarily demand these higher risk premiums.   
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Figure  2-6     Volatility in Growth Rates  10             
 
 
Figure  3-6     Shareholder Value (Risk Premium) and Growth Rates  11          
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Chapter Summary 
  
 We have provided a framework for evaluating the profit maximization 
strategies of foreign subsidiaries and their relationship to their basic operating 
strategy in foreign markets.  This link is important in understanding how growth and 
shareholder expectations drive foreign investment that supports growth in the global 
economy.  
 
We find that the average foreign subsidiary in this study provides their parent 
with a foreign equity risk premium of 13.3% and that this premium is supported by 
maintaining stable growth in revenues with good asset utilization.  In our sample, 
larger firms have significantly higher rates of growth; likewise, core subsidiaries also 
have slightly higher rates of growth as opposed to non-core subsidiaries.  We find 
general support for our argument that the firm’s operating strategy is linked with its 
form of profit maximization.  High value-added subsidiaries depend on higher levels 
of investment to sustain long-term growth whereas marginal cost producers must 
maintain improvements in productivity and constant alignment of their product 
cycles.  In contrast, the technology-sourcing foreign subsidiaries face the challenge of 
lower marginal productivity of capital in the short-run with redundancy in asset 
investment needed to capture temporary gains from transient technological spillovers.   
 
We also show through the key growth factors common to foreign subsidiaries 
that modest inflation, stable growth in host GDP, improvements in firm-level 
productivity all have positive, short-term impact on growth.  Likewise, capital 
investment has a more selective short-term influence on growth that but is also linked 
more closely with the firm’s operating strategy.  
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We further find that high value-added operating strategies linked with 
comparative and competitive advantages provide superior shareholder value than the  
classified as sourcing foreign technology and cost efficiency.  In total, about 26% of 
the firms in this study showed superior, relative shareholder returns of >18% which is 
significantly higher than the best 10-year average of the S&P 500 of about 16%.  
Finally, we show that foreign subsidiaries have a profit maximization strategy that 
also allows them to adapt to changes in the host economic environment and market 
structures.  We found the Type 4 ownership-advantaged firms to be stronger profit 
maximizing for this period, whereas the Type 3 efficiency-seeking firms are more 
likely to be growth or sales maximizing.  The Type 1 firms that are location-
advantaged are likely to be growth maximizers with a profit constraint, whereas Type 
2 technology-seeking firms are more likely to be long-run profit maximizers with 
some short-term impairment of their asset returns and efficiency during the near-term 
absorption of technological spillovers.   
 
 There is a number of challenging areas for further research on the results 
presented here.  In particular, we have focused on the observable, quantitative growth 
factors that concern the external shareholder in assessing the prospective value of 
foreign subsidiaries.  There are a large number of qualitative internal factors from the 
strategic management viewpoint that are more difficult to assess empirically at the 
firm-level such as the effects of ownership structure, product marketing, price 
discrimination and R&D which affect the multinational’s ability to sustain long-term 
growth in foreign markets. 
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CHAPTER  SEVEN THESIS CONCLUSION 
 
 We have argued and demonstrated through empirical analysis and testing of 
our research questions that capital markets function as an integral component of the 
foreign subsidiary’s market structure, that is, the source and costs of capital funding 
affects the strategic conduct of the firm.  Capital markets affect the choice of funding, 
the timing of investments, the mitigation of foreign risk, and the expansion of FDI as 
well as the organization of their profit maximization strategy.    
 
From our results, we can see that a more expansive approach to portfolio or 
arbitrage FDI theory can explain why the cost of capital and rates of return work in 
conjunction with the benefits of direct ownership when we consider that operating 
and profit strategies are linked with the firm’s market structure.  Thus, in contrast to 
some of the long-standing arguments against the portfolio theory of FDI, we can 
now argue that: (a) that multinationals finance FDI with foreign capital as a way of 
improving their risk and return performance (b)  that although intra-industry or core 
FDI does not provide a significant risk premium, it does generally have higher rates 
of revenue growth, suggesting short-term rates of returns may be deferred in favor 
of successful, long-term competition in foreign markets, and (c)  that multinationals 
may invest in a portfolio of different FDI types, which in combination with the 
benefits of direct ownership, can provide superior shareholder value.  
 
 In Chapter Four, the link between FDI and capital markets functions in the 
firm’s market structure where expectations on asset prices, growth  and interest rates 
affect the flow of new capital and capital investments made by foreign subsidiaries.  
In Chapter Five, the link between the FDI and capital markets functions in the firm’s 
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use of leverage and shorter debt maturities that shift financial risk onto the host 
creditors.  In Chapter Six, the link between FDI and capital markets functions by   the 
modification of the firms profit maximizing strategy where high growth and profit 
maximization are linked to the firms operating strategy to generate a risk premium 
for investment of the parent firm’s equity in foreign market risk.   
 
Summary of Thesis Results 
 
 In Chapter Four, we found that contrary to most economic theories of FDI, 
interest rates (i.e., the effect of the cost of capital on rates of return) coupled with the 
expectation of future growth as measured by the market values in capital markets 
have an impact on new capital flows and new capital investments made by foreign 
subsidiaries.  For every 1% increase in the total S&P 500 market return (i.e., a proxy 
for global assets prices), we have and increase in new capital flows of 0.22%.  
Likewise, with a 1% increase in the PE ratio of the parent home stock market (i.e., a 
measure of the future expectation of growth) results in a 4.5% increase in foreign 
capital investments. 
 
 In Chapter Five, we examined how foreign subsidiaries modify their capital 
structure in response to foreign business risk that is linked with their operating 
strategy.  By increasing the foreign subsidiary’s overall amount of leverage and 
reducing the maturity on their debt, these firms transfer more financial risk to the 
local host creditors.  On average, a 1% increase in a typical risk business factor such 
as an increase in volatility of wages was correlated with an increase in their leverage 
by 0.08% in a given year.  Although the business risk factors have relatively small 
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elasticities, it is because the largest component of the annual adjustment of capital 
structure by comparison is the gap between the target level and the current year level 
that accounts for the largest portion of the annual change in capital structure.  
Although these business risk elasticities are small, they are consistent across 
thousands of firms, in a wide range of industries and countries.  
  
 In Chapter Six, we demonstrated the link between the firms operating strategy 
and its capacity to generate the excess returns demanded by the shareholder for 
investing their equity in foreign risk.  Here we see the unique features of the firm’s 
operating strategy plays in the modification of the firm’s profit maximization 
strategy.  We find the FDI risk premium, the basic measure of the shareholder’s 
return, is strongly correlated with stable growth in revenues and good asset utilization 
(i.e., growth maximization with a profit constraint).  We show that holding 
profitability constant, for a 1% increase in the growth in revenue, the FDI risk 
premium increases by 0.88% while volatility in growth reduces the risk premium by 
about the same amount (-0.87%). 
 
 We have argued and given supporting empirical evidence that demonstrates 
the linkage between capital markets and the market structure of foreign subsidiaries 
is strongly linked with their operating strategy that follows their basic market entry 
motive as proposed by the FDI taxonomy of Driffield et al.  We conclude the thesis 
with remarks that reflect on some of the significant challenges that the multinationals 
will face as changes in the structure and organization of global capital markets and 
global forms of capitalism evolve in the near future.  
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The most significant and logical consequence of a strong relationship between 
FDI and capital markets may be seen in the future impact of the equity risk premium 
will have on future global trade and investment.  As Siegel has noted, the long-term 
equity risk premium (i.e., the rate of return of equities over that of risk-free 
investments, or the premium paid for investment in equity risk) may contract with the 
secular rise in the interest rates of risk-free securities resulting from fundamental 
shifts in global fiscal policy (Siegel, 2005).  The rise in the rates of risk-free 
securities may be the result of more government debt being sold to the public or 
sovereign buyers to cover ever-increasing levels of social costs particularly in the 
OECD.  This could result in investors moving away from investment in purely 
domestic firms needing to raise equity capital and moving towards multinationals 
with their FDI portfolios that pay higher-risk premiums in emerging markets. As the 
competition for limited private investment capital increases, firms may seek even 
more high-risk FDI projects to generate higher risk premiums.  
 
Policy Implications of this Research  
 
The total flow of capital and trade amongst the world’s foreign subsidiaries is 
a formidable component in the global economy.  As financial markets become ever 
more closely integrated, the aspirations and investment policies of corporations will 
become increasingly important to the future stability of the global financial system.  
As the fortunes of national sovereign governments rise and fall with their predilection 
for financing their social aspirations with ever more levels of public debt, the 
multinational corporation may become more visible in its capacity for allocation of 
domestic surplus capital in foreign markets.  As a prospective social leveling 
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mechanism, the multinational may be less impaired with regional political constraints 
in its ability to allocate growth capital to impaired or under-developed regions or 
economies.   
 
The prospect of increasing levels of industrial and socio-economic policy 
through more complex capital controls and trade policies is inevitable.  Moreover, we 
also see the rise of a new form of state capitalism where state-owned multinationals 
compete in open markets to generate revenues for socio-political purposes as seen in 
China and Russia.  These firms compete for market share with the foreign 
subsidiaries of multinationals based in free and open economies, and represent a 
serious potential for the impairment to free trade and market-based competition.   
 
Sovereign governments in the last 50 years have amassed more than $40 
trillion in global debt to finance social and defense programs thus increasing the 
probability that sovereign defaults may shift ever more weight for the allocation of 
surplus capital from national governments to corporations.  The significant 
decoupling of the international business economies and national economies is 
becoming more evident.  For example, the record high profits of US and many EU 
corporations in the last half of 2010 are coupled with the highest continuous 
unemployment rates since the Great Depression.   
 
Ultimately, it may be the central planning and the fiscal discipline of the 
corporate boardroom rather than national legislatures that may have the greatest 
social impact on domestic capital formation and industrial policy.  The regulation of 
foreign capital movements will present difficult policy questions and challenges for 
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national industrial policy makers as the global economy become more integrated.  
Some of the near-term policy questions would include: 
 
1. With the increased risk of global inflation as a policy tool to devalue the 
worldwide global debt, will FDI become an inflation hedge or trap for 
investors seeking to protect their returns?  
 
2. Will international trade policy be the mechanism that arrests the growth in 
FDI as more national governments reach for revenue streams through 
increased cross-border taxation or state capitalism?  
 
3. Which host economies are more likely to become overly dependent on new 
inward FDI in the event of another massive global deflationary spiral?  
 
4. Is the expropriation of foreign assets preferable to sovereign default for 
emerging economies caught in a deflationary spiral? 
 
5. Would the increasing likelihood of the monetization of national 
indebtedness in the OECD result in a partial or permanent decoupling of 
the economies of multinationals from that of their source country? 
 
Discussion and Opinion  
 
 
A long-held, stylized fact in economics is that international capital flows will 
tend to move from socialist or command economies to open, capitalist economies.  
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This results from the demand for a risk premium for private investment capital.  This 
trend was highly visible in the 1950’s post-war period where investment capital fled 
the eastern bloc countries to the West.  As the competition of state capitalism and 
free-market capitalism face-off in the next 20 years, we will undoubtedly see FDI as 
a linchpin that will channel and divert much of the international capital flows 
between these two economic systems.   
 
Now, 50 years after Hymer’s seminal work on FDI, we see that multinationals 
still seek to exploit ownership advantage or proprietary intellectual property and limit 
risk through direct ownership.  We can also see the influence of capital markets 
where the cost and availability of credit and capital affects the timing and scope of 
FDI that make it a special case of portfolio theory.  We can now restate Hymer’s 
hypothesis in a contemporary context:  
  
Portfolio theory and the ownership advantage of direct control are both necessary 
determinants of FDI but neither is sufficient alone to explain the capital flows and 
market entry choices of the foreign direct investor. 
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APPENDIX 1     Estimation of  Panel Vector Autoregressions 
 
 Vector autoregression (VAR) has a long history of application in varied 
macroeconomic problems for its usefulness in supporting policy decisions such as 
determining the effect of the length and duration of interest rate adjustments on 
unemployment.  To a lesser extent, it has been used in financial time-series 
applications with similar problems such as interest rate shocks.  Generally, the VAR 
estimation methods rely on a long time-series of variables, typically 15 to 20 years.  
This provides assurance that the secular trends can be distinguished and real 
statistical causality can be determined.  In contrast, panel data sets are very useful 
in industrial economics as they contain a wide set of variables, which are often very 
rich in information but collected over shorter time periods, often less than 10 years.  
To bridge this gap, Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen proposed a technique for 
transforming panel data for analysis with VAR (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988).   
  
 Vector autoregression is simply an autoregressive process for a vector of 
stationary variables.  Generally, there are three types of VAR used in economic 
modeling: reduced form, recursive and structural equation modeling or SEM. SEM 
combines economic theory and a system of equations, whereas recursive and 
reduced form VAR rely on inferences from known economic models for 
interpretation.  We will briefly discuss the reduced form method used in Chapter 
Six for the analysis of growth rates.    
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In the reduced form VAR equations, each variable is expressed as its current 
and past value with a serially uncorrelated error term.21   In Model 6.0, we have 
chosen four variables from our panel data estimates that show strong correlation 
with the rates of revenue growth:  inflation; host GDP; productivity; and capital 
investment.  Thus, there are 5 equations for estimation of the parameters.  
 
A sequence of preparatory steps is required to transform the panel data to 
time-series that precede the estimation of the parameters and the creation of the 
impulse-response diagrams.  First, to transform the wide and short panels to time 
series, the cross-sectional data is pooled.  This normally relaxes the condition of 
stationarity.  However, we initially time-demeaned the data to remove any random 
walk process.  The data is then Helmert transformed to remove fixed effects.  To 
control for endogeneity, the algorithms in our program uses GMM estimation to 
provide the internal orthogonal instruments (Love & Zicchino, 2006).  In a typical 
VAR process, we would first test the number of lags to remove autocorrelation prior 
to estimation.  In this instance, we specify 2 lags that are generally sufficient with the 
GMM estimator that is used in this case.  In addition, for this method, there must be 
twice the number of time periods as the number of lags; in this case we specify 2 lags 
with 8 time periods.    
 
This transformed data is then estimated with a GMM estimator for each lag 
and variable as shown in Table A-1.  Finally, in the post-estimation process, the 
impulse-response diagrams are generated from these parameters using a Monte Carlo 
process of 200 iterations producing the data seen in Figure 1-6.  Rather than the usual 
                                                 
21 Vector Error Correction (VEC) is used for time-series with serial correlation in the error terms. 
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Granger causality test that follows the VAR post-estimation process, we see the 
standard errors and student t-values reported as familiar with GMM estimations that 
we can use as our basis of statistical inference. 
 
One of the challenges with this technique as applied to this study is that while 
we are purging individual fixed effects before estimation, we are also likely purging 
some industry effects, which is why we see lower t- values in samples, which have 
mixed capital intensities.  For example, capital investment will vary strongly in 
industry groups as evidenced by the varied responses to capital investment by the 
different FDI types as seen in Table 3-6.  In contrast, we see strong responses 
between productivity (i.e., input cost productivity as opposed to factor productivity) 
and host GDP that are not necessarily constrained by the externalities of any specific 
industry.  Given the strong weighting of OCED countries in the data set, these results 
also confirm the linkage between inflation and GDP in the global business cycles 
which appears to have strong influence on growth in foreign affiliates (Chauvet & 
Yu, 2006). 
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Table A-1 Estimation of VAR parameters and t-values 19 
 
Dependent Variable: Sales Growth
Lag Coefficient Std Error  t- value
Sales Growth 1  -.01639691      .01066031 -1.53
Capital Investment 1   .00166426      .28732245 0.00
Inflation 1   2.4144449      2.1285311 1.13
Productivity 1  -.00631554      .00656095 -0.96
Host GDP 1  -5.308e-13      5.226e-14 -10.15
Sales Growth 2  -.00476223      .00339961 -1.40
Capital Investment 2   .07911883      .09389353 0.84
Inflation 2  -.89276621      .80150541 -1.11
Productivity 2   .01708077      .00411875 4.14
Host GDP 2  4.393e-13     4.631e-14 9.48
Dependent Variable: Capital Investment
Sales Growth 1   .00069333      .00115596 0.59
Capital Investment 1   .65333512      .02642647 24.72
Inflation 1   .08934188      .14531537 0.61
Productivity 1   8.352e-06      .00028875 0.02
Host GDP 1  -3.624e-15      8.567e-15 -0.42
Sales Growth 2  -.00068773       .0004411 -1.55
Capital Investment 2   .02022921      .01351731 1.49
Inflation 2   .04614788      .08558051 0.53
Productivity 2  -.00042811      .00025713 -1.66
Host GDP 2  3.275e-15     7.580e-15 0.43
Dependent Variable: Inflation
Sales Growth 1  -.00005145      .00006697 -0.76
Capital Investment 1  -.00408894      .00256456 -1.59
Inflation 1   .65002857      .02357809 27.56
Productivity 1   6.764e-06      .00001217 0.55
Host GDP 1  -2.016e-14      5.364e-16 -37.58
Sales Growth 2  -.00001114      .00002232 -0.49
Capital Investment 2  -.00076874      .00060504 -1.27
Inflation 2  -.16613974       .0188467 -8.81
Productivity 2   5.309e-06       .0000172 0.30
Host GDP 2  1.623e-14     4.750e-16 34.16
Dependent Variable: Productivity
Sales Growth 1  -.00494061      .00732489 -0.67
Capital Investment 1   .86039811      .90731959 0.94
Inflation 1  -.50653047      .61976945 -0.81
Productivity 1  -.00329751      .00957076 -0.34
Host GDP 1  -8.277e-15      1.132e-13 -0.07
Sales Growth 2  -.00160749      .00320663 -0.50
Capital Investment 2  -.59365855      .62648655 -0.94
Inflation 2   .13267886      .59469035 0.23
Productivity 2  -.00692137      .00648878 -1.06
Host GDP 2 -2.370e-14     1.058e-13 -0.23
Dependent Variable: Host GDP
Sales Growth 1   1.142e+10      4.316e+09 2.64
Capital Investment 1  -3.491e+11      2.865e+10 -12.18
Inflation 1  -5.659e+11      1.013e+11 -5.58
Productivity 1  -2.999e+09      5.464e+08 -5.48
Host GDP 1   .85164073        .013418 -63.47
Sales Growth 2  -3.608e+09      1.473e+09 -2.44
Capital Investment 2  -2.807e+10      1.141e+10 -2.46
Inflation 2   1.455e+12      8.875e+10 16.39
Productivity 2  -1.024e+09      4.516e+08 -2.26
Host GDP 2 -.13430555     .01208699 -11.10
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APPENDIX 2 NACE Classifications  
 
 In the Master Data Set, all the firms, both parent and subsidiaries are group 
in one of the following NACE classifications.   
 
10 Agriculture and Mining   Codes 0001 to 1499  
 
15 Manufacturing    Codes 1500 to 3999 
 
30 Energy and Construction       Codes 4000 to 4999 
 
40 Retail      Codes 5000 to 5999 
 
60  Transportation and Communication Codes 6000 to 6500 
 
70  Communications Services   Codes 7000 to 7500  
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APPENDIX 3 Country Representation in Master Data Set  
 
 
 
Table A-2    Country Representation in Master Data Set 20     
Country ISO Firms
AUSTRALIA AU 6            
BELGIUM BE 1,094     
BERMUDA BM 15          
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BA 1            
CANADA CA 1            
CAYMAN ISLANDS KY 5            
CHINA CN 2            
CROATIA HR 55          
CZECH REPUBLIC CZ 50          
FINLAND FI 147        
FRANCE FR 2,068     
GERMANY DE 32          
GREECE GR 182        
HONG KONG HK 7            
INDONESIA ID 4            
ITALY IT 901        
JAPAN JP 2            
KUWAIT KW 1            
LUXEMBOURG LU 2            
MALAYSIA MY 10          
NETHERLANDS NL 165        
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AN 1            
NEW ZEALAND NZ 3            
NORWAY NO 283        
PAKISTAN PK 7            
PHILIPPINES PH 20          
POLAND PL 36          
RUSSIAN FEDERATION RU 77          
SINGAPORE SG 55          
SOUTH AFRICA ZA 1            
SPAIN ES 117        
SWEDEN SE 496        
SWITZERLAND CH 40          
THAILAND TH 7            
TONGA TO 1            
UNITED KINGDOM GB 2,110     
UNITED STATES US 3            
8,007     
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GLOSSARY  
 
 
Arbitrage The buying and selling of an asset in two-different markets.  In 
theory, the arbitrageur risks no capital, but benefits from 
momentary differences in the price of an asset in different 
markets.   
 
Equity Risk 
Premium The rate of return of equities over that of government bonds.  
That is the risk premium paid for investing in the risk of 
equities over that of risk-free securities. 
 
Growth The increase or growth in sales output without an increase in 
capital stock or fixed investment implying increasing returns 
to scale as compared to expansion which is the increase output 
supported or requiring an increase in capital investment. 
 
Interest Rate In context of foreign investments, it is frequently interchanged 
with the term ‘rates of return’, that is the rate of interest or 
return on the parent’s investment of equity in foreign 
operations or assets. 
 
Leverage The use of debt (i.e., borrowing to finance assets). 
 
Market Rate The market ‘value’ of the firm’s assets. It is often used 
interchangeably with ‘asset price’.  It has a positive 
relationship to the firm’s cost of capital since selling the firms 
share price at higher ‘market rates’ above the value of the 
firms lower capital costs. 
 
NACE European system for industrial classification on industries.  
 
Return on Assets (ROA) measured by dividing the net income for the year by 
the total assets of the firm.  It is a proxy for returns to scale, 
profitability, and asset utilization. 
 
Return on Equity  (ROE) measured by dividing net income by the shareholders 
total equity.  ROE can be negative is company has significant 
profit losses which excess the total paid in equity. 
 
Risk Is expectation of loss as measured by multiplying the 
probability that a future event will occur by the relative impact 
it will have if it does occur. 
 
S&P 500 The Standard and Poor’s largest 500 US corporations, which 
include a number of large foreign affiliates of foreign 
corporations.  It is a broad, global index of all industrial firms.  
 
Winsorize  The removal of extreme outliers in a sample by averaging.  
